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Preface (Author's Note) 
I came to Durban, South Africa to work among its young people and study their civic attitudes, 
perceptions, and behaviours. I majored in history while a university student. I had focused my 
undergraduate study on localized moments of social change because I believe it is important that 
we find and tell the untold stories of individuals and communities. My experience professionally 
propelled an interest in politics. My work with youth and communities in the United States 
demonstrated the urgent need for the meaningful inclusion and empowerment of young people 
and groups that have been traditionally marginalized. The participatory mandate of democratic 
South Africa and its history of youth activism encouraged me to seek opportunities to travel to 
South Africa to study its youth citizen experience. 
I wanted to learn directly from young South Africans, while also contributing to community and 
youth development efforts in Durban; therefore, I intended that a large part of my 'learning' 
occur in the context of my own participation. I taught life skills courses and facilitated a support 
group for students at Dumahlezi High School in Ntuzuma with Phakama, a youth development 
and gender empowerment program. I provided general support to Abahlali baseMjondolo, a 
grassroots movement of shack dwellers fighting for land and housing. Additionally, I conducted 
interviews with youth leaders, delivered presentations to youth groups, collected over five 
hundred youth surveys. 
One day, as I left an Abahlali event to go on to the Phakama office, Mnikelo, one of the Bahlali 
youth turned to me and jokingly said, "Ally, what are you? Activist? Academic? Youth Worker? 
Soccer Player?!" Indeed, as participant, observer, and researcher, it was often a delicate 
balancing act to negotiate roles. 
In order to appropriately contextualize youth civic engagement, I sought understanding that 
extended beyond the individuals and organizations with whom I interacted. Balancing micro and 
macro and theoretical and practical discussions, however, proved challenging. Broad and 
prominent democracy theories themselves did not adequately explain South African democratic 
structures. Theoretical and practical conceptualizations of democratic participation and 
development, the effect of broad theories on national policy, and the impact of national policy on 
opportunities for democratic engagement also required study. 1 found theoretical approaches to 
youth study scarce; therefore, I drew mostly upon a more generalized understanding in 
interpreting youth engagement but rooted that understanding in historical youth context and a 
youth development approach. In this study, I hoped to demonstrate sensitivity toward individual 
and subgroup differences while seeking some generalizability. 
The literature review likewise balanced a wide selection of material ranging from pop culture 
commentary to sophisticated academic analysis and included local and national focus. 
Overwhelmingly, my research suggests that rather than rejecting politics in youthful indulgence 
or self-motive, young people care deeply about their communities and have rejected politics 
because of their frustration with increasing divides between rich and poor, empty political 
promises, and the seeming disregard of politicians and governmental officials for youth concerns 
or empowerment. In this master's thesis, I hope to tell the stories of young people making 
change and operating civically within their communities so that communities and state bodies 
might better support their young people. 
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Introduction 
From the vantage point of Fairvale Secondary School in Wentworth, KwaZulu-Natal the 
Engen factory looms large, an audible hum of factory activity sounds, and, periodically, smoke 
pours upward from its tall stacks. Communities in Wentworth, who have long been 
complaining, have mobilized in the last several years to address the health hazards caused by 
their unfriendly neighbour. Despite such community efforts, the factory continues unabated. 
Positioned adjacent to an active and frustrated community of flat dwellers and a secondary 
school, the smoke stacks seems to send a warning signal about the state of the new South Africa 
inviting broader society to look inward and ask of itself: 
• Do the processes and associated values of capitalist economic policy and 
liberal state politics support or supplant community and truly participatory 
notions of democratic society? 
• How is today's generation of youth fairing as it negotiates its role in the new 
South Africa? 
Engen Factory Seen From Fairvale Secondary School. Wentworth, Durban. 
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Turning right to ascend the hill leading away from the Fairvale Secondary School and the 
factory, a wall adorned by colourful graffiti aligns the road. One section of the wall portrays a 
politician in a suit at a podium. The podium is labelled "SAP," perhaps suggesting affiliation 
between the politician and the South African Police. The politician is clearly ageing, depicted 
with white hair and a balding head. He is addressing a crowd, exuberantly holding out his hands 
and extending the peace symbol. However, his message is a seeming unlikely one, "Vote for 
yourself." What prompted the young artist to assemble and display a political scene with the 
message "Vote for yourself? Does the message confirm societal assumptions about its young 
people and demonstrate a general apathy and selfish orientation among the current youth 
generation? Or does it portray a more complicated relationship between young South Africans 
and the new democracy? 
"Vote for Yourself Graffiti Art. Wentworth, Durban. 
The visual in Wentworth demonstrated frustration, cynicism and disconnect from political 
processes, which are perceived as increasingly connected to government function, in the new 
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state. For young South Africans, the promises of political leaders and the actions of state bodies 
and elected officials did not align. Young people did not believe the South African state was 
doing enough for its young people or communities, and as a result, they were turning away from 
political involvement. Total disengagement of South African young people, however, paints an 
inadequate portrayal of youth civic activity. The message "Vote for Yourself may not have 
been an expression of individualist retreat but of collective rejection of state-sponsored forms of 
political participation. The complicated relationship between democratic society and its youth 
element needs further exploration. Specifically, this study has attempted to answer the following 
questions: 
• What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political 
involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek? 
• What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues 
of civic engagement? 
• What do youth, who actively participate civically, tell us about the extent and 
ways youth are engaged in civil society? 
• What recommendations can be made based on research findings? 
A mixed model approach was adopted in order to attain both micro and macro level 
understanding of youth civic engagement. To this end, research was gathered through 
participant-observation, surveys, and interviews. Participant-observation occurred among a 
youth development organization and social justice movement of shack dwellers. A survey was 
administered to a purposive sample of high school students and actively engaged youth. 
Interviews were conducted with youth leaders selected purposively. "Youth" were defined as 
13-29 year olds living in eThekwini who were involved civically, enrolled in school, or both. 
Though this study's findings may be useful in informing initiatives affecting a broader 
population of South African urban youth, actual representivity does not extend beyond 
eThekwini. Additional studies should seek to understand the attitudes and behaviours of youth 
in other regions and geographic locations and among those least engaged. This research hopes 
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to close gaps between perceptions of youth and active youth practice through a nuanced 
exploration of youth civic engagement in eThekwini. Direct youth experience and insight rather 
than abstract assumptions informed analysis. 
Theoretical approaches, however, were helpful in understanding the contexts and spaces 
available for participation. Chapter 1 reviews a wide range of approaches that include broad and 
prolific democracy and localized democratic participation theories as they relate to the 
emergence and development of the democratic state in South Africa. Civic engagement must be 
understood both locally and theoretically and in both state-sanctioned and state-opposed spaces 
for participation. Because theories for understanding youth participation in particular were 
limited, historical approaches and youth development theory were introduced to provide youth-
specific context. 
Chapter 2 furnishes an expansive literature review that is divided into two parts. Part 1 
discusses contemporary national and local demographic trends and statistics, national and local 
policy relevant to such trends, and discussion of local social movements in eThekwini. Part 2 
describes contemporary social perceptions and trends among South African young people, the 
history of the concept of youth in South Africa, relevant youth development policy and practice, 
and examples of youth engagement. Chapter 3 reviews the mixed model methodology adopted 
for this research study. Chapter 4 reports findings and analysis in three parts that explore youth 
interpretations and trends of civic engagement, discuss the impact of civic engagement on youth 
actively involved, and make recommendations about youth participation based upon the input 
from civically active youth. 
Young people are participating civically in democratic South Africa, but on their own 
terms of engagement. 
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Chapter 1: Theory 
In seeking to answer the following questions, it was necessary to search for theoretical 
grounding in multiple arenas of thought. 
• What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political 
involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek? 
• What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues 
of civic engagement? 
• What do youth, who actively participate civically, tell us about the extent and 
ways youth are engaged in civil society? 
• What recommendations can be made based on research findings? 
Broad democratic theories fell short in explaining localized forms and understandings of 
participation; however, they provided essential insight to state conceptualizations of democracy 
and participation on local levels. Democratic theory laid the groundwork for understanding the 
spaces, institutions, and contexts sanctioned by the South African state for participation, as well 
as how society and the state defined democracy and democratic participation. In local and 
practical contexts, the definition of participation was a source of great contention. Many argued 
that state-sanctioned public participation had lost its meaning in the wake of an increasingly 
electoral and technocratic approach to democracy. Such analysts pointed to a rise in social 
movements, as indicative of contestation for more meaningful and broader avenues for 
democratic participation. Some social movement theory, therefore, was useful in contextualizing 
forms of engagement occurring outside of official structures. Youth and youth development 
theories explained both the societal expectations imposed on young people as well as the 
alternative approaches that challenged status quo understanding. To understand youth civic 
engagement in democratic South Africa, therefore, a multi-faceted and integrated approach was 
necessary. Theories shaping the understanding of South African democracy, young people, and 
democratic participation were useful only if they based understanding of engagement in local 
forms. Discernment of youth civic engagement, therefore, occurred not through the vantage 
point of the democratic forms available but through youth forms and interpretations themselves. 
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1 Democracy Theories and the South African State 
Democracy theories vary wildly in their approach to measuring the democratic health of 
nations. On the one hand, the Schumpeter school suggests that democracies be measured by 
their institutions and the process by which political leaders compete for votes. In Capitalism, 
Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter rejects the notion that democracy produces universal 
ideals. He defines democracy, rather, as a "political method, a certain type of institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions" (Schumpeter 1947, 
242) whereby "individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for 
the people's vote" (269). Within a democracy, he posits, the "role of the people is to produce a 
government" (269). Therefore, according to Schumpeter, democracy is a 'method' best 
measured by the presence or absence of civil liberties and electoral institutions. 
Laswell, on the other hand, suggests that democracy be measured through its individual 
and group values. Harold Laswell and Abraham Kaplan, in Power and Society: A Framework 
for Political Inquiry claim that a set of universal values can be attributed to democratic states. 
For Laswell, individual preferences and values affect all aspects of the shaping and sharing of 
power. Groups of individuals in society, he argues, mimic patterns of individuals in making 
decisions based on such goals and preferences. For example, demands for attention, interest, and 
loyalty motivate decisions of individuals and groups. Forces of power, too, can be understood 
through the value(s) on which they are based (Laswell and Kaplan 1952). Laswell posits that a 
set of universal values can be attributed and used to measure a democracy, however he neither 
names this set of values nor makes distinctions between value sets among differently formed 
democratic nations. 
Macpherson does not provide a universal value set but instead distinguishes between 
democratic forms as they relate to systems of economy (Macpherson 1966). Macpherson 
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describes the western liberal model developed and attached to a market society, the non-liberal 
form based on a post-revolutionary class concept, and the non-liberal form then emerging in 
nations in Africa and Asia after revolution that applied mixed models. Because western liberal 
democracies value accumulation of wealth and material consumption, often over human 
relationships, Macpherson argued a half century ago, such nations were at risk for losing moral 
standing. The liberties inherent in western democracy would be both its advantage and liability 
as long as they were linked to an attachment for accumulation and its resulting inequality (66). 
Rather than collective values inherent to particular democratic states, Robert Dahl argues 
that individual values influence the degree of democratization a state achieves. In Polyarchy 
Participation and Opposition (1971), Dahl describes the necessary conditions for democracy to 
include opposition, rivalry, or competition in elections and the continuing responsiveness of the 
government to the preferences of its citizens. No nation is fully democratic and inequality 
persists, however, Dahl argues because of a lack of impetus among citizenry to continue to assert 
demands when sub-cultural rights are afforded and limited demands are met (114-119). In After 
the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society (1990), Dahl elaborates on the impact of values on 
preventing full democratization. Dahl suggests that individuals are motivated in private and 
public decision-making by degrees of choice, competence, and economy. Potentially limiting 
democratic participation, for example, the economy condition requires that the number of 
associations one participates in is few. Similarly, Dahl asserts that an individual's sense of 
efficacy decreases as distance is placed between her and decision-making, making the 
remoteness of national government problematic in democratic states (116). Dahl provides 
multiple models for democratic decision-making and concludes that the smallest association 
possible makes the best choice because of the proximity and enhanced sense of economy, choice, 
and competence afforded the citizen (53). To enhance fuller versions of democracy, therefore, 
public participation must be encouraged in smaller more accessible units. Dahl's approach while 
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illuminating, proves limited, however, as long as the biases of the western liberal state that value 
representative and electoral notions of democracy define the public arena for participation. 
Contrary to Dahl's theories, Frederic Shaffer attempts to connect values and institutions 
while providing the means for understanding democratic institutions in non-western societies. 
Shaffer believes that Dahl failed to incorporate individuals' understandings of their actions. In 
Democracy in Translation :Understanding Politics in An Unfamiliar Culture (1998), Shaffer 
suggests rather that analysis begin with the institutions and investigate the ideals to which they 
might be orientated through a language-centred approach to conceptual analysis (9). According 
to Shaffer, democratic institutions must be understood by the associated meanings. His research 
in Senegal, for instance, found that the word for democracy in Wolof had a different meaning to 
the French word used by the political elite. Within the popular context, democracy meant both 
individual choice and group consensus, seemingly contradictory concepts in the elections and 
rights-based version of democracy (54). In explaining institutions through culturally relevant and 
popular understanding, however, Shaffer fails to consider the multi-directional flow of influence: 
democratic understanding emerges not only from indigenous cultural interpretations but also as 
product of direct experience occurring outside of state frameworks. 
Franz Fanon, libratory theorist of colonial Africa, as early as the middle of the last 
century, sought to build and interpret locally relevant forms of democracy in Africa according to 
"third world" principles of humanity, development, and participation. In "Come, then, 
Comrades, Red," Fanon condemns the European model of states and institutions and writes 
Humanity is waiting for something other from us than such an imitation... if we want to 
turn Africa into a new Europe, and America into a new Europe, then let us leave the 
destiny of our countries to Europeans. They will know how to do it better than the most 
gifted among us. But if we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring 
it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we 
must make discoveries. (Fanon 1965) 
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Hussein Adam, in Nigel Gibson's Rethinking Fanon: The Continuing Dialogue (1999), interprets 
Fanon as a democratic theorist, envisioning democracy based on developmental ideals. For 
Fanon, democracy is a process and an end in which individuals cooperate as free and equal 
participants in demanding and realizing the task of development and self-rule. Fanon's theory of 
democratized development emphasizes decentralization and participation, with a democratic 
conceptualization of leadership that rejects the 'cult of leaders' typical of post-revolutionary 
states in Africa. Fanon advocated for fully participatory forms of democratic involvement. As 
Fanon stated, "in an under-developed country, experience proves that the important thing is not 
that 300 people form a plan and decide upon carrying it out, but that the whole people plan and 
decide even if it takes twice or three times as long" (Fanon 1968). Fanon emphasized the role 
horizontal participatory institutions might play in ensuring that the party would not be the only 
political bureau. Such institutions might also fit the small unit requirement of Dahl's thinking. 
According to Fanon, horizontal participatory institutions would enable democratic consultations, 
education, and persuasions in ushering in social and economic equality within the new 
democracy. 
In The Eye of the Needle (Turner 1980), lectures delivered during apartheid, Richard 
Turner envisioned a future version of democracy in South Africa that would fundamentally 
redistribute wealth and power. Full participatory democracy in South Africa, Turner argued, 
would be based upon popular participation, workers' control, and political freedoms for all 
people. Democratization would include large-scale investment in schooling, housing and public 
health, a redressing of racial imbalance in property ownership, and universal suffrage (77). 
Additionally, Turner urged, South African democracy would ensure its participatory nature 
through intermediary institutions between government and individuals and decentralization of 
real power to local and provincial authorities (81-83). "The citizens should be adequately 
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integrated into the political system." Otherwise, Turner feared, as with other new democratic 
states, 
the very political parties established to provide for mass political participation 
will become such oligarchies...Once this happens, individuals faced with 
steamroller political vote-collecting machines over which they have no control, 
become even further alienated from the political process (79). 
South African democracy, therefore Turner argued, required both popular economic 
empowerment and participation. 
Immediately prior to and following the emergence of the South African democratic state, 
a democracy inclusive of wealth redistribution, small unit participatory forms, and localized 
understandings later urged by Schaffer seemed eminent. As Lodge describes in Politics in South 
Africa from Mandela to Mbeki (Lodge 2000), the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) represented a bargain that incorporated the mass and earlier revolutionary disposition for 
public ownership and wealth redistribution with the influence of the private sector and 
international development politics. The RDP balanced 'growth through redistribution' policies 
(22). The RDP also promised to integrate a people-driven process, structured consultation 
processes, and empowerment of ordinary citizens in the delivery of development goals and basic 
services (22; 25). By 1996, however, in a closed-door decision made and released by the ANC 
elite, the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy represented a shift in 
balance towards the growth aspect of RDP rather than redistribution (25). Likewise, by 1997, 
the RDP had ceased to be understood as a 'people-driven' process (69) and instead development 
goals were pursued from the top-down (28). As Lodge describes, the South African democratic 
state's "commitment to people-driven development seems to have been fluctuating and 
ambivalent" (168-169). Associational life and the South African concept of ubuntu, Lodge 
posits, if encouraged and supported may provide the foundations for advancement of 
participatory and development notions of democracy in South Africa, however (231). Though 
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South Africa seems to have moved toward a liberal state approach to democracy, that approach 
has not been universally accepted. Alternate forms of participation may indeed succeed in 
bringing South African democracy closer to the participatory and development model. 
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2 Conceptualizing Participation 
Okotho-Ogendo links good democratic governance to the "creative interactions designed 
to promote full and effective participation by the citizenry in public affairs" and maintaining a 
"continuous state-society and intra-society nexus" (Camay and Gordon 2002). Despite the very 
real potential of civil society to enhance participation in democratic South Africa, many theorists 
have concluded that within the new democracy and within the global development context, the 
concept of "participation" has become an empty slogan, bereft of meaning. Verba and Nye 
define participation as "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at 
influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" and "where a 
few take part in decisions there is little democracy; the more participation there is in decisions, 
the more democracy there is." (Verba and Nye in Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005) There have 
been many attempts to define and classify different forms of participation, distinguishing 
between meaningful and token forms of participation. Such researchers argue that as 
participation as a concept has become politically and economically attractive in the donor world 
and institutionalized civil society has placed distance between state and society actors, tokenism 
has increased (Chambers 2002; Hogan 2002; Inglis 1997; Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005; White 
2000). 
Within South Africa, the professionalizing of civil society and state pressures have 
limited the ability of civil society to enable meaningful participation. With professionalism, 
Rahnema argues, NGOs began to promote state-sanctioned development agendas rather than 
people-driven processes (Rahnema 1993, 116-127). Likewise, the number of civic actors and 
the degree of access was also restricted (Benjamin 2005). Where professionalism has not done 
so, the ANC has acted to limit the role of the civic in fostering democratic participation. Lodge 
describes the marginalization of the civic by the ANC as extreme (206-207). Gumede names 
public dialogue as perquisite to democratic participation and decries the silencing of public 
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dialogue, dissent, and protest by the ANC (Gumede 2005). Richard Pithouse agrees and argues 
that despite contrary national and local trends, democracy should be understood "to include the 
right to express dissent outside of electoral participation." (Pithouse "A Second Democracy for 
the Second Economy" 2006) In light of the highly politicized appropriation of the democratic 
concept of "participation," the author has purposefully framed her research questions around 
issues of "engagement," implying a broader sense of democratic interactions inclusive of 
electoral, political, civic, and social forms of participation existing in both state-defined and 
external and individualized loci. In the wake of civic exclusion, social movements have emerged 
among local communities to contend for the right to participate and define participation in South 
Africa. 
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3 Social Movement Theories 
A rise in social movements in South Africa occurred in the first five years of the twenty-
first century to contest the existing frameworks of democratic participation. In Voices of Protest 
(2006), Richard Ballard, Adam Habib and Imraan Valodia define social movements as "political 
and/or socially directed collectives often involving multiple organizations and networks, focused 
on changing one or more elements of the social, political, and economic system within which 
they are located" (2). In approaching social movements theoretically, the authors describe a 
three-pronged approach that analyzes political opportunities that limit or expand opportunities 
for movement, mobilizing structures, and framing processes. They suggest, however, a new 
emphasis on processes that connect these elements, urging a dynamic framework for 
understanding social movements (8). Emerging social movements, as they radicalize, 
appropriate non-politicized sites, activate boundaries, and transmit ideas, become the site of 
praxis. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1972).,. Paulo Freire writes about the process of struggle 
and humanization and argues that through praxis, reflection and action upon the world, 
oppressed and marginalized people critically perceive of the world, commit to acting toward 
transformation, and expel the myths of the old order with teaching for permanent change. Social 
movements in South Africa, therefore, potentially inform the process of engagement and 
transformation of the state that other marginalized groups (e.g. young people) might seek. 
Within South Africa, individuals engaged in popular movements and local communities 
conceived of participation as contrary to forms encouraged by the increasingly unresponsive 
state. Fatima Meer concludes that the nation and world are in a crisis of values in which South 
African democracy "does not work for the people" but it "evades the people" (Meer 2006). 
Through social movements and other means, South Africans have sought to expose this reality 
and work towards transformation. S'bu Zikode, President of Abahlali baseMjondolo, a Durban-
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based social movement, describes the emergence of new, more democratic forms of political 
participation found within social movements. "There is Abahlali politics, the politics of the 
people, and then there is party politics. The political parties have their own culture, where you 
find.. .more talking and no action" (Ngiam 2006, 32). "Our politics is a traditional home politics 
which is understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos" (S'bu Zikode, "The Greatest 
Threat," 2006). Pithouse describes the democratizing process that occurs when grassroots 
movements commit to running autonomously and democratically and open to innovation from 
below. This democratizing politics is what Abahlali president, S'bu Zikode has characterized as 
"The politics of the strong poor" (Richard Pithouse, "Rethinking Public Participation," 2006). 
Social movements are creating alternative forms and understandings of democratic 
participation in response to both the disempowering practice and unfulfilled development 
promises of political parties. A youth member of Abahlali baseMjondolo, M'du Hlongwa, 
provides Abahlali's critique of state interactions with the public: 
They may say, at the top they may call a press conference and say we are working 
for Kennedy Road, we are building maybe 1000 houses on Kennedy Road. Only 
to find they haven't come to the people to ask, how many houses are needed in 
that area of Kennedy Road? How many families are here? They may say we built 
100 houses for Kennedy only to find that maybe 4000 houses are needed for 
Kennedy.. .Only if they come and ask the people and talk to the people, then they 
have the exact number of house needed. That's what we want from the 
government. Come and ask the people. Don't say 'we built a tuck-shop in 
Kennedy.' What if people don't need a tuck-shop? (Ngiam 2006, 35) 
The failure to deliver basic services and encourage consultation and popular decision-making, 
some argue, points to an incomplete democratic transformation. Rita Abrahamsen in 
Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa (2000) 
concludes that in sub-Saharan Africa, electoral democracy contains substantial limitations and 
the region requires that democracy also address socio-economic rights. Abrahamsen suggests 
that concept of the political be expanded to include all relationships based on power; therefore, a 
state's retreat from addressing socio-economic issues would be viewed as undemocratic. 
As social movements have struggled to assert the popular right to participate, dissent has 
risen. On the one hand, the very notion of 'community' has become contested terrain for 
different practices of power trying to define the movement through its priorities, goals and 
strategies. Because social movements have emerged outside the locale of the tripartite alliance, 
unions and the ANC have felt threatened (Barchiesi 2004). On the other hand, movements seek 
control over conceptualization of their struggle. Ballard cautions that the media and academics 
did not always acknowledge social movements in the context of ordinary people and community 
struggles as they defined them. Ashraf Cassiem, a member of the Western Cape Anti-Eviction 
Campaign, at a conference at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, stated, '"Social movements' is a 
name we got from people like you." Cassiem insisted that his organization and others like it 
were autonomous bodies of ordinary people fighting daily battles (Richard Ballard et al. 2005). 
Issues of autonomy and control over the very ideas of participation are highly relevant to those 
faced by young people engaging civically. 
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4 Youth and Youth Development Theories 
As poor and local communities battle for their right to 'participate' on their own terms, 
the debate concerning youth participation is relatively silent. Outside of generic youth 
development theory, there is a narrow range of existing research on youth participation and huge 
gaps remain. In Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1980s (1993), Jeremy Seekings seeks 
to understand youth in the context of their role in resistance and violence of apartheid. 
According to Seekings, the term 'youth' took on heightened use and meaning between 1976 and 
1985, shifting from being used to mark the process of maturation to marking attitudes and the 
process of political change. During the eighties and nineties, Seekings asserts, two extreme 
stereotypes emerged. Society began considering youth on the one hand as violent and 
apocalyptic and on the other as broadly sympathetic and libratory. According to Monique 
Marks, who studied the Diepkloof community in an attempt to understand youth politics in the 
1980's and 1990's, the majority of young people operated between the extremes of the two 
stereotypes. Most youth self-identified as 'bearers of the future,' but within Diepkloof, at least, 
multiple layers of activism existed within the context of struggle and violence. Multiple layers 
of violence also occurred: youth experienced violence as revolutionaries, as victims of state 
violence, as discipline within youth organizations, and as gangsterism (Marks 2001). 
Despite gradations of participation in struggle and violence, by the 1990's a concept of 
youth emerged that was "understood to mean that there is a generation of young people who are 
somehow 'lost' " whose experiences with unemployment, education gaps, and violence can be 
combined into the overall "problem of the youth." (Marks 2001, 100) Both Seekings and Marks, 
caution against treatment of young people as a monolithic entity. However, in contemporary 
South Africa, despite a new generation of South Africans born into or raised in a democratic 
society, the concept of'the problem of the youth' persisted. 
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Youth development theory provides an alternative and more suitable approach toward 
understanding youth participation. Like notions of "participation" in general, youth development 
theory suggests different gradients. On the one hand of the youth participation continuum, youth 
are viewed and treated as objects or recipients. 'Youth' in this instance takes historically and 
societally imposed meaning that assumes both helplessness and aggression, the sum 'problem of 
the youth.' Contemporary interpretations of'the problem of the youth' will be reviewed in the 
following chapter. On the other end of the youth participation continuum, young people are 
viewed and treated as resources or partners. Youth development theory employs several 
different approaches: 
1) youth centrality and leadership approach based on the principle that "young people 
should be partners in their own development." The Youth Development Network 
acknowledges, however, that it is often challenging for those working with youth to 
relinquish their power in order to allow young people to 'have a voice' and requires a 
paradigm shift in the way the youth are seen and embraced. 
2) an asset-based approach which seeks to identify the strengths of young people and use 
these as a base from which to engage with their needs and challenges 
3) youth community development approach which recognizes the role communities play in 
developing its young people as well as the role young people play in developing their 
communities 
4) learner-centred approach (Youth Development Network, 10-12) 
A youth development approach would understand meaningful youth participation as a 
transformative opportunity not only beneficial to young people but to the broader society. 
Further, youth development practitioners and theorists recognize that although young people 
possess a range of similar needs, they are not a homogenous group (Youth Development 
Network). Conceptualization of youth participation, therefore, requires that democratic 
participatory theory be grounded in a youth development approach. 
' Young people in South Africa can be divided into several subgroups: women/men; disabled; unemployed/employed; in school/ 
out of school; in prison; rural/urban/suburban; and age cohorts (6). 
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5 An Adapted Theoretical Approach 
Because no singular theoretical approach adequately addressed youth civic engagement, the 
author applied several principles to her analysis: 
1) Local conceptualizations of democracy and participation are required to understand the 
civic participation of a particular population or society. 
2) Both African developmental and participatory notions of democracy and Western liberal 
democracy theories shaped the formation and practice of the South African democratic 
state. 
3) Participation exists within both state-sanctioned and contested spaces. 
4) Young people do not form a monolithic subgroup but do share similarities in 
development needs and interactions with state actors. 
5) Young people should be viewed as partners in their development and the development of 
communities. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
South Africa, the South African Constitution, and South African citizens stand as beacons 
of hope and promise to democracies and nations across the world. However, South Africans 
have bemoaned the democratic decline of its young people, classifying low voter turnout as part 
of a broader 'problem of the youth.' In a poll taken to assess the health of South African 
democracy, half of South Africans thought that young people had forgotten the struggle against 
apartheid that resulted in South African democracy (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). 
Evidence for youth voter turnout warrants attention. In 2004, though 75% of total eligible voters 
had registered to vote, only 53% of eligible youth ages 18-25 had done so. ("Young Tell ANC" 
2004, 22) The eThekwini municipality2 is seated in KwaZulu-Natal, the last stronghold of 
colonialism, the birthplace of the African National Congress, the site of the youth-on-youth 
political violence of the eighties and nineties, and the continued exception to ANC hegemony. 
Youth comprise the largest subgroup of the diverse urban area (over 40%) (Statistics South 
Africa 2001). EThekwini, therefore, provides a vibrant locus for the study of democratic 
participation of youth citizens. In this study, 'youth' are defined as young people between the 
ages of 13 and 29 living in eThekwini civically engaged and/or enrolled in school. Particular 
emphasis has been placed on poor black urban youth. In attempting to investigate current trends 
of civic and political engagement of eThekwini youth, I aimed to answer the following 
questions: 
• What characterizes youth forms of civic engagement? Besides direct political 
involvement, what avenues of engagement do young people seek? 
2 Over 3 million people reside in the eThekwini municipality, which includes the surrounding areas and the city of Durban, the 
2nd most populous city in South Africa and largest city in KwaZulu-Natal ("Durban," Wikipedia 2007). Of its 3 million people, 
68% are Black African, 20% Indian, 9% White and 3% Coloured. 53% of its population are female whereas 47% are male 
(eThekwini Municipality 2005). EThekwini residents are religious. 68% of eThekwini residents are Christian, 11% are Hindu, 
3% are Muslim, and only 16% have no religion. ("Durban" Wikipedia 2007) Young people form the largest subgroup of the 
population. Children and youth between the ages of 5 and 24, alone, constitute 40% of the general population (Statistics South 
Africa 2001). Young people in eThekwini comprise a vital part of a diverse urban society. 
• What attitudes and perceptions do youth possess concerning different avenues 
of civic engagement? 
• What do youth, who actively participate civically, tell us about the extent and 
ways youth are engaged in civil society? 
• What recommendations can be made based on research findings? 
In order to better address this study's main questions of youth engagement in eThekwini, 
I conducted an expansive literature review of material that examines and discusses demographic, 
political, social, historical, policy, and youth contexts. As discussed in Chapter 1, material 
specific to contemporary youth participation is limited in quantity and breadth, and therefore, has 
been drawn from a wide range of literature including pop culture commentary, news articles, 
history, and serious political science analyses discussing both national and local and general 
population and youth specific trends. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
discusses political and policy contexts and trends affecting the general population both 
nationwide and locally. The second part will focus on youth-specific content including policy, 
social perceptions, historical interpretations, and contemporary issues and examples of 
engagement. 
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1: General Literature Review 
1.1 Political Context 
Nationwide, South Africans supported their democracy but grew increasingly critical of 
the ruling party. On average, citizens expressed positive outlooks about South African 
democracy. Following the 2004 national election, Archbishop Desmond Tutu concluded: "We 
are getting to be experts at this.. .It is often said that the first election after freedom is the last 
one, because most countries degenerate into dictatorships. We are disproving that" ("South 
Africans Flock to Polls" 2004). In a survey conducted by the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa (IDASA) in 2004, 67% of respondents were fairly to very satisfied (IDASA "Polling the 
Nations" 2004). In another survey conducted in 2004, 70% of South Africans reported that 
"considering everything" they were optimistic rather than pessimistic about South Africa's 
future. 68% said that the ability of ordinary people to influence government was better now than 
under apartheid (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). Development gains had been made. 
Those not attending an educational institution because of no money for fees, for example, 
decreased from 2002 to 2005. Likewise, the percentage of households living in informal 
structures, and the percentage of households where an adult went hungry declined. The 
percentage of households that had a cell phone available for use grew rapidly from 35% in 2002 
to 60% in 2005 (Statistics South Africa 2005). 
However, citizens viewed democratic gains as limited. In one survey, only 31% found 
that South Africa was a "full democracy," while 56% found it to be a democracy with major or 
minor problems. Over two thirds (67%) reported legal inequality: that some people were treated 
better than others by the legal system (Paper for Public Opinion Research 2004). Citizens may 
be disengaging from political organizations and processes as a result of increasing 
dissatisfaction. COSATU workers reported a decline in the belief that the party they intended to 
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vote for had workers' interest at heart with 91% positively reporting in 1994 and only 76% in 
2004 (Buhlungu, COSATU Workers' Political Attitudes in South Africa, 205). Though 80% of 
the Voting Age population voted in 1999, only 74% voted in 2004 (Centre for Contemporary 
Conflict 2004). 
Some analysts denied the connection between voter decline and citizen satisfaction levels 
(Centre for Contemporary Conflict 2004). Proponents of the "normalization" theory, argued that 
the decline in voting rates reflected the 'normalization' process of South African democracy. 
The National Youth Commission, for example, concluded that the decline in youth participation 
"shows that we are becoming a normal democracy" (Everatt 2000). 
Others, however, viewed voter decline as part of a significant disengagement trend 
resulting from citizen concerns about service delivery and governance. Rita Abrahamsen (2000) 
claimed that theorists use the 'normalisation' argument to justify leaders and ignore citizen 
dissatisfaction. Boyte suggested that South African democracy should be measured not by its 
voter rates, but by its practice of community-based and society-centred forms of democracy 
(Boyte 2004). In contemporary South Africa, elections and local elections in particular created 
meaningful spaces for community participation only if they enabled debate on community levels 
that directly impacted government actions (Williams 2007, 15). 
As voting rates decreased, participation in civil society organizations increased. In the 
late 1990's, this trend was noted by the Human Research Council which discovered an increase 
in participation in women's, youth, and other civil society organizations (Muthien 1999). Civil 
society and social movement theorists, indeed, concluded that the rise in social movements and 
participation in civil society and the simultaneous decline in voter turnout indicated not blind 
disengagement but increasing dissatisfaction with the democratic state (Ballard, Habib, and 
Valodia 2006, Pithouse 2006, Barchiesi 2004, et al.). 
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1.2 Policy Context: Service Delivery and Public Participation 
Though in the initial years of South African democracy the ANC promised service 
delivery through a people-driven process, national policies shifted emphasis to a privatized top-
down growth model (See Chapter 1). Public criticism mounted over the government's economic 
policies, and many expressed discontent over slow service delivery, which they perceived as the 
government's rejection of development goals for a privatized and free-market approach to 
governance. In his 2006 State of the Nation Address, President Thabo Mbeki renewed his 
administration's continued commitment to the growth-based capitalist model for governance 
(Mbeki 2006). Among other initiatives, he posited the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
for South Africa (ASGISA) as the solution to challenges of unemployment and poverty. Some 
believe the heightened popularity of Jacob Zuma to have represented popular dissatisfaction with 
Mbeki's intimate relationship to the private sector and belief that Zuma as the country's next 
president would better represent working and poor people (Ngonyama 2006). 
EThekwini's residents were increasingly dissatisfied with service delivery and persistent 
inequality. Two-thirds of citizens surveyed in the Quality of Life study felt men and women 
didn't have same work opportunities (eThekwini Municipality 2005, 12). Satisfaction regarding 
prepaid electricity declined 22 percentage points (22). Notably, general satisfaction, itself, also 
declined. In eThekwini, 43% of citizens reported satisfaction in 1998 but only 39% in 2004 (11). 
The majority of residents in eThekwini continued to grapple with poverty, and many still did not 
have access to basic services. In considering all persons aged 15 to 65 in eThekwini, 66% (2.04 
million) reported no income (Statistics South Africa 2001). Of its entire population, 61% made 
less than R427 per month (eThekwini Municipality 2005, 15). 15% of all households in 
eThekwini were informal. 18% of its citizenry still did not have access to safe drinking water 
and 21% did not have electricity (7). As part of the national social development agenda to 
address basic needs, Area Based Management areas were established to coordinate and integrate 
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development. Inanda, Ntuzuma, and KwaMashu or the INK area in eThekwini is the second 
largest grouping of poor neighbourhoods in the nation. 30 km north of Durban city centre, INK 
includes residential townships and informal settlements and a mixture of developed and 
undeveloped areas home to approximately 510,000 residents. In INK, despite development 
efforts, high levels of "unemployment, social dislocation, poverty and crime, [are] exacerbated 
by inadequate physical infrastructure and severe degradation" (eThekwini Municipality 2007). 
The persistence of inadequate housing and services in INK was not unique to INK but was 
experienced in many parts of eThekwini. Satisfaction levels seemed to reflect such experience. 
Even members of the tripartite alliance, COSATU, SACP, and ANC, had become 
increasingly critical of national development and participation positions. Zwelinzima Vavi, 
head of COSATU, in unfolding its plan to flood ANC ranks with leftist politicians, described the 
directive as originating from union ranks with "a massive anger exploding" regarding the 
accumulation project of Mbeki's presidency (Tabne 2007). Jeremy Cronin, South African 
Communist Party Deputy General Secretary, characterized Mbeki's presidency as creating the 
conditions for a capitalist growth plan driven first by macro-economic policy embodied in its 
GEAR policies, next privatization, and finally and most recently by state capitalism. Cronin 
asserted that these approaches had been accompanied by a persistent inability of the government 
to address development challenges, an increase in corruption and careerism, and the destruction 
of the ANC's organizational capacity. Cronin took issue not just with the economic policies of 
the current administration, but also its methods. According to Cronin, the 'Mbeki project' had 
led to the establishment of "representational vanguardism" that attempted to claim "righteous 
vanguardism." Cronin asserted that this new form of governing had not only failed to balance 
growth initiatives with development goals but had abandoned participatory forms and 
approaches to democracy in its acceptance of the liberal model (See Chapter 1). Cronin asked, 
"What can we say about the vision of popular participation in self-government?" (Cronin 2005). 
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The government has been slow to deliver despite the popular and legal directives for both 
meaningful participation and adequate service provision. 
Public participation has a strong mandate from constitutional, national, and local law. 
Constitution Section 152 (1) contains two objectives for local government: the democratic and 
accountable governance of communities and the encouragement of the involvement of such 
communities (Piper 2006). The Local Government Transition Act (LGTA ACT No 209 of 1993) 
conceived of local government as the "local sphere of government with the constitutional 
mandate to carry out a number of developmental duties." The White Paper (1997) on local 
government established the basis for a new developmental local government system committed 
to working with citizens and community groups to meet the needs of the communities (Mathekga 
and Buccus 2006, 13-14). The White Paper highlighted four modes of citizen participation: 
voting, policy processes, service users, and partners. The Municipal Structures Act (1998) 
Section 19 provided for development mechanisms to consult the community, review the needs 
and involve the community in municipal processes including the details for ward committees. 
Section 16 of the Municipal Structures Act required that a "culture of governance that 
compliments formal representative government with a system of participatory government" be 
established, including public involvement in the IDP preparation, establishment and review of 
Performance Management targets, preparation of the budget and strategic decision-making 
related to service delivery (Piper 2006). The Local Government Municipal Systems Act (32 of 
2000) provided core principles, mechanisms, and the process necessary to enable municipalities 
to move progressively toward the upliftment of local communities, defining the most important 
functions of the municipalities as service delivery with community participation as the means for 
bringing about service delivery (Mathekga and Buccus 2006, 14). The Local Government 
Municipal Systems Act (2000) established a culture of governance as power sharing, albeit 
mostly focused on deliberation and public consultation (Piper 2006). 
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Recent policy documents attempted to expand the notions of participation beyond public 
consultation and deliberation. A ten-paged brief, the National Public Policy Framework for 
Participation (2005), called for the legitimization of ward committees and a new phase of 
partnership with the public where communities share rights and responsibilities (Piper 2006). In 
KwaZulu-Natal, specifically, the Local Government TA Community Participation Framework 
(2006) tried to make the national framework practical. The framework called for the inclusion of 
other modes of citizen participation in addition to ward committees and suggested statutory 
obligations (Piper 2006). National and regional policy and law include local communities in 
definitions of local governance. The impact of the lofty efforts of policy-makers, however, 
seems to have been slow to reach grassroots levels. 
In eThekwini and KwaZulu Natal, meaningful forms of public participation were limited. 
The city planner for Durban claimed that eThekwini valued popular participation in service 
delivery, quoting the municipality's purpose statement, "the active of involvement of citizens is 
fundamental to achieving our outcome of improving people's quality of life" (Moodley 2007, 4). 
The "eThekwini approach" to participation, however, was narrow. The approached focused 
primarily on consultation, the "utilization of stakeholder workshopping at the geographic...and 
the sectoral level(s)" (Moodley 2007, 4-6). As Piper noted, participation through consultation 
does not directly connect citizens to power (Piper 2006). Further reflecting limitation, even in 
seeking consultation, eThekwini grappled with representivity, targeting only leadership and 
intermediary bodies in stakeholder workshops. (Moodley 2007, 4-6). 
Other efforts in eThekwini demonstrated ineffective and almost token commitment to 
participation. Towards public consultation in the renaming of Durban streets and roads, 
advertisements were placed in the newspapers calling for name suggestions within a 30-day 
period. The city compiled a list and then gave the public 21 days to respond with specific 
concerns (Kockott 2007). Alarm was raised about inconsistency regarding selections for the list 
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presented to the public, and despite large numbers of complaints and even protest actions, only 
257 specific suggestions were accepted by the city. Participation in eThekwini seemed nominal 
in practice. Fakir points, in part, to a 'transformation fatigue' among public officials on both 
local and provincial levels of government that has meant inadequate commitment to truly 
meaningful popular participation (Fakir 2006). 
In KwaZulu-Natal, research conducted in 2001 and 2002 found that public participation 
in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature was "still at a rudimentary stage." Limitations 
included ambiguity concerning which government body was responsible for public participation, 
inadequate information available to the public, lack of focus in increasing participation, and 
inaccessibility of public hearings. As a result, the KZN Legislature drafted a public participation 
programme for 2004-2009 with a programme of action, but its impact is still unclear (in 
Mafunisa and Maphunye 2005). "Ward committees have been identified as the most important 
structure through which to involve communities in local government in South Africa" (Piper and 
Chanza 2006, 18), but their effectiveness in encouraging popular participation in KwaZulu-Natal 
had also been questioned. In 2004, only 42% of KwaZulu-Natal residents reported some 
knowledge of ward committees (Hemson 2007, 10). Traditionally marginalized groups seemed 
the least included in ward committee processes. Piper and Chanza found that in Msunduzi, the 
second largest municipality in KwaZulu-Natal after eThekwini, young people were under-
represented and under-participated in ward committees. As a result, youth issues remained 
mostly ignored (Piper and Chanza 2006, 18). Even for those included, ward committees did not 
provide opportunities for meaningful participation. The Centre for Public Participation, in a 
study associated with HSRC and the University of KwaZulu-Natal, found that ward committees 
lacked resources and required structural empowerment (Buccus et al. 2007). As the result of 
growing frustration, distrust rose. Where ward committees were known, from 2004 to 2005, 
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trust decreased 9 percentage points and distrust increased 14 percentage points (Hemsen 2007, 
12). 
As distrust for official structures increased, some considered NGOs as potential 
intermediaries between government and the public in providing service delivery and space for 
participation. Ndlela conducted research on two NGOs in eThekwini and found that they 
succeeded in enhancing participatory democracy (Ndlela 2005). Smith, on the other hand, 
found that NGOs were unable to serve as effective intermediaries because of capacity and 
funding limitations and pressures from state entities that detracted from relationships with 
communities (Smith 2001). As discussed in Chapter 1, others were even more critical and 
pointed instead to locally-based social movements as the greatest potential democratizing agent 
in South Africa. 
1.3 Social Movements in eThekwini: The Politics of Contestation 
As increased numbers of citizens rejected state forms of participation, social movements 
likewise increased. According to Gumede, social movements provided a needed forum for 
deliberation, helped citizens form opinions, and gave public officials insight into popular 
concerns (Gumede 2005). Benjamin supported Gumede's claims, arguing that in providing 
alternative spaces for deliberation and action, social movements contested the existing 
frameworks for engagement with the state (Benjamin 2005). This contestation was evident in 
eThekwini. 
Reflecting concerns of the broader public, members of social movements spoke of their 
frustration over the failed promises of government for service delivery and meaningful 
engagement. Abahlali baseMjondolo, a Durban-based movement of shack dwellers had 
mobilized in over 30 communities for land and housing. According to M'du Hlongwa, a youth 
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member and former Secretary of Abahlali, a university student, and an active volunteer in his 
community, 
The constitution says that everyone must have adequate shelter. We don't have 
adequate shelter and the situation is not getting better. Now the city is trying to 
evict us and is leaving people homeless on the side of the road. How many lives 
will be destroyed before our voices are heard? How many children will drown in 
rivers on the way to school because 'there is no budget' to build bridges while 
casinos, and airports and theme parks have huge budgets? Who will do something 
about the fact that the police who are supposed to protect the people are always 
abusing us? Is it right that they come into our houses and ill-treat us, insulting us, 
stealing from us and hitting us? Who will do something about the fact that even 
when our youth finish grade 12 they just sit at home because there is no work and 
because our parents can't afford to send us to university? Who will turn our 
economy from something that lets the rich get richer off the suffering of the poor 
into something that lets all the people make a better life? 
M'du was frustrated not only by the increasing divide between rich and poor South Africans but 
also by the politics of the democratic state. His interactions with elected officials had not been 
participatory or partnering but parasitic: 
The politicians have shown that they are not the answer to our suffering. The 
poor are just ... the ladders of the politicians. The politician is an animal that 
hibernates. They always come out in the election season to make empty promises 
and then they disappear.. .their power comes because they say that they will 
speak for us (Hlongwa 2007). 
Rejecting representative democracy in its current manifestation, Abahlali members 
asserted their right to speak for themselves and their communities. 
That is why in Abahlali we started to say 'Speak to us and not for us' and why we 
vote in our own elections for people who will live and work with us in our 
communities and without any hopes for making our suffering into a nice job. 
(Hlongwa 2007) 
They asserted their right to meaningful voice by withholding participation in official structures. 
Leading up to the 2006 municipal elections, Abahlali ran a very successful "No Land, No House, 
No Vote" campaign. M'du hoped Abahlali would run a similar campaign for the Presidential 
election in 2009: 
Let us keep our votes. Let us speak for ourselves where we live and work. Let us 
keep our power for ourselves. The poor are many. We have shown that together 
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we can be very strong. Abahlali has now won many victories. Other organizations 
are working hard too. Let us continue to work to make ourselves the strong poor. 
Let us vote for ourselves every day. (Hlongwa 2007) 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, in rejection of state-defined spaces for and definitions of 
participation, had defined its own grassroots politics of movement. According to S'bu Zikode: 
The politics of the strong poor is an anti-party politics. Our politics is not to put 
someone in an office. Our politics is to put people above that office.. .Our politics 
is also not a politics of a few people... [it] is a traditional home politics which is 
understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos because it affects their lives 
(Zikode, "Greatest Threat," 2006). 
For many involved in Abahlali and other social movements nationwide, the very act of 
disengaging from party politics was political. As they rejected state political forms as 
undemocratic, within internal structures and spaces, members of Abahlali defined and adhered to 
their own democratizing "home politics." According to a youth member, Mnikelo Ndabankulu, 
the Abahlali Annual General Election held in November 2006 embodied "real democracy" 
(Ndabankulu 2006). 
Social movements of varied form claimed democratic authority. In 2004, the Centre for 
Civil Society and the School of Development Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in 
Durban brought varied scholars and activists together for a Social Movement's Conference. 
Over seventeen movements were discussed in conference proceedings (Dwyer 2004, Pillay 2004, 
Rustimjee 2004, Greenbert 2004, and Schmidt, The President from the Sky, 2004). Conference 
proceedings urged the unanimous recognition of social movements as "ultra-democrats" rather 
than "anti-democrats." (Schmidt 2004) In practice, too, social movements apply principled 
democratic action. Coloured communities living in Wentworth, in addition to fighting for flat 
maintenance and upgrades, also waged an environmental campaign against the health problems 
caused by the emissions of the nearby Engen plant when the city refused to address the health 
issues itself (ka-Manzi, 2006). The Bayview Flat Dwellers, in their fight for basic services and 
housing actively resisted cut-offs, evictions, and the installation of pre-paid meters. In February 
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2007, the group blocked municipal contractors from installing pre-paid meters. When the city 
retaliated by cutting off power from residents who had already paid, the group marched to the 
local councillor's house, chanting, "This is what democracy looks like." The flat dwellers 
refused to leave until the power had been restored (Walsh 2007). 
Abahlali baseMjondolo demanded strict adherence to a democratic participatory model 
from members and partners alike. In late 2006, a dispute emerged concerning the Social 
Movement Indaba (SMI). The SMI was conceived at the 2002 World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg as an umbrella body for left-wing organisations such as the Anti-
Privatisation Forum, Jubilee South Africa and the Landless People's Movement. In 2006, 
Abahlali baseMjondolo leadership participated in SMI planning processes for a national meeting 
to occur in Durban in December 2006; however, Bahlali withdrew its participation over concerns 
about process within the planning committee. On December 3, 2006, Abahlali and the Western 
Cape's Anti-Eviction Campaign interrupted conference proceedings to voice their grievances 
against the lack of transparency, poor budget decisions, and low levels of democratic decision-
making within the SMI (Cassiem 2006). SMI members accused Abahlali as operating 'tsotsi' 
politics to hijack the meeting and attributed such behaviour to the influence of white middle 
class academics (Tolsi, On the Far Side of the Left, 2006; Naidoo 2006). Abahlali asserted the 
autonomy of social movements and their right to protest, denying 'tsotsi politics' accusations and 
describing allied academics as "servants not masters" (Tolsi, On the Far Side of the Left, 2006; 
Cassiem 2006). 
Indeed, the contestation for its right to define participation outside of official structures 
and NGOs has led many to accuse Abahlali of anti-democratic behaviour and attribute its 
activism to the so-called "third force."3 Lennox Maboso and Harry Metiuna accused Abahlali of 
3 The term "third force" was used originally to refer to apartheid regime and vigilante agents acting to fuel the IFP-ANC political 
violence of the 1980's and 1990's in order to discredit and divide black leadership and subvert democratic negotiation processes. 
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being under the sway of "an agent provocateur" (Maboso and Metiuna 2006). Others called 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, itself, a "third force," alleging that it sought to derail democratic 
processes. The President of Abahlali, S'bu Zikode, appropriated the term, however, in his now 
famous "Third Force" pronouncement that the New York Times published in December 2005. 
Zikode refuted the accusations and wrote, 
We need to get things clear. There definitely is a Third Force. The question is what 
is it and who is part of the Third Force? Well, I am Third Force myself. The Third 
Force is all the pain and the suffering that the poor are subjected to every second 
in our lives. The shack dwellers have many things to say about the Third Force. It 
is time for us to speak out and to say this is who we are, this is where we are and 
this how we live [W]ho will speak about the genuine issues that affect the 
people every day - water, electricity, education, land, housing? 
We discovered that our municipality does not listen to us when we speak to them 
in Zulu. We tried English. Now we realise that they won't understand Xhosa or 
Sotho either. The only language that they understand is when we put thousands of 
people on the street. ...[The movement] will finish its job when land and housing, 
electricity and basic services have been won and poverty eliminated. 
We are driven by the Third Force, the suffering of the poor. Our betrayers are the 
Second Force. The First Force was our struggle against apartheid. The Third 
Force will stop when the Fourth Force comes. The Fourth Force is land, housing, 
water, electricity, health care, education and work. (Zikode, The Third Force, 
2006) 
Abahlali baseMjondolo's struggle for land, housing and basic services, though relatively 
new, was rich and multi-layered. The movement, which began in 2005 and continues to-date, 
had been marked with effective and widespread mobilization, defining moments of struggle, 
democratic experience within the movement, and negative encounters with the state. Academia, 
the media, and activists within Abahlali baseMjondolo themselves chronicled and analyzed their 
experience. In the first edition of its self-published newspaper, Izwi Labampofu (The Voice of 
the Poor), Abahlali members described the movement's development from its first protest 
organized in the Kennedy Road Settlement in March 2005 to then representing over 34 shack 
settlements across Durban and as far away as Pietermaritzburg. The first protest in Kennedy 
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Road was organized when the municipality began developing land that had been promised to 
shack dwellers for other purposes and immediately following the failure of the municipality to 
collect refuse gathered in the Kennedy Road Settlement. When the state responded to protestors 
with teargas, arrests, and violence, the community declared that "We are on our own now." 
Other settlements joined Abahlali baseMjondolo, and a series of legal marches and banned 
marches occurred. Since then, Abahlali 
democratized the governance of settlements, stopped evictions, won access to 
local schools, won some victories around services like water, toilets and refuse 
removal, [attained] legal support, won a number of victories in court, [initiated a 
successful 'No Land. No House. No Vote.' boycott of the March 2006 municipal 
elections], made the voice of shack dwellers very strong in the media, set up 
creches, a sewing cooperative, and vegetable gardens, and seriously challenged 
the city's slum clearance project (Abahlali Bayanda, 1). 
Other articles in Izwi Labampofu covered more recent struggles in resisting illegal evictions in 
Juba Place and Motala Heights Settlements. ("Victory for the people of Motala Heights" 2006; 
Hlongwa 2006; "Juba Place Evictions" 2006) 
Several scholars conducted first-hand interviews and participant-observation in attempts 
to understand the meaning of the events of protest for shack dwellers participating in the 
movement. Xin Wei Ngiam concluded that the movement grew from a feeling of betrayal over 
the dissonance between political practice and democratic ideals (Ngiam 2006). Raj Patel placed 
Abahlali baseMjondolo's politics in the context of Alan Badiou's theory of 'real politics,' as the 
result of radicalizing events that produced people who decided to relate from the perspective of 
the event and where the driving force is internal and autonomous from the state (Patel 2005). 
Jacob Bryant described this process and how the sense of betrayal of Bahlali was transformed 
into a sense of empowerment (Bryant 2005). Richard Pithouse provided extensive analysis and 
comment on the events and development of Abahlali baseMjondolo. In his 2006 report entitled, 
"Our Struggle is Though On the Ground, Running. The University of Abahlali baseMjondolo," 
Pithouse provided a thorough account of Abahlali baseMjondolo's foundation, history, successes, 
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and challenges and described in detail the illegal and violent behaviour of the state, which has 
been belligerent and repressive throughout Abahlali's struggle (Pithouse 2006). 
State responses to Abahlali's battle for services and the right to meaningfully participate 
often assumed an anti-democratic nature. The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) accused 
the national government in the Mail and Guardian last year of illegally restricting citizens from 
their right to protest. FXI experts named state interactions with Abahlali as an example and 
concluded, "There is a widespread violation of the right to demonstrate in South Africa. 
Demonstrators are denied their constitutional rights to freedom of expression and assembly (FXI 
2006)." FXI further urged investigation into behaviour of police during and after protest 
gatherings. Police treatment of Abahlali baseMjondolo members was indeed suspect. 
Zikode issued a statement on behalf of Abahlali demanding an end to the illegal 
harassment by the police of shack dwellers (Zikode 2007). Abahlali and associated group 
members were frequent victims of police harassment and staged arrests. System Cele provided a 
first-hand account of the police attack in the March 2005 protest that resulted in her losing her 
front tooth (Cele 2006). The Vice President of Abahlali baseMjondolo, Philani Zungu described 
numerous examples of police brutality, including his own unprovoked arrest and police attack 
that resulted in his loss of consciousness in September 2006 (Zungu 2006). This incident gained 
national coverage (Tolsi "I was punched, beaten," 2006). Abahlali are commonly known as the 
izikipa ezimbomvu ("the red shirts"), and one of the arresting police officers was quoted to have 
said, "there will be no more red shirts here" as the Abahlali leaders were thrown into the police 
van. In December 2006, an umhlali was pepper sprayed by municipal forces as he attempted to 
present a legal letter concerning the illegality of demolition occurring in the Motala Heights 
settlement (Abahlali Bayanda 2006, 1). 
Information was also a source of contestation. In March 2007, despite previous 
assertions that slum housing would be eliminated by 2010, the eThekwini municipality admitted 
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that such a goal was "far fetched" and would "require a miracle" (Goldstone 2007). In October 
2007, however, when Abahlali had requested information from the city concerning slum 
clearance plans and progress in accordance with the Promotion of Access of Information Act 
(PAIA), the city delayed its response and provided outdated and limited information. Abahlali 
published a critique of the plans in its first ever newspaper, flipping the undemocratic behaviour 
of the state in order to democratize knowledge ("We are Still Waiting for Answers" 2006). 
Abahlali members described their decision to use knowledge of the law and self-education as 
"the second tier of our strategy to liberate our people. We have protested and we now believe 
that we can use the Constitution not just as a shield but as a sword too" (Tolsi "Abahlali Demand 
Information," 2006). Members were encouraged by Abahlali leadership to exercise acquired 
knowledge of constitutional and legal rights to move the struggle forward (Zikode, "Presidential 
Message," 2006). 
In his editorial in the Mail and Guardian, "What Future for SA politics?" Richard Calland 
asked about the future of South African politics when real politics increasingly occurred 
"separate from the formal operation of the government" in the hands of "an active citizenry that 
refuse[d] despite material deprivation to succumb to a culture of victimhood." (Callands 2006) 
If social movements seeking service delivery and meaningful participation in the South African 
democratic fabric model real politics, then youth participation, too, must be understood in this 
context. South African young people, as they face significant social and economic challenges, 
have also turned away from official forms and concepts of participation in favour of self-defined 
alternatives. 
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2 Youth Literature Review 
2.1 Social Context: 'The Problem of the Youth' 
Low voter rates plagued South African young people. Though 74% of the voting age 
population voted in 2004 (Centre for Contemporary Conflict. 2004), only 53% of South Africans 
aged 18-25 had even registered to vote ("Young tell ANC" 2004, 22). For many young South 
Africans, low voting rates seemed to be an issue of access or preference rather than indifference. 
Levels of civic awareness, for example, were to be relatively high among young people. In one 
study, 4 in 10 young people had seen a copy of the constitution, which was higher than any other 
age cohort (Everatt 2000). Young people in particular, however, lacked access to official 
political and electoral processes. In a study of the 1999 election, of those who did not have a 
form of ID, 70% were in the age group 17-21. Of those who had no identification, 20% had 
applied but more than half of those had been waiting for more than 12 weeks (Muthien 1999). In 
2004, an IEC-commissioned study conducted focus groups with 16-21 year olds in KwaZulu-
Natal. Young people indicated that they faced significant challenges in political participation 
including difficulty attaining identity documents and poorly managed voters' rolls. The youth 
also reported frustration with a lack of service delivery and development for young people in 
particular (Strategy and Tactics 2004). Low voter turnout among young people might also 
represent a political statement about a perceived lack in service delivery. As one young person 
described it, 'I'm not going to vote,' said Beauty Mogwe, 26. "I grew up hungry and I'm still 
hungry. I grew up in apartheid and life is still the same...We're still poor, so why should we 
vote?" ("Young tell ANC" 2004, 22). 
The particularly low voting rates of South African young people have inaccurately been 
interpreted as reflecting a broader 'problem of the youth.' In a recent UN report, "World Youth 
Report 2005," the UN argued that the current generation of young people faced even more 
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complex challenges than the previous including "social prejudice based in age and on stereotypes 
about their abilities" (Piper and Chanza 2006). Indeed, youth in contemporary South Africa 
were problematized in three ways: as 'sell-outs' who had rejected the legacy of the revolution for 
materialism; as too inexperienced and immature to participate; and as problems to be 
characterized by their violence, lack of respect and sexual restraint, and poverty. 
South African youth were accused of acquiescing to a consumerist, market-driven ethos 
at the cost of some of the achievement of the preceding decades of struggle. Some believe that 
as the national government shifted its policy from a development approach to a free-market 
model, South African youth withdrew from activism in favour of capitalist consumption. David 
Everatt, for example, compiled popular evidence. One journalist characterized the modern youth 
as one who "feeds off a diet of MTV, Nikes, AIDS consciousness, shopping malls, 
environmental awareness, and a generous spirit of nihilism: It burps attitude without the 
idealism of its more politically earnest forebears." YFM radio station declared, "Black youth are 
unpolitical and extremely materialistic" (Everatt 2000). 
Gavin Steingo wrote about Kwaito music in the context of youth consumerism (Steingo 
2005). Today's youth, or the "Kwaito generation," he posited, had embraced a consumerist 
culture as an equation for hoping for something better. Steingo found that like the youth they 
appeal to, Kwaito artists had abandoned their post as social commentators for the allure of 
capitalist gain. McGregor, in her account of the life of DJ and AIDs victim Khabazela, wrote 
about kwaito as emblematic of its time and found in much of its lyricism, a "yearning for a better 
life" (McGregor 87). Steingo examined the use of gold as a symbol both in the new ethic of 
consumption as well as the old system of oppression that forced Africans to move from their 
homes to work in the gold mines. He remarked that the "new generation of South Africans has 
embraced the system that once enslaved them." 
45 
The President of South Africa also voiced his concern about a growing materialism. 
President Mbeki warned against the 'distraction of kwaito' (McGregor 86) and described a new 
understanding of freedom based on the quest for wealth and material. In the 2006 Nelson 
Mandela Memorial Lecture, President Thabo Mbeki blasted the growing culture of accumulation 
plaguing South African society and its young people, traced its roots to colonial oppression, and 
concluded that, 
the meaning of freedom has come to be defined not by the seemingly ethereal and 
therefore intangible gift of liberty, but by the designer labels on the clothes we 
wear, the cars we drive, the spaciousness of our houses and our yards, their 
geographic location, the company we keep, and what we do as part of that 
company. 
He argued that whatever the individual benefits explicit in capitalist economic models, South 
Africans "share[d] a fundamental objective to defeat the tendency in our society toward the 
deification of personal wealth as the distinguishing feature of the new citizen of the new South 
Africa." (Mbeki, Nelson Mandela Memorial Lecture, 2006). 
Even engaged youth were attacked as having corroded the gains of the revolution in their 
consumerist pursuits. The Media Limited Board of the Mail and Guardian recently vilified the 
ANC Youth League in an editorial in which they accused the "young Quirks" of undermining the 
democratic structures established by their predecessors. After young politicians "went 'bling,'" 
the Media Limited Board insisted: 
They started chasing flashy cars and big bucks, selling the soul of the 
organization... instead of charting away forward for the mass of South Africa's 
young people, who have yet to taste the fruits of freedom.. .[T]he league should 
be grooming anew set of leaders capable of confronting growing inequality, 
runaway crime and South Africa's biggest challenge, HIV/AIDS. It has signally 
failed to so. 
The editors characterized recent moves to repress internal dissent by the ANCYL as fallout from 
the League's 'selling the soul of the organization" (Mail and Guardian Media Limited Board 
2007). The ANCYL and Young Communists, indeed, gained much notoriety for their 
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unwavering support of Jacob Zuma and the silencing of dissent regarding the Zuma issue 
("ANCYL must defend our democracy" 2006; "Zuma Should Be President" 2006; Ndamase 
2006). As a result of disputes over Zuma, the ANCYL dissolved provincial structures in all but 
two provinces (Mgibisa and Majova 2007, 2). 
Despite societal perceptions, materialism was not universally accepted among young 
politicians. The Young Communist League (YCL) expressed repeated concern over the 
capitalist influence on young people and the growth strategy of the national government. In 
April 2006, the YCL responded to the State of the Nation Address that touted ASGISA as the 
solution to development issues. The YCL stated, "As the YCL, we utterly reject ASGISA." The 
IFP Youth Brigade, on the other hand, expressed support for ASGISA (IFP Youth Brigade, "IFP 
Youth Brigade Supports ASGISA" 2006). The president of the ANC Youth League attacked the 
"culture of greed and wealth exhibition" among South African young people and his own party 
("The Face of the Next Generation" 2004). The YCL also vocalized concern over the culture of 
accumulation affecting young people in general and youth politicians specifically, accusing the 
ANC Youth League of having become the "ANC of Capital" and urging young people in general 
to pronounce "that Capitalism has failed the youth and South Africa" (YCL, National Secretary 
Political Notes, 2006). On two separate occasions, the YCL warned against the anti-democratic 
influence of materialism among young people. During the 30l anniversary of the Soweto youth 
uprising, the YCL expressed its worry of the "excessive worship of money among young people" 
warning that "crass materialism has become the order of the day" (YCL, YCL June 16 Message, 
2006). The National Secretary likewise stated that an individual "is unfree alone." Harkening to 
broad theoretical approaches to democracy discussed in Chapter 1, the Secretary emphasized the 
collective nature of South African democracy over the individualist approach of the rights-based 
liberal model (Manamela 2006). Young people, themselves, therefore, rather than having 
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unconditionally gone 'bling,' debated economic policies and bemoaned the culture of 
accumulation as its influence grew among South African youth. 
If those youth who did participate in public processes were not labelled as materialistic 
sell-outs, they were marginalized and dismissed as immature. As reviewed in Part 1 of this 
chapter, in the ward committees of the Msunduzi municipality, youth were underrepresented, 
under-participated, and were side-lined or marginalized within committee meetings. Youth 
representatives sitting on ward committees were usually given sports or recreation portfolios, for 
instance. Councillors from uMsunduzi viewed youth as too immature to participate in 
governance. One councillor concluded, "We should let the youth be the youth. When they are 
mature enough, they can join then." Another felt that youth participation would be detrimental 
to the greater community: 
Young people are not matured enough to involve them in government structures. 
They should not be a part of the process while still raw. We're talking about the 
lives of people here... Sometimes young people take this as a plaything and 
sometimes there is all that carelessness." (Piper and Chanza 2006) 
The National Youth Commission, itself, responded to criticism of the Commission by the Young 
Communist League by labelling the Young Communists as "irrelevant, yet immature young 
activists" (Galane 2003). The roles afforded to youth sitting on the Durban Youth Council, 
launched in July 2007, likewise seemed nominal. According to Ken Mchunu, writing for the 
municipality, young people from across the city assumed the role "of councillor from various 
political partiesybr a day" (emphasis added). As Mchunu reported, "there was a general 
feeling," though no guarantee, that the youth should convene quarterly (Mchunu 2007). In the 
broader political spectrum, youth were afforded minimal opportunities for participation. 
Tired of the dismissive attitudes found within official structures, in May 2005, the Young 
Independent Democrats (Y-ID) launched their national campaign in Durban. Three hundred 
youth members attended the launch where the Chairperson of KwaZulu-Natal Y-ID announced, 
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"We have finally found a proper political party that says young people must do for 
themselves"(Sapr-pr-young 2005). The IFP, ANC Youth League and Young Communists all 
expressed concern over the marginalization of youth issues and young people. All three groups 
requested the amalgamation of national youth structures. Both the ANCYL and YCL called for 
the integration of the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, Provincial Youth Commissions, and the National 
Youth Commission into one body (Mbalula 2006; ANC 2006; Verbatim 2007; YCL "Young 
Communist League June 16 Message to Young People" 2006). In KwaZulu-Natal, a gathering 
of mostly ANC-affiliated and some IFP and independent youth called for the formation of a 
youth ministry (Kumalo 2006). In 2006, the IFP Youth Brigade demanded that the IFP 
recognize the youth role by appointing youth as district and local mayors (IFP Youth Brigade, 
IFPYB Calls Upon IFP, 2006). Youth who were afforded the opportunity for meaningful 
participation demonstrated increased levels of engagement. For example, in one study, high 
school and college students who participated in civic education programming experienced an 
18% increase in local participation and a significant increase in their sense of political efficacy 
(USAID 2002). 
Contrary to evidence of positive youth engagement, most commentary on contemporary 
youth trends tended to focus on the problems young people faced: increasing or persisting high 
rates of incomplete schooling, teen pregnancy, disease, drug use, unemployment, and violence. 
Though attention placed disproportionate weight on negative behaviour, young people did face 
significant socio-economic issues. Of children and youth in eThekwini between the ages five 
and twenty-four, 59% attended school, but only 3% attended university or technikon and 33% 
did not attend school (Statistics South Africa 2001). Many of those who did not attend an 
educational institution did not attend because they lacked money for fees (Statistics South Africa, 
2005). 
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Teen pregnancy had increased among South African young women and girls. According 
to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA), 28, 327 mothers under age eighteen were 
registered for the child support grant at the end of 2006 as compared to only 15, 599 in 2003. In 
KwaZulu-Natal, a similar increase was noted in a survey conducted in 120 schools throughout 
the province (Sosibo 2007). The government vehemently denied any link between teen 
pregnancy and the child support grant; however, anecdotal reports of young girls having children 
in order to become recipients of the grant existed (Research Department Social Development 
2007). Government officials took a relatively hands-off approach to teen pregnancy. 
Responding to a report about the increase in teen mothers, an education minister said, "It is not 
our problem and now we are being accused as if we were directly responsible for impregnating 
these learners" (Verbatim" March 9 to 15 2007). 
Rather than emphasizing a need for education efforts and service provision, some blamed 
the increase on reckless sexual behaviour. Legislators even attempted to regulate sexual activity. 
In 2006, legislative efforts sought to change the distinctions between gay and heterosexual 
activity and forbid sexual activity between children ages 12-15 (Boyle 2006). Youth did appear 
to be taking risks sexually. In one survey, only half of youth between the ages 15 and 19 
reported using condoms during their last sexual encounter (Sosibo 2007). Their behaviour 
seemed tied to a lack in education and knowledge. In the same survey, over one-third of youth 
between ages 15 and 24 felt that they were not at risk of contracting HIV (Sosibo 2007). 
Unemployment and poverty also plagued increasing numbers of young South Africans. 
Between 1997 and 2002, the number of unemployed young people grew from 1.7 to 3.5 million. 
According to the Umsobomvu Youth Fund's report on the state of youth, "unemployment has 
become predominantly a problem of the young, "and its effect has had a particular impact on 
black youth (Morrow, Panday, and Richter 2005, 8). 60% of all economically active youth were 
unemployed and one third had never had full or part-time employment (Youth Development 
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Network 2007). Young people under the age of 35 comprised 74 percent of all unemployment 
(Mlaba 2005). 41 percent of 18-24 year olds and 29 percent of 25-35 year olds lived in poverty. 
Of those living in poverty, half were living in extreme poverty (Morrow, Panday and Richter 
2005, 10). 
Some youth turned to crime and employed gangsterism and drug structures as the means 
to acquire wealth in face of otherwise limited opportunities (Dissel 1997). In 2006, juvenile 
delinquency was reportedly on the rise (Du Plessis 2006) and more than half of the prison 
population was considered youth (Young Communist League 2006). In 2007, concern over the 
high levels of crime in the nation heightened. The Mail and Guardian began including a special 
section to its weekly reporting entitled "The Call Against Crime" (Tutu 2007). Individuals, 
communities and businesses wrote commentaries and staged protests against a lack of 
government intervention (Verbatim, March 9 to 15, 2007). Mbeki answered calls of concern in 
his 2007 State of the Nation Address (Mbeki 2007). That crime, unemployment and poverty 
were problems affecting South Africans in general and young people in particular was 
undeniable. However, the thinking that grouped young people generically as a "problem" was 
inherently flawed. 
Issues of poverty and unemployment were not relevant to all South African youth. Race 
and class were important distinctions. Though some theorists argued that the transformation of 
the new South Africa substantially eroded the correlation between race and class, Erasmus 
concluded that race and class was still linked (Erasmus 2005). In 2006, the white minority still 
controlled 60% of South Africa's wealth ("Fears over exodus" 2006). Equity politics have had a 
limited effect, serving mostly to benefit a black elite. The ANC-sponsored "Black Economic 
Empowerment," or BEE as it is commonly known, created a massive transfer of wealth to a 
small but growing black elite. In 2004, Archbishop Tutu asked, "What's black empowerment 
when it seems to benefit not the vast majority but a small elite that tends to be recycled?" 
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(Freedberg 2006). According to the Mayor of Durban, eThekwini's business procurement 
practice had done little to uplift its traditionally marginalized. In 2005, 74% of procurement 
funds went to historically white businesses and only 2% went to African owned businesses 
(Mlaba 2005). Race, Erasmus argued, has been used as armour for both white and black elite to 
protect white privilege on the one hand (the 'race is best forgotten' attitude) and, on the other, to 
deflect criticism and dictate voting patterns by the ruling political elite (Erasmus 2005). 
Some white South Africans argued that they had been unduly discriminated against in the 
new South Africa to the cost of the nation. One commentator railed in 2006 against the 
"cleaning out of white expertise... hugely contributing to the skills crisis" (Freedberg 2006). 
Such individuals blamed BEE and affirmative action policies for the so-called "brain drain" of 
educated young professionals ("Fears over South Africa's Exodus" 2006). The affect of 
affirmative action on white youth opportunity may be exaggerated. In 2005, of youth arriving on 
the labour market, less than one-third of blacks but fully three-fourths of whites could expect to 
attain employment (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 18). Particularly high numbers of white 
South Africans, however, did seem to have left South Africa to seek employment overseas. 
From 1995 to 2005, though all other populations increased, whites fell by 16 percent ("Fears 
over South African Exodus" 2006). Regardless of the reasons for emigration, the exodus of 
South African young professionals has been of particular concern to the nation as it pertains to 
the fields of health and education ("South African hit by brain drain" 2002 and "Fears over South 
Africa's Exodus" 2006). 
There remained in South Africa, however, a significant number of white young people 
who grappled with their identity in the new South Africa. Young white Afrikaners, in particular, 
drew media attention in early 2007. The extreme popularity of Bok van Blerk's folk song, "De 
La Rey," brought attention to this particular subsection of South African youth. Though Krog 
insisted that the popularity of the song represented the struggling of young Afrikaners with 
52 
apartheid history and unexpressed guilt (Krog 2007), others believed that the popularity reflected 
an attempt of the youth to extricate themselves from sharing apartheid guilt and assert claims on 
their place in the new South Africa. The contemporary generation of Afrikaner young people, 
Eloff asserted, were generally liberal-minded and had embraced the new South Africa, but they 
had also rejected politics because of a "gatvol (fed up) attitude" regarding perceived attacks on 
Afrikaans as a medium, race card playing in politics, and affirmative action policies. Elof 
concluded that "De la Rey" served as a symbol for these young South Africans who were proud 
of their culture and believed that they "have shed the apartheid guilt" (Elof 2007). 
Though perhaps it is not possible to interpret any subsection of South African young 
people universally, young South Africans in general were struggling to understand their role in 
the new nation. Society insisted on universally grouping young people together and 
characterizing them by the problems they faced whether by materialism, inexperience, poverty, 
racial politics, or a socially imposed identity. Youth were understood as the generic "problem of 
the youth," in part, because of the persisting legacy of the approach to youth that emerged during 
the political violence of the 1980s and 1990s. 
2.2 Historical Context 
Because of their prominent role in the fight against apartheid and the violence of the 
1980s and 1990s, much of the research on South African youth has focused on providing 
background and context for understanding youth mobilization and youth violence. Dlamini 
provided an extensive history of KwaZulu-Natal as it pertains to resistance and violence. 
KwaZulu-Natal held out longest in southern Africa against colonial forces, provided the locus for 
a series of subsequent uprisings, served as the birthplace of the ANC, and its debate helped 
articulate differences between black resistance groups (Dlamini 2005). Joshua Gumede supplied 
a history of youth politics from 1953 until 1983, characterizing 1963-1967 as a time of political 
53 
passivity, guided by the 'paper politics' of student bodies dominated by a white liberals and 
1967-1975 as the emergence of university Christian movements, black consciousness, and the 
South African Student Organization (SASO) and the re-emergence of group bannings. Dlamini 
likewise characterized 1960-1975 as a period of suppressed resistance and the implementation of 
apartheid structures (Dlamini 2005). Nokomo concentrated on African institutions of higher 
education, concluding that in addition to black consciousness movements and external power 
conflict, the apartheid design for higher education itself produced inadvertently a distinct student 
culture of resistance among black African students (Nokomo 1984). Harms and other 
contemporaries attempted to document the prevalence of violence against young people by the 
apartheid regime in the 1970s and '80s (Harms et al 1987). Gumede further described 1975-
1983 as the onset and escalation of violence (Gumede 1990). 
Many focused their research on the black-on-black violence of the 1980s and 1990s. 
From the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, violence took the "ferocity of an undeclared civil 
war." Over 25, 000 were injured, 200-500,000 fled and 11, 600 died in KwaZulu-Natal alone 
(Jeffrey 1997, 1-2). The South African Institute of Race Relations produced The Natal Story: 
Sixteen Years of Conflict in an attempt to understand the violence from both UDF/ANC and IFP 
standpoints (Jeffrey 1997). The large and nuanced volume chronicled 'The Natal Story' over 
sixteen years beginning in 1980. Dr. Ran Greenstein compiled a collection of chapters about the 
violence of the 1980s and 90s, with multiple chapters focusing specifically on the politically 
inspired violence between the IFP and ANC in KwaZulu-Natal (Greenstein 2003). Aitchison 
gave a chronological account of the violence in KwaZulu-Natal leading up to the 1994 election 
(Aitchison 2003). 
Chief Buthelezi and his Zulu cultural group, Inkatha, gained extreme popularity with its 
policy of cultural liberation and support of worker strikes in the 1970s (Aitchison 2003). By 
1979 (four years after its founding as a cultural organization under Buthelezi), Inkatha had 500 
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branches in now Kwa-Zulu-Natal and between 300,000-350,000 members (Jeffrey 1997, 24). In 
1980, the participation of young people in school boycotts, a move that had been opposed by 
Inkatha, set the context for the first outbreak of violence (Jeffrey 1997). In 1983, the ANC-
affiliated United Democratic Front emerged from trade union, women's, youth, and community 
movements and organizations to coordinate the domestic opposition to apartheid (Thompson 
2001, 228). During the eighties, Inkatha and UDF supporters would repeatedly clash over the 
UDF's policy of ungovernability. "No-go" zones were formed throughout KwaZulu-Natal by 
both sides. Until 1985, the townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi had been quiescent.4 Following 
the school boycotts of the early 1980's, they too became the site of no-go areas in the violent 
interplay between UDF and IFP and security forces (32-63). 
By the late 1980's, the UDF fought two fronts in then Natal: the security forces and 
Inkatha (Aitchison 2003). The "third force," comprised of police and vigilante security forces, 
provided weapons to IFP, committed acts of political assassination and sabotage, and generally 
fuelled the conflict's intensity. In 1990, Inkatha was launched as a political party, the Inkatha 
Freedom Party. Together, the IFP, the apartheid state, and covert groups engaged in what the 
ANC described as a 'low intensity war' with the ANC. The formation of self-defence units, the 
return of MK soldiers, and political assassinations carried out by the UDF in Ntuzuma and other 
townships likewise propelled the war (Jeffrey 1997, 290-295). In the lead up to the first 
democratic election, violence intensified yet again as the ANC attempted to make inroads in 
rural areas and Inkatha lost control of township areas. During this time, fifty or sixty deaths 
occurred per month (Aitchison 2003). 
Some analysts explored the intersection between youth politics and youth violence of the 
1980s and 1990s. Seekings sought to close some of the gaps in the 'narrow range' of research 
Permanent areas were slow to develop in Durban, and until the 1950s, immigrant black workers lived in slum tenements or by 
squatting in back yard properties. KwaMashu and Umlazi were formed in an attempt to address the "black problem" by forcing 
the migration of the largest informal settlement, Cato Manor (Dlamini 60-63). 
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on youth politics (Seekings 1993, xi). After the Soweto uprising, Seekings asserted, the term 
'youth' took on heightened use, marking attitudes and the process of political change (xiv). 
During the ensuing political violence, youth came to be cast as one of two extreme stereotypes: 
'hostile, violent, and apocalyptic' on the one hand or 'broadly sympathetic [and] libratory' on the 
other (3-6). According to Seekings, young people participated in violence for a variety of 
reasons. Some were inspired by the militarized subculture inspired by Umkhonto we Sizwe (64). 
Others may not have been psychologically able to return to mundane lifestyles after the waves of 
activism of the seventies and early eighties (Straker in Seekings 1993, 90-92). Others, to quote 
an ANC youth leader, 'were steeped in the politics of opposition that excluded debate with their 
enemy' (ANC Youth League in Seekings 1993, 89). Writing just prior to the first democratic 
election, Seekings warned against continuing to consider youth as a single body defined by their 
experiences with violence, unemployment, and a lack of schooling, the general conception of the 
"the problem of the youth" that as aforementioned has persisted in contemporary form (100). 
Monique Marks, in Young Warriors. Youth Politics, Identity and Violence in South 
Africa (2001), considered the Diepkloof community in her attempt to further explore youth 
politics and the violence of the 1980s and 1990s. Like Seekings, Marks concluded that the 
majority of youth operated in between extremes during the eighties and nineties and that neither 
youth politics nor youth violence could be understood in indiscriminate terms. Schools, where 
students experienced violence inflicted by the state and where they initiated their own 
'unbanning' and ungovernability campaign, were a locus for both violence and activism. In an 
attempt to render the civil government inoperable, the campaign of ungovernability created 
multiple 'layers' of leadership and activism. Violence, too, was multi-layered and manifested in 
four distinct ways: the ungovernability campaign against the state, the state's repression against 
the youth, discipline within youth organizations, and gangsterism largely fuelled by police 
agents. The multiple and unclear layers of leadership, types of violence, and role of youth in 
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both leadership and violence meant that negotiating the youth role immediately prior to and 
following the first democratic election would prove difficult. 
Nombuso Dlamini described the identity formation of youth in response to the polarized 
political situation of KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990's (Dlamini 2005). Dlamini illustrated 
sophisticated and active youth practice in pursuit of democracy that escaped the narrowly 
defined boundaries of culture and politics fuelling ANC and IFP youth violence. She explained 
how youth pursued alternatives that enriched their lives, navigated the violence of township, and 
negotiated labels imposed on them (12-13). 
According to Dlamini, even as Inkatha consolidated its support in the townships and 
violence escalated, ANC-affiliated students continued UDF activities. Intimidation and violence 
pervaded. In KwaMashu, residents feared a group known as amasinyora, originally a soccer 
group who claimed politics but who operated as tsotsis (73), and, in Umlazi, Inkatha suppressed 
all social groups except soccer. UDF/ANC-affiliated youth, however, went to Lamontville to 
carry out political activities. Dlamini further described how generational divides and cultural 
expectations formed prevailing notions of Zulu young people. Many older Zulu men and women 
insisted that their youth had lost respect for their culture, and they categorized youth political 
activity, in particular the campaign for ungovernability, as exemplifying this rejection. 'The 
Fathers say that they are fighting against a takeover of black townships by teenagers who do not 
follow the African tradition of respect for elders' (World Press Review 1986 in Dlamini 2001, 
78). The concept of youth in KwaZulu-Natal, therefore, was steeped in an assumption that youth 
political activity meant a rejection of traditional values and culture. 
Despite the many pressures, Dlamini asserted, a variety of groups and youth formed 
outside of culturally and politically-charged distinctions. Black consciousness revival groups, 
church groups, loosely affiliated social groups, and soccer groups operating outside of political 
arenas all emerged during the early 1990's. These groups defied the prevailing notions of group 
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formation. Though many cultural and social-activist groups defined their practices through their 
Zulu identity and history, they affiliated with UDF politically. The soccer groups served as 
symbols of freedom even as other soccer teams were co-opted for political activities throughout 
the region. 
In 1994, Nelson Mandela voted in Durban at Ohlange High School in Inanda (where John 
Dube was buried) during the first free election, closing the circle of resistance that had had its 
earliest formations in the region, but the election did not bring an end to political violence. 
Nationwide, some youth found release in giant open admission township parties (McGregor 
2005, 85). Others continued to resort to violence of a political and gangster nature. As late as 
1999 KwaZulu-Natal remained a hotspot with 300 people killed in five months. By April 2004, 
however, a routine electoral process was reported (Centre for Contemporary Conflict 2004). 
Dlamini argued that though many youth successfully navigated fiercely-enforced cultural-
political divisions during the late 1980s and 1990s, in the succeeding years both older and new 
generations of young people lacked the strategies to deal with an increasingly mediated 
democracy (Dlamini 197). Implementation of national youth development policy meant to 
support young people in their negotiations with the new state, indeed, has been limited. 
2.3 Policy Context: Youth Development 
David Everatt asserts that in the decade after apartheid South African society asked 
"What's wrong with the youth?" without acknowledging, "every youth-centred initiative since 
1990 ha[d] collapsed" (Everatt 2000). Everatt provided a rough periodisation from 1990-2000 as 
follows: 1990-1993, optimism and organization; 1994-1996, disillusionment and missed 
opportunities, and 1997-2000, institutionalisation, policy formation and drift. Though the South 
African Catholics Bishops' Conference and the South African Council of Churches successfully 
put the youth sector on the democratic agenda resulting in the formation of the National Youth 
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Development Forum (NYDF) in 1993, the NYDF failed to intervene in the negotiations process 
to represent the youth sector. Instead of a Youth Ministry, the new government devoted only 6 
paragraphs to youth under the 'Arts and Culture' section in a 147-page document outlining the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme. When the National Youth Commission was 
established in 1996, Everatt posits, appointments were based on a political awards system rather 
than youth development expertise. 
During the institutionalization phase, the South African Youth Council failed to translate 
its activity into programs to benefit large numbers of youth (Everatt 2000). In 1999, Parliament 
formed a Portfolio Committee on youth, women, and the disabled, but the diversity of 
responsibilities made this committee less effective than it might have been (Morrow, Panday and 
Richter 2005, 3). The Further Education and Training Act of 1998 set an agenda for addressing 
past imbalances, made higher education to be more responsive to training needs of young people, 
and reduced colleges in number from 150 to 50. The National Youth Development Policy 
Framework (2000-2007) that emerged following the mostly ineffective policy initiatives of the 
nineties, emphasized the importance of integrated youth development with social policy and 
established a clear set of ideals. Analysts questioned, however, whether such ideals and 
framework had translated into viable programming. (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 3). 
Many national programs sought to contribute to the positive development of South 
African young people. In 2006, IDASA reviewed the contemporary state of national youth 
development. Though it had failed to translate into programmes, the South African Youth 
Council operated as an independent council to evaluate youth programmes and services. The 
government's ASG1SA (Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa) called for 
the establishment of 100 youth advisory centers, registering 10,000 youth in the National Youth 
Service Initiative, expanding business support systems, and intensifying the youth cooperative 
programme. The National Youth Commission, established in 1996, pioneered the mainstreaming 
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of youth issues in government services. As part of its 2006 initiatives, the NYC called for Youth 
Units within all municipalities (IDASA 2006). In 2006, the Chairperson of the NYC concluded 
that the NYC had made significant strides towards delivery and listed among its 
accomplishments the development of a National Youth Development policy, the establishment of 
the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the establishment of the National Youth Service programme, and 
lobbying for an increase in access to higher education (Gauteng Provincial Government 2006, 6). 
National youth programmes only moderately impacted grassroots levels. 
In "Young People in South African 2005 Where We're At and Where We're Going," an 
overview of young people in South Africa commissioned by the Umsobomvu Youth Fund, the 
authors made mixed reports about the state of youth and a call to action was urged (Morrow, 
Panday and Richter 2005). The report found that educational opportunity had been expanded 
massively, young people valued education, and the more education a person had the more likely 
that he or she would gain employment, but problems existed regarding inadequate life skills 
training, the quality of education, repetitions and drop-outs, and the effects low levels of 
education have on youth employability (15). The numbers of those aged 25-35 who had 
completed matric increased among all racial groupings except white, demonstrating the 
enormous expansion of educational opportunities. However, among this age group, as well as 
their younger counterparts, there still existed racial disparity. Whereas the percent of young 
South Africans aged 18-24 years who achieved Matric increased from 16% in 1995 to 24% in 
2002 among Africans and 26% to 31% among Coloureds, such matriculation rates were 
disproportionately low compared with the 69% of Indians and 61% of Whites to matriculate in 
2002 (16). Among youth in general, due to dropouts and repeats, the average years needed to 
reach Grade 12 was 60 percent higher than the minimum required (16). The researchers urged 
schools to consider themselves important loci for youth development, especially given the large 
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numbers of young people who still attended school in their twenties (19). Young people, 
however, perceived school environments as unsafe and lacking quality teaching (16). As 
measured in 2004, an estimated 826,000 youth arrived on the labour market each year having 
completed Grade 12 or having dropped out of education. Of the new entrants, only 29% of 
Africans would get jobs, 50% of coloured, 70% of Indian and 75% of white (18). 
The high levels of unemployment affecting young South Africans warranted serious 
attention, but youth business development efforts faced challenges in implementation. 
Incomplete schooling and inexperience among young people and inadequate funding posed 
significant challenges, in particular. Programmes operated under the Small Enterprise 
Development Agency (SEDA), for example, were ill equipped to support youth 
entrepreneurship. The UYF, itself, was limited in practice by funding and inadequate orientation 
towards young people among its lenders (12-13). The Skills Development Act (1998) and the 
Skills Development and Levies Act (1999) established Sector Education and Training 
Authorities, but these too had inadequate focus on youth (20). Learnerships, on the other hand, 
had positive impact on youth. In 2005, more than two-thirds of those who participated in 
learnerships reported securing employment (20). 
The social integration of young people was likewise reportedly mixed. Youth awareness 
levels were relatively high. Over 67%, for example, reported watching the news on TV at least a 
few times a week (31). Young people demonstrated creativity and skill in using modern 
technology to gain access to information through the use of cell phones as a crucial mode of 
networking and communications (33). However, wide variations and a general low level of 
participation were reported for organized activities. 66% of youth reported never having 
participated in a community sports team and 75% had never been involved in a community 
society or club (30). Differences of access and advantage were apparent between sub-groups. 
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Use of community facilities such as youth centres, parks, and sports facilities, for example, had 
the lowest rates among rural areas because of inadequate provision (32). 
Young people had withdrawn from traditional forms of engagement, but their 
participation in issue-based activism had increased. Issues like HIV/AIDs have to some extent 
replaced party allegiance (30). Young people were targeted as potential advocates in 
environmental campaigns ("Environmentalists" 2006). Others took stands on gay rights ("Gay 
and Lesbian Youth Speak Out" 2006). On college campuses, student organizations not 
necessarily affiliated with the tripartite alliance (outside of SASCO, the Student Representative 
Council, and the ANC Youth League) battled the issue of university fees. At the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal-Westville campus, for instance, the Socialist Student Movement mobilized 
students to call for debt cancellation (A. Naidoo 2006). Reports also described a high level of 
religious activity among South African young people (Morrow, Panday and Richter 2005, 33). 
Since national policy had inadequately addressed equity issues among South African young 
people, young people themselves had altered the terrain available for participation by seeking 
engagement in a variety of non-traditional and unofficial forms. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In their democratic South Africa, young people witnessed a shift in policy away from 
development and participatory models of democracy towards western liberal forms. Official 
structures had little success in enabling meaningful forms of popular participation. Significant 
change occurred in the democratic nation, but change was slow to resolve the wide array of 
social and economic challenges facing the majority of young people. Some young South 
Africans grappled with identity in the new nation. Despite significant challenges, South African 
young people engaged civically but decreasingly availed themselves of official structures. This 
study aimed to understand the youth civic practice and attitudes of young people ages 13-29 
living in eThekwini. 
1 Mixed Model Approach 
1.1 Introduction to Mixed Model Research 
In designing my research model, I adopted the mixed method approach in order to gain a 
more rich understanding of youth civic engagement in eThekwini. The debate over qualitative 
and quantitative research has long divided researchers into two opposing camps. Many have 
championed quantitative research as the more objective of the two, though others have argued 
total objectivity is unattainable in social and political science research. Specifically, approaches 
have varied in how they value objectivity, whether there can be a framework for understanding 
our world free from human bias, and subjectivity, the meanings people give to their environment 
(May 2001). A third group of researchers exists, however, that opposes the 'incompatibility 
thesis' that holds that quantitative and qualitative research cannot be mixed. These researchers 
urge a synthesized approach. According to Miles and Huberman, for example, researchers 
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should "be open to an ecumenical blend of epistemologies and procedures" (Miles and 
Huberman, 1984). The mixed methods approach collects multiple data using different strategies 
and methods so that the resulting mixture results in complementary strengths and non-
overlapping weaknesses (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 18). Mixed method research, 
therefore, can use the strengths of one method to overcome the weaknesses of another, provide 
stronger evidence for a conclusion throughout, add insights, and increase generalizability. 
Because qualitative research allows the researcher to investigate complex and sensitive 
issues in detail and quantitative research allows the summarizing of large amounts of data and 
the reaching of generalizations based on statistical projections (Trochim "Qualitative Measures" 
2006), a mixed approach was ideal for the study of youth civic engagement. This study of youth 
civic engagement employed three modes of research: 
• Participation-observation: through direct participation and observation, I gained 
insight to the civic engagement demonstrated by young people participating in 
Phakama, a youth development and gender empowerment organization part of 
Youth for Christ (KZN) and Abahlali baseMjondolo, a collective of local shack 
dwellers' mobilizing for land and housing. 
• Survey: I developed a survey tool designed to measure perceptions, attitudes and 
behaviours of youth pertaining to seven indicators of civic engagement (political 
voice and awareness, community engagement, community problem-solving, 
justice orientation, electoral involvement, efficacy in individual and community 
contexts, and trust). 554 young people completed the survey tool. 
• Semi-formal Interviews: Employing a semi-formal format, I interviewed 22 youth 
leaders from Phakama, Abahlali, Interact service clubs, and several key 
informants from various youth and student groups. 
1.2 Issues in Mixed Method Research 
Though the mixed method model is generally accepted, some have raised concerns about the 
validity of mixed approaches. Miles and Huberman argued against such critics, however, 
suggesting that their main objection related to the relative lack in methodology then available 
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(Miles and Huberman 1984, 22). Increasingly, researchers have developed method techniques 
for the synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data (Woods et al. 2005). Miles and Huberman, 
themselves, provided a framework for understanding mixed methods. They divided analysis into 
three concurrent actions: data reduction, data display, and conclusion-drawing and verification 
(Miles and Huberman 1984, 23). During the data reduction phase, research questions are posed, 
sampling and instrumentation are determined and employed, and data is collected and coded. 
Data display helps consolidate data and makes analysis easier by placing data into matrices and 
charts. In her conclusion phase, a researcher clusters data into single conceptualizations by 
noting patterns, clustering, and relationships between variables. During verification, the 
researcher checks for representivity, triangulates across data sources, and weights evidence (20-
50). 
Others expressed concern about the conclusion and verification phases of mixed method 
research. According to Massey, mixed method researchers often make misleading and invalid 
claims (Massey 1999). In particular, Massy objected to the term triangulation, itself, because it 
implied a degree of certainty attainable by physical surveyors but not social scientists. 
Triangulation refers to the process used to corroborate one set of findings with another, based on 
the claim that once a proposition has been confirmed by two or more independent measurement 
processes, the uncertainty of its interpretation is greatly reduced. Though the process of 
corroborating findings between different data sets is a useful one, there are potential pitfalls. 
Comparing the results of two samples, as if they belong to the same population, for example, is 
particularly misleading (Massey 1999). 
Additional researchers argued that the criteria used to judge quantitative research should 
not be used to verify qualitative research. Issues of validity, reliability, and objectivity (strength 
of conclusions, consistency of measurement, and whether it can be proved free from bias) may 
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not be appropriate forjudging qualitative analysis. Gula and Lincoln developed a list of 
analogous criteria more appropriate for qualitative analysis. Issues of credibility and 
transferability were provided (whether the results are credible from the perspective of the 
participant and the degree to which the results can be transferred to other contexts) as the 
equivalent forms for validity measurement. The authors further recognized that in reality the 
same thing could not be measured twice, therefore, they replaced the notion of reliability with 
dependability. Dependability emphasized the need for the researcher to describe changes in the 
setting and how the changes affect the way research approached the study. Lastly, confirmability 
referred to the degree to which others could corroborate results (Gula and Lincoln in Trochim 
"Qualitative Measures" 2006). 
This study addressed each of the aforementioned research issues. Different data sets 
were used to corroborate data among similarly drawn purpose samples. For example, data 
gathered from interview samples (which included actively engaged youth only) and survey 
samples (which included actively engaged and general high school youth) were used for 
corroboration of findings about actively engaged youth. Data collected in participant-
observation (which studied poor black actively engaged youth) was used to supplement general 
findings but to confirm subset specific findings only. Interviews helped confirm credibility as it 
related to observations and survey results. The wide range of subgroups included in the 
purposive sample population helped ensure transferability. Participant observation and 
interviews addressed the issue of dependability. Attitudes and behaviours were noted across a 
variety of contexts in participant observation and interviews were administered in a wide variety 
of circumstances. Few differences in findings were observed across the different settings. 
Confirmability was more difficult to measure because of the lack of youth civic and political 
research available. Specific actions taken during data reduction and data display phases of 
research are discussed in the following three sections describing each model of research 
employed in this study. 
2 A Mixed Model for Measuring Youth Civic Engagement in eThekwini 
2.1 Participant Observation 
The ethnographic approach to research emphasizes study of entire cultures of a people, 
groups, or organizations (May 2001, 147). The most common approach to ethnographic research 
is participant observation, which helps derive an "authentic" understanding. In participant-
observation, the researcher becomes immersed as an active participant and records extensive 
field notes (Trochim, "Qualitative Measures," 2006). Proponents believe that participation 
leads to empathetic understanding (Bell 1993; May 2001, 151). Researchers acknowledge that 
the location, values, and interests of the people they study shape their research, and suggest that 
this influence, "reflexivity," is positive (May 2001, 163). 
My research as participant and observer took place over the course of several months in a 
variety of contexts as I gained insight to the civic engagement demonstrated by young people 
participating in Phakama, a youth development and gender empowerment organization part of 
Youth for Christ (KZN) and Abahlali baseMjondolo, a collective of local shack dwellers' 
movements. 
As participant-observer with Abahlali baseMjondolo, I attended meetings, rallies, site 
visits and other events formal and informal from September 2006 through March 2007. Abahlali 
members represent over 30 informal settlements, with its most active membership from over 10 
sites throughout the eThekwini municipality. I spent most of my time with members from Joe 
Slovo Settlement in Mobeni Heights, Kennedy Road and Foreman Settlement in Sydenham, 
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Motala Heights in Pinetown, and Jadhu Place near Overport. Though most observations 
occurred at general meetings held in the Kennedy Road Settlement, events took place in a variety 
of locations. The heaviest concentration of observation occurred from September through 
December 2006. In addition to attendance and participation in general discussions, I took part in 
the planning and organizing of a housing, education policy, and legal rights workshop, logistical 
operations, and the creation of several press statements. I took notes at all events, noting 
numbers of participants, number of youth participants, emergent themes, events, and discussions 
that had occurred. All notes were placed into a database. In more informal situations, I recorded 
observations to the central document after the events took place. Discussions often took place in 
isiZulu with English translation provided, but when translation did not occur, I later asked for a 
review of conversations. All direct quotes have been taken from observed conversations that 
occurred in English or were translated into English by Abahlali members. 
As participant-observer of Phakama, I supported programming in Dumahlezi High 
School in Ntuzuma from August 2006 until February 2007. During this period, I co-facilitated 
standard eight and nine life skills classes and assisted in the facilitation of the peer educators' 
group. I collected observations from August through October 2006 from Peer Educators' leader 
meetings, Peer Educator group meetings, Peer Educator events, school events, and life skills 
curriculum implementation. All events and observations occurred at Dumahlezi High School. I 
focused my attention on learners participating in the peer educators' support groups. In addition 
to facilitation and observation, I created a democratic framework and evaluation tool to 
supplement Phakama curriculum and programming in the 2007 school year. All conversations 
took place in a mix of isiZulu and English with a heavy concentration on isiZulu. When I could 
not interpret events on my own, my co-worker provided full explanations of discussions and 
events. Following data collection for both Abahlali and Phakama, observation notes in the 
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central database were coded according to themes and themes were extracted into a concept map. 
This map was later interfaced with concept maps from interviews and survey data. 
There are several issues important to quality in conducting participant observation 
research. Extended duration, intimacy, variety of circumstance, and social consensus should be 
ensured (May 2001, 163). Perhaps the most debated and interesting issue, however, is that of 
reflexivity. Spending months with particular individuals and organizations, building friendships 
and trust, and contributing toward the mission of the organizations has meaningful impact on the 
research itself. In this study, the influence of the researched subject on the researcher and 
research was multifaceted. Insight otherwise unavailable was gained.5 Other conclusions were 
verified or strengthened.6 Commitment to the broader organizations and individual relationships 
has the potential to distort results; however, in this study, it led to a deepened dedication to 
accurate analysis.7 This study further impacted the researcher herself.8 Reflexivity, however, 
rather than distorting results, enhanced understanding this study of youth civic engagement in 
eThekwini. 
2.2 Survey 
My survey tool (see Appendix) was comprised of: 
• 4 identification questions about age, location, employment status, and 
education including 1 filter question 
5 For example, I observed the positive effect on school morale of a school assembly that had been organized by Phakama Peer 
leaders. Morale is not something measured or reported but observed first hand. 
6 For example, my view that Abahlali politics as experienced and practiced by its youth was deeply democratic was enhanced by 
experiencing the practice first-hand when I planned a workshop for land and housing and again when I served as youth 
committee chair. 
7 The rigorous demand of Bahlali individuals and Abahlali collectively that their right to autonomy be honoured caused me to 
strive intently in my analysis and writing to avoid inaccurate interpretations of member voices and actions. Likewise, I embraced 
the commitment among Phakama staff to honouring the leadership potential of all young people and in particular those youth 
involved in peer leading. My commitment to depicting accurately youth interpretations of democratic involvement was increased 
because of my commitment to the leadership potential of the young people with whom I worked. 
8 The democratic experience found with Abahlali baseMjondolo was the most profound I have ever encountered. Their approach 
to democracy and change as taught to me by Bahlali friends, as encountered firsthand, and as included in their fight for land and 
housing influenced my approach to understanding democratic participation more than any social or political theory. The 
influence reaches not only this study, but also extends to broader societal and life goals for how I envision change and my future 
work. Though, to the suspecting reader, this pronouncement sends warning signals of bias and tainted perspective, I have at this 
point only to offer my first-hand encounters and their congruence with survey and interview research. I have represented events 
and my experience accurately. 
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• 33 scaled statements of agreement and disagreement concerning civic 
indicators (25 questions), future orientation (3 questions), societal perceptions 
of youth (2 questions), and youth perceptions of society (3 questions) 
• 14 "Yes" or "No" response questions about current and recent past 
participation 
• 2 open-ended questions asking respondents to define active citizenship and 
problems facing youth. 
All survey items were coded and/or categorized by response. For the 33 statements concerning 
civic indicators, future orientation, societal perceptions of youth, and youth perceptions of 
society, items were scaled according to a Likert scale with " 1 " indicating strong disagreement, 
"2" indicating disagreement, "3" indicating neither agreement or disagreement, "4" indicating 
agreement and "5" indicating strong agreement. The 8 statements pertaining to societal 
perceptions of youth and youth perceptions of society were considered independently. The 
majority of the statements (25 of 33) were further categorized according to seven civic 
indicators. 
In measuring civic attitudes and behaviours, I hoped to design a survey tool that would 
measure multiple aspects of engagement without becoming overburdensome. I consulted a 
variety of survey tools and indexes. The Centre for Information and Research on Civic Learning 
and Engagement's civic engagement quiz measures general civic behaviour with four indexes: 
civic activities, electoral activities, political voice activities and attentiveness (Andolina et al. 
2003). Joel Westheimer makes distinctions between personally responsible, participatory, and 
justice-oriented engagement. He notes that justice-oriented engagement is often neglected in 
measuring or teaching civic engagement (Westheimer and Kahne 2004). I also explored the 
Civics Assessment Database of youth specific surveys (Tourney-Purta 2007). The content was 
vast and varied; however, no existing tool satisfied the needs of this study. Specifically, other 
tools lacked cultural relevance to South African notions of participatory democracy and 
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community, localized examples of civic behaviour,9 and equal weighting across indicator sets. 
Bias towards electoral processes was found in many surveys that grouped community 
engagement, justice orientation, and community problem-solving into one category while 
electoral indication maintained singular consideration. Though I wanted to account for this 
western liberal bias by developing my own set of indicators and corresponding statements, from 
the existing tools, I gained ideas about the range of questions to seek and the ways to distinguish 
civic indicators appropriately. 
The seven civic indicator sets selected included Community Engagement10, Justice-
Orientation11, Community Problem-solving12, Political Voice and Awareness13, Trust14, Electoral 
Politics15, and Efficacy.16 Average mean scores for each indicator were calculated from 
responses included in each indicator set. Indicator scores range 1-5, with 5 indicating the 
strongest level of indication for that civic orientation and 4 suggesting general indication. 
Those questions that did not employ the Likert scale were assigned numerical values. For 
the fourteen statements concerning recent-past and present civic behaviour, yes and no responses 
were numerically coded so that " 1 " signified participation and "0" signified lack of participation. 
The two-open ended questions asked young people to identify the biggest problems facing their 
generation and to define active citizenship. Definitions of active citizenship were grouped and 
coded according to 15 categories determined from youth responses that were not unique.17 
9 For example, stokvel associations are not listed among literature originating in the United States. 
10 Mean scores were determined from two survey statements and measure feelings of connectedness and involvement in the 
community. 
1' Mean scores were determined from two survey statements and measure inclination towards getting involved, activism, or 
protesting. 
12 Mean scores were determined from one statement and measure inclination towards working to address social problems. 
13 Mean scores were determined from three statements including one three-part statement and measure attention paid to social 
and political issues and affairs and inclination towards raising concerns to party or government officials. 
14 Mean scores were determined from two statements including one four-part and one five-part statements and measure overall 
trust for civic actors including government, political parties, trade unions, religious groups, schools, and community groups. 
15 Mean scores were determined from three statements and measure inclination towards participating through political parties and 
elections. 
16 Mean scores were determined from three statements and measure sense of individual, collective, and youth abilities to effect 
social and political reality. 
17 Live in a democracy or be free; love or feel proud of your country; care for or help others; participate or take part in the 
community or community events; vote or participate in politics; possess knowledge and awareness of issues facing the nation or 
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Identified youth problems, likewise, were grouped and coded according to 19 distinct categories 
• 1 R 
based on responses that were not unique. 
In survey design, I paid particular attention to question wording and content. In selecting 
statement and questions, I attempted to ensure simple language, relevant and appropriate content, 
proper specificity and neutral tone (May 2001, 106-107). In order to prevent bias towards 
agreement, I included two "reversal items" in which strength of agreement indicated a lack of 
civic indication towards valuing voting and discussing social and political issues (Trochim, 
"Scaling," 2001). To determine if the respondents were qualified to answer, I included a "filter 
or contingency question" (Trochim, "Survey Research," 2006) about age. After survey 
completion, I tested the questionnaire. As qualified youth workers, Phakama staff reviewed 
statements according their clarity, importance, appropriateness, and cultural relevance. Based 
upon staff recommendations, I made significant changes to wording, question order, and format. 
Next, I provided the survey to a high school student atNorthwood Boys High School for his 
review. He made suggestions but found typographical errors only. Finally, I provided the 
survey in a pilot administration to Youth for Christ interns. After completion, suggestions were 
solicited, however again only minor changes in wording were made. The survey was then 
translated into isiZulu 
After survey design was secured, I administered the survey to the sample population. 
IsiZulu versions were administered to Dumahlezi High School students and Phakama Peer 
Leaders and made available at each other administration of the survey. 554 young people 
community; influence or educate others as a role model; positively develop oneself by advancing through education and 
temperance; voice opinions and criticism; work towards solving social problems; develop grow, or build the country or your 
community for the better or to make a difference; protect or know your rights or the rights of others; fight against injustice; be a 
Jacob Zuma supporter; "I don't know"; it doesn't mean anything or means something negative; play sports 
18 Drugs, tobacco, and alcohol abuse; negative attitudes or a lack of respect and self-control; HIV/AIDS and disease; materialism; 
peer pressure; jobs, unemployment and money; general education concerns; access and cost of tertiary education; teenage 
pregnancy and premature sex; poverty; crime and violence; Jacob Zuma or other politicians; depression; environment; stress from 
expectations at school; Black Economic Empowerment; negative perceptions of youth; racism; abuse or rape 
completed the survey. Additionally, 7 surveys were discounted because of age disqualification 
and 8 surveys were disregarded because of inadequate completion. Survey completion was 
assumed if the majority of statements and questions were completed on each page of the survey. 
The response rate, therefore, was 99%. The high rate of successful survey completion can be 
attributed to school and project staff and leadership who helped facilitate survey administration 
and ensured access to a captive audience. When all surveys had been collected, data was entered 
into an excel spreadsheet and imported into SPSS software. Using SPSS programming for data 
reduction and display, correlations, independent t-tests of means, basic cross-tabulations and 
frequencies were tabulated among the entire population, between leaders and non-leaders, and 
according to location, age, and group identification. Finally, key themes from survey results were 
extracted into a concept map that I later interfaced with concept maps from participant-
observation and interviews. 
2.3 Interviews 
For the purposes of this study, I conducted semi-structured interviews so that I could 
categorize responses with more uniformity than unstructured forms but allow individuals to 
respond on their own terms. In the semi-structured interview, questions are normally specified, 
but the interviewer is free to probe beyond the answers to seek clarification and elaboration. 
"These types of interviews are said to allow people to answer more on their own terms than the 
standardized interview permits, but still provide a greater structure for comparability over that of 
the focused interview" (May 2001, 123). 
My semi-structured interview (see Appendix) included twelve questions regarding civic 
attitudes, opinions, and behaviours of young people. Question wording was vetted among 
Phakama staff. I conducted twenty-two interviews over the course of several months. At the 
outset of each interview, I briefly introduced the study and assured anonymity if desired. During 
each interview, I asked follow-up and probing questions and provided space for elaboration 
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where appropriate. The interviews of Phakama peer leaders were conducted in isiZulu with 
translation provided by Phakama staff. All other interviews were conducted in English. For two 
groups of Phakama peer leaders, interviews were group-administered to accommodate student 
schedules and translation needs. Interviews were recorded through note taking and tape-
recording. For those for whom tape recording would be inhibiting, I took shorthand notes and 
recorded them electronically after each interview. For all others, I recorded proceedings and on 
tape and transcribed each interview. Following electronic copying and transcription, I placed 
interviews into a central matrix. Trochim suggests that qualitative data may be interpreted 
through coding (Trochim "Qualitative Measures" 2006). Interviews were, indeed, coded by 
theme and themes were drawn into a concept map. Interview, participant-observation and survey 
concept maps were then interfaced in order to make generalizable conclusions. 
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3 Sample 
One of the most important issues in research design is sampling. Though random 
selection produces samples that are statistically representative, as was the case in this study, 
random selection is not always feasible. Non-probability sampling provides a suitable 
alternative. In purpose sampling, the researcher has one or more specifically predefined groups 
that she seeks (Trochim "Nonprobability Sampling" 2006). I wanted the scope of this study to 
include the young people from a variety of backgrounds living in eThekwini with a weighted 
focus on young leaders actively participating civically in a wide variety of behaviours including 
religious, service, peer education, direct politics, and activism. This study excluded extremely 
marginalized youth, including only those young people who met at least one of the following 
conditions: school enrolment, employment, or group membership (active civic engagement). 
Further efforts should be taken to better address the civic behaviour and attitudes of young 
people not engaged through school, employment, or civic activity. This study was designed to 
be gender-blind; therefore additional gender-sensitive research should also be undertaken. 
In selecting the population to be surveyed, I employed purposive sampling. The sample 
population for survey administration was selected to include poor black, Indian, coloured,20 and 
materially-privileged white, black and Indian racial and economic categories. Categories were 
identified according to school profiles where geographic location was used to aid in determining 
predominant economic standing.21 The survey was administered randomly in four high schools 
selected to represent eThekwini young people generally: 
19 Though general gender balance was sought in selecting population samples, gender identification was not incorporated into 
analysis. Gender likely impacts the civic behaviour of South African young people, however, such analysis was outside of the 
scope of this study. 
20 To reflect population characteristics of Durban, this study de-emphasized coloured youth. Future research should undertake to 
study coloured youth in particular. 
21 For this study, township and informal settlements are associated with predominately poor economic standing. Suburban 
affiliation is equated with materially privileged status. Urban environments were associated with poor economic status unless 
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Predominant Population Descriptors 
Black African township 
Indian township 
Mixed Suburban 
In addition to general youth whose civic behaviour was unknown and assumed 
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representative of general youth behaviour, samples were drawn from youth identified as 
members in groups identified for civic activity.23 Racial and economic categories were garnered 
according to group profiles. The survey was administered to participants in groups engaged in 
student leadership, service, political, and religious activity with a de-emphasis on political 
involvement. Groups were selected to achieve representivity as it pertained to civic activity as 
well as racial and economic categorization. The sample population was heavily weighted 
towards service and community activity in part to counteract societal imbalances weighted 
towards understanding youth engagement through electoral and political activity. Justice-
orientated activity was not included in the survey population, but was over-emphasized in the 
sample selected for interviews. The survey was administered to youth participants active in the 
following groups: 
Name of Group 
Phakama Peer Leaders 
Fairvale Interact Club 
Our Lady of Fatima Interact Club 
Durban Girls Interact Club 
Northwood Boys Interact 
Youth for Christ Interns 
Durban Youth Council 
VN Naik School for the Deaf Interact, 
Prefects, and RCL Leaders24 
University of KwaZulu-Natal ANC, 











Type of group 





Christian community development 
internship for out-of-work recent matrics 
Appointed citywide student leadership 
council 
Service club and student leaders 
Political affiliates of ANC or ANC affiliated 
campus organizations 
Predominant Population Descriptors 
Black township and informal 
settlements 
Coloured and Indian poor urban and 
township 
Suburban white girls 
Black, Indian and white materially 
privileged urban girls 
Black, Indian and white suburban boys 
Black African township 
Mixed 
Black and Indian Township 
Black African mixed economic 
standing 
otherwise informed by known group and school profiles. Group and school profiles, as reported by school officials and observed, 
helped confirm assumptions. 
22 Hereafter, "non-leader" will be used to refer to this portion of the population. This term is meant only to signify membership 
to the general body of youth surveyed who were not identified for civic activity. The term indicates a lack of known leadership 
and active participation. 
23 Hereafter, the term "leader" will be used to refer to this portion of the sample population. 
24 The inclusion of the VS Naik School for the Deaf further adds to this sample's representivity, inclusive of young people 
grappling with physical disability. 
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Survey respondents included 306 leaders and 248 non-leaders. In addition to 
identification through group characteristics, survey analysis divided respondents by geographic 
residence. Of all youth respondents, 23% were urban (mixed income), 4% informal settlement, 
33% township, and 36% suburban. Correlations were drawn between mostly materially 
privileged (suburban) and mostly materially poor (township) young people. The decision to base 
comparisons upon interpreted economic status rather than race was in part to preserve the 
integrity of individual responses. In emphasizing the impact of socio-economic status on civic 
interpretations and behaviours of young people, this study did not aim to discount the effect of 
race. As discussed in Chapter 2, in contemporary South African society, economic status 
continues to be linked to race. A future exploration of civic engagement might aim to ascertain 
more nuanced understanding of racial and class categories. Purpose sampling does not ensure 
the precise representivity guaranteed by random selections. 
In focusing on racial, economic, and civic representivity, other variables were distorted. 
For example, though meant to measure the civic behaviour of young people aged 13-29, the 
survey was heavily biased towards young people aged 13-17 (77% of the responses). Likewise, 
as aforementioned, political activity was intentionally de-emphasized, but justice-oriented 
behaviour was not adequately represented in the survey sample. Of religious youth, a heavy 
influence was placed among Christian youth. Though survey results themselves may contain this 
bias, other research methods employed helped preserve the representivity of this study in 
general. 
To probe further among groups already selected and address gaps in the population 
completing the survey tool, a purposive sample was drawn for semi-formal interviews. All 
young people interviewed were particularly active participants or leaders involved civically. 
25 The decision to omit a direct question regarding racial classification was made in order to promote honest survey response 
among individuals who might otherwise have based responses on the desire to conform or avoid conforming to racial categories. 
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Interviewees were selected to represent racial, age, and economic groups according to individual 
involvement in religious, political, justice-oriented, and community activities. Efforts were 
made to include more young people involved in justice-orientated, political and non-Christian 
and Christian religious activity. Among the twenty-two young people interviewed, seven 
participated in social movements, two held leadership positions in Muslim student groups, ten 
led Christian-based peer education, one held leadership positions in direct politics, and two held 
leadership positions in youth service groups. In actuality, most young people interviewed 
participated in more than one civic activity. 
Intentionally, the interview sample strongly represented poor black youth (17/22) who 
comprised the majority of eThekwini's youth population. Materially privileged black (1), white 
(1), Indian (2), and mixed race young (1) people were also represented. Though this sample 
more adequately represented different ages within the target population than the survey, it still 
contained bias toward younger youth. Nine 13-17 year olds, ten 18-24 year olds, and three 25-29 
year olds were interviewed. The majority of young people interviewed at the time of their 
interview attended high school (13), but four attended university, and five were neither employed 
nor attended any schooling. This particular subset of the youth population, out-of-school and 
unemployed youth who were actively engaging civically, if afforded the opportunity for greater 
input in further studies, might have valuable insight about how to best meet the needs of the great 
numbers of youth facing the same challenges but who have disengaged civically. 
Though this study is not free from bias, general representivity of youth civically engaged 
and/or attending school or university and particularly those young people actively engaged in 
civic behaviour in eThekwini can be assumed. 
From hereafter, "youth" or "young people" will refer to young people living in eThekwini aged 13-29, who were actively 
engaged civically and/or attending school or university, with an emphasis on youth ages 13-24. 
78 
Chapter 4: Analysis and Findings 
Part 1: eThekwini Youth Democratic Interpretations and Engagement 
Travelling with sixteen undergraduate students to attend the South African Student 
Sports Union (SASSU) national soccer tournament in East London, a ripple of excitement wove 
through the bus as we passed Nelson Mandela's birthplace. For a moment, the boisterous chatter 
and house music took backstage as all eyes searched for Mandela's home. Muntu27 was the first 
to spot the former president, political prisoner and activist's homestead. Eagerly peering out the 
window, almost to herself she commented, "My family was very political. I'm not that political. 
I'm not sure why..." ("Muntu." 2006. Observation. 3 December.) 
At least in part, young people avoided political involvement because of their frustration 
with governmental policy and politics. Generally, youth did not believe the government or 
political parties worked adequately to support them or solve social problems. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, young people faced significant challenges, and social pressures and a culture of 
accumulation added complexity to the realities they negotiated. In response, they had formed 
their own definitions of participation in the democratic state and drifted away from direct 
politics in favour of community-based participation. Young people South Africans were 
participating civically, but on their own terms of their engagement. 
1.1: Perceptions of Government and Politics-Not Enough 
1.1.i. Youth faced significant social challenges. 
Serious significant pressures confronted young people. 
27 For those desirous of anonymity and for all youth under the age of 18, aliases were assigned. See Appendix for interview, 
observations, and other key informant lists. 





On the surface, race did not seem to preoccupy the attention of today's young people as 
much as the growing divides between rich and poor South Africans. Race did not factor into 
the top ten most listed problems. Less than 1% of young respondents listed race or racism as 
the most pressing issue affecting today's young people. No respondents from either townships 
or informal settlements listed race as the most pressing issue. Munhara claimed that "[As 
young people], we are able to connect and get along better with each other." Within the 
Socialist Student Movement, financial exclusions impacted white and black students alike. As 
Thabo described, "I don't see any [racial] barriers. We have poor Indian students. Poor white 
students." If probed, however, many white, black, and other young people acknowledged that 
race was still an issue that often lay under the surface of other issues. The divide between rich 
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and poor South Africans was perceived along racial lines. "There aren't a lot of sports centres 
you can go to for free, especially in black communities" (Mapule 2006). 
Racist attitudes and clashes also persisted. According to Star, 
Since 1994, people are free, but people, especially black people, are still 
suffering. The police have been beating us. ...I heard the conversation of some 
black policeman in Sydenham, and they said the reason some other policemen 
do this to us is because they knew black people were not well educated and 
they didn't know their rights very well. They knew there was nothing they 
would do against them. That's still racist. 
Glen acknowledged that "Race is a big factor. There are still a lot of problems, and [as a student 
leader] I deal with it every day on a day to day level." He further described an incident that had 
taken place on the day of his interview. A group of white students had thrown banana peels at 
two black students, which prompted a fight between large numbers of students. According to 
Glen, "We try to combat it." Like other suburban and urban counterparts, Glen blamed 
affirmative action policies like BEE for the continuation of racial tension. "If we ignore race 
and just let the best win, I believe racism will die and we'll have a happy country." The issue of 
affirmative action has been an increased source of contention for young white South Africans 
(see Chapter 2). 
Surveyed young people unanimously agreed, however, that the biggest problems facing 
young people were drugs (29% listed as the most pressing issue), HIV/AIDS (23%); teen 
pregnancy and premature sex (16%), peer pressure (14%), and crime and violence (11%). 
Drugs, HIV/AIDs, teen pregnancy and crime and violence were listed universally in the top five 
most listed responses across all age, leadership status, and location. Among those interviewed, 
seventeen of the twenty-two young people including university students, out-of-school youth, 
and high school youth from both wealthy and poor schools described a significant portion of 
young people as engaging in reckless sexual behaviour or substance abuse. 
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To a certain extent, young people blamed youth attitudes and culture for the high 
prevalence of disease, pregnancy, crime, and joblessness plaguing young people in general. 
Mbali described the situation, "Many young people take themselves as adults." Among 
surveyed youth, a loss of respect or negative attitudes ranked sixth. 
Most Pressing Youth Problem 
Drugs or Alcohol Abuse 
HIV/AIDS or Disease 
Teen Pregnancy and Premature 
Relationships 
Loss of Respect or Control 
Peer Pressure 
Crime and Violence 
Materialism 
Education 
































































































Equal numbers of suburban youth considered a loss of respect and unemployment as the most 
pressing issues. More township youth considered loss of respect the most pressing issue (6% as 
compared with 3%). Sihle described what he perceived as the changed youth attitude, "Each 
and everyone we're not respecting ourselves. We're not respecting our parents. It means we're 
not respecting anybody." 
Young people worried in particular about the negative influence of peer pressure in 
contributing to decline in respect and risk-taking among young people. Peer pressure ranked 
fourth overall as the most pressing youth issue and impacted youth from a wide range of socio-
economic backgrounds.28 Younger South Africans were more concerned than older 
Peer pressure ranked third for suburban youth and fifth for township youth. 
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counterparts.29 Mpho, from Ntuzuma, explained, "Friends say 'It's cool,'" therefore, young 
people believe that "living about today is fun and not hard work" despite the fact that "thinking 
about the future is hard work." Glen described the culture of peer pressure at Glenwood Boys 
High School, "All of these guys are sheep...the biggest problem with teenagers is that they 
haven't been brought up with enough self morals to make them unique and willing to stand up 
for what they believe in." Though willing to hold their peer group accountable, young people 
also attributed the wide range of social challenges to inadequate government intervention. 
1.1.ii. Young people lacked trust for political and government bodies. 
Young people possessed low levels of civic trust and viewed political parties with 
wariness. Only 10% of survey respondents indicated general trust. Levels of trust for almost 
all civic actors were low. 
Trust for Civic Actors 
0 20 40 60 80 
% Who Agreed or Strongly Agreed 
DReligiousgroupsareworkingto solve 
problemsin our community 
• I trust religiousleaders 
• Trade unionsare working to solve problemsin 
our community 
• Community servicesare working to solve 
problemsin our community 
I trust community leaders 
I Itrust school leaders 
• Political part iesare working to solve 
problemsin our community 
• The government isworkingto solve problems 
inour community 
I Itrust political party leaders 
29 Peer pressure ranked third among 13-17 year olds but sixth among youth aged 18-23. 
30 For all indicators (trust, electoral, efficacy, political voice and awareness, community engagement, community problem-
solving, and justice orientation), average mean scores were determined from indicator set statements. Scores greater than or 
equal to 4 suggest indication. 
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Levels of trust were particularly low in relationship to government officials and political parties. 
Only 36% believed the government was working to solve problems in the community. 
Young people perceived politics as vacuous and full only of empty promises, posturing, 
and careerism. Glen described his perception of politics and political leaders: "Politics is not 
really the answer. My answer would be to get.. .role models to start leading the way.. .rather 
than the deputy president walking into a hospital and hugging a baby." Surveyed young people 
did not believe that the government or political parties worked adequately to solve problems in 
the community. Asked whether government parties, trade unions, religious organizations, 
community services, and political parties were working to solve problems in the community: 
• 57% agreed that unions were working to solve problems 
• 52% agreed that religious groups were working to solve problems 
but only 
• 36% agreed that the government was working to solve problems 
• 29% that political parties were working to solve problems.3 
Rather than service to the community, young people believed politicians sought career 
advancement. According to Thabo, students on the University of KwaZulu-Natal-Westville 
campus "no longer trust their student leaders. They know that they are just there for themselves 
or to polish [their] cv for a job in a government department. That's why [students are] dealing 
with their problems on their own." Khurshid similarly described youth politics on campus. 
"The ANCYL on this campus and generally in South Africa has become [a place for] people 
seeking a 'political springboard.'" "We've sacrificed our values." According to Khurshid, an 
accumulation culture could be observed among student politicians by the expensive brands they 
wore at ANCYL meetings on campus. "People shout viva this viva that," he asserted, but the 
actions of student politicians did not align with their sloganeering. 
31 Strikingly, more people disagreed (33%) than agreed (29%) that political parties were working to solve problems in the 
community. 
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Youth perceived these trends as indicative of the broader political arena, which had 
fallen short in the provision of services and creation of meaningful democratic spaces for 
participation. As truly participatory and development concepts of democracy lost currency in 
both local and national political contexts (see Chapter 2), basic services in eThekwini failed to 
reach the majority of residents. 
1.1.iii. Young people were frustrated by a lack of services and supports. 
Young people were frustrated by a lack of service delivery and believed that not enough 
had been done for youth in South Africa. Only 35% surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that 
political parties cared about youth issues. Of the twenty-two youth leaders interviewed, 
nineteen (86%) said that the government was not doing enough. According to Khurshid, the 
ANC took for granted their position of power, "They don't really need to deliver." 
Youth reported a need for safe spaces, education and opportunities for growth and 
development. Some youth criticized government for a lack of effective prevention efforts. 
Several youth perceived the child grant as aggravating the problem of teen pregnancy among 
poor youth desperate for any source of income. (Mpho 2006; S'bu 2006) Others argued that the 
government should do more regarding drugs and drug dealers in the schools (Mbali 2006). 
Glen attributed the disengagement of young people to the lack of government intervention. 
"Some of us don't know what to do on a Saturday afternoon and if they could motivate us that 
would be something. The government is just into politics and advancing careers." According to 
Mapule, "The Government doesn't have enough support mechanisms for youth-a place to go if 
a person feels like talking to someone- the youth centres. There aren't a lot of sports centres you 
can go to for free-especially in poor communities." 
A lack of youth development opportunities seemed to disproportionately impact poor 
young people. Thabo decried the ANC policies he attributed to the increasing disparity, "The 
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ANC has betrayed the youth of the country. Especially poor communities." From the 
perspective of the youth from the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement for land and housing, in 
regards to basic services to its poorest citizens, eThekwini had made only empty promises. A 
deep sense of betrayal and frustration with a lack of delivery permeated all interviews with 
Bahlali32 youth: 
I was born in Ntuzuma and my family came to stay here in Kennedy Road in 1987 
so from 1987 I grew up here...The municipality promised that they would build 
houses here... [T]he Urban Foundation, came and built a hall and these toilets, and 
they said that there was progress here and that we were not going anywhere. 
...Later on, they changed. They said this space was unstable. The land is moving 
and if you build a house, it will crack. They saw that we didn't understand that 
and after a while they said no, there are gases in the air here because you live near 
the dump. The gases are dangerous to you and you and your children you will 
have to move away. We asked them why all of a sudden... we hadn't seen 
anyone here but they said no they had sent people to do the research. But we 
didn't see anyone doing the research. (System 2006) 
There were so many problems in Joe Slovo. They promised us housing. I think in 
2003, one man came in my house and he said "You've got free housing." Then he 
came back and said "You can't have the house because we've lost your form" but 
they said that "next year you will get the house". Okay, so I wait and I wait and I 
wait. (Ayanda 2006) 
Other young people described the impact of income disparity on education. "Orphaned 
and vulnerable young people are unable to pay the school fees and sometimes a person can't go 
to the next class because she hasn't paid the school fees" (Lindiwe 2006). In some areas, 
children who didn't pay their fees didn't receive their reports (System 2006). Regarding the 
financial exclusions of students on campuses and education disparity in general, Thabo declared 
"It's a betrayal of the struggle... Access should not be based on how much you have." 
A lack of education and access to basic services aggravated other social ills. Ayanda, a 
15-year-old from Joe Slovo Settlement, described the situation in his informal settlement, "here 
in Joe Slovo we just have to sit in the house and do nothing all day. Some young people go and 
Literally, "Bahlali" means "residents" and "Umhlali" means "resident" (baseMjondolo "of the shacks") but in reference to 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, "Bahlali" and "Umhlali) refers to activist(s) within Abahlali movement for land and housing. 
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do crime because they don't know what to do. [There is] no grounds. No house. What else do 
they have to do? Go for crime. Go for drugs." System, who finished grade 11 but did not 
complete her matric, asked, "I'm over 18. So what must I do? There are no jobs. So the youth 
just turn to drugs. Go stealing." Star also linked the lack of job opportunities to participation in 
negative behaviours. "There are no jobs here. Young people are still suffering. Some are 
involved in drugs, crime. Nothing seems to be going their way." 
Young people blamed government for failing to address the rise in unemployment and 
continued lack of job opportunities plaguing young people in general and poor young people in 
particular. As discussed in Chapter 2, unemployment has taken a youth face in South Africa 
with young people comprising 74% of the unemployed (Mlaba 2005). Of surveyed youth, both 
suburban and township youth were concerned about jobs (ranked seventh and eight 
respectively). Youth who had entered or were about to enter the job market were especially 
concerned. Overall, among surveyed youth, jobs and unemployment was listed seventh as the 
most pressing issue facing young people, but fifth among young people aged 18-23 years old 
and first among 24-29 year-olds. Of the nine people interviewed who studied at the tertiary 
level or who were out-of-school, seven (78%) highlighted jobs as a major problem. 
Youth development programs designed to uplift the economic status of young people 
fell short of intended goals (See Chapter 2). Young people believed national economic policies 
like Black Economic Empowerment benefited a small elite. According to Sihle, who lived in 
Joe Slovo, an informal settlement, for most of his life, the national youth entrepreneurship 
program, Umsobomvu Youth Fund, for example, was not accessible to the average young 
person finishing matric. "You need huge [amounts of] money but they know exactly that we 
don't have money." Poor young people struggled to gain experience and skills necessary to 
compete in the job market. "Now, when you want a job they want the license and the computer 
skills and everything they're supposed to give us in our schools but they don't give us in our 
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schools. They give everything to the private schools, which are for the rich." (Sihle 2006) 
Mandla, from Ntuzuma, summarized the experience of many youth from his community, 
"When you finish matric, you don't have money to go to tertiary. And posters for jobs show 
that you need experience and you don't have experience, so you're stuck." According to poor 
South African young people, in particular, therefore, government forms of youth intervention 
only accentuated disparities inherent in the capitalist growth model adopted by the state. "In 
other words, when you're rich you get richer. When you're poor, you're very poor." (Sihle 
2006) 
1.1.iv. Young people were frustrated by a lack of meaningful spaces for popular participation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in addition to service delivery, local municipalities were 
required to enable public participation. Despite the constitutional mandate, however, young 
people described interactions with government and municipal forces as ineffectual and distant at 
best and violent at worst. The politics of the ruling party, as experienced on the local level, did 
not only fail to effectively deliver needed supports, but afforded little room for meaningful 
participation. 
In some instances, the government seemed hesitant to engage with community partners 
in addressing social needs. A young peer leader from INK described the refusal of local 
government to partner or support local efforts. "I belong to the group helping in the community 
and the government is doing less to help the community. There is no sponsorship of those in 
the community helping the community. For example, there was a shortage of gloves. The 
[government] clinics refused to provide when they asked for gloves" (M'du 2006). 
Several young people commented on a perceived lack of respect of public officials for 
their constituents. Zodwa smiled as she told the story of the court case won against the 
88 
municipality reversing the city's decision to ban an Abahlali protest. Asked why she was 
smiling, she answered 
Because no one had ever thought that people from shacks can take the 
municipality, recognized as the biggest municipality for the whole country, to the 
courts and win the case. It's a victory. Because people from the shacks are the 
lower classes so the people in the municipality don't treat them as South African 
citizens. Maybe because we are living in shacks. I don't know because we are 
the voters but if you're living in the shacks, people don't take you seriously. 
(Zodwa 2006) 
Several surveyed leaders (2%) listed negative youth perceptions as the most pressing issue 
facing South African young people. One survey respondent problematized "the fact that the 
adults recognize us as a 'lost generation'" (Durban Youth Council Surveys 2006). As discussed 
in depth in Chapter 2, the concept of youth as a problem remained pervasive in South African 
society and affected the way in which public officials interacted with the youth citizenry. One 
teacher at a high school in INK interrupted the facilitators of the class to publicly reprimand a 
student. Leaving, he turned to the facilitators and exclaimed, "Are they giving you any 
trouble?" Later, the same teacher commented in private, "The youth! They are a problem!" 
(Phakama Observations 1/9/2006) Youth described how contemporary attitudes and politics 
affected their struggle for development. "It was better [during apartheid] to be blocked with a 
board, because we could fight to demolish that board, but now when it's concrete and it's not 
easy to fight and break that concrete. Why I say that is because the people that have power 
won't respect the lower people." 
Mapule described the top-down approach of ruling-party governance as it impacted 
young people, "The Government assumes it knows what young people want. They don't 
actually know." Likewise, one youth member of Abahlali, M'du Hlongwa, problematized the 
city's behind closed doors practice of decision-making: 
They may say, at the top, they may call a press conference and say we are 
working for Kennedy Road, we are building maybe 1000 houses on Kennedy 
89 
Road. Only to find they haven't come to the people to ask, how many houses are 
needed in that area of Kennedy Road? How many families are here? They may 
say we built 100 houses for Kennedy only to find that maybe 4000 houses are 
needed for Kennedy...Only if they come and ask the people and talk to the 
people, then they have the exact number of house needed. That's what we want 
from the government. Come and ask the people. Don't say 'we built a tuck-shop 
in Kennedy.' What if people don't need a tuck-shop?' (Ngiam 2006) 
Decisions about housing and development were consistently made without the 
participation of the affected communities and to the detriment of those communities. 
Star described the negative impact of the municipality's lack of public consultation as it 
pertained to housing: 
They haven't told us anything; they just told us, "We're relocating you. We're 
not upgrading there" - [the land] where they had promised us [houses].But 
actually, most people are working around this area, so it would be difficult for 
them to move there [to the new site]. It's a rural area. There's no hospital. 
There's no police station, so if the people move from here to there, they're 
actually going to struggle more. And they will lose their jobs. There are no 
jobs there...that's why we're still unhappy with the municipality and Abahlali 
will take it forward. 
Politics on the local level meant not only top-down policy implementation, but the 
promising, withholding, and awarding of services according to an emergent system of 
patronage. Young people were dismayed by the politics of delivery and participation they 
experienced. As Ayanda described, RDP homes originally promised to his family and 
neighbours in his informal settlement were allocated as political favours to individuals not from 
the community (Ayanda 2006). Youth believed that their ability to connect with government 
officials depended upon political affiliation. Several youth voted or expressed their intention to 
vote for a particular party because they believed government officials tracked voting records 
(System 2006 and Lindiwe 2006). Others expressed exasperation because even within the 
system of patronage their party affiliation had not translated into fulfilled service delivery: 
• We're fighting for land and housing. Councillor Baig came to Foreman at the time 
that he was campaigning for votes, and he told us, together with the mayor, "If the 
ANC wins, there's land there. If you vote for the ANC we will definitely build 
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houses there." But ever since the ANC won, they have been ignoring us. (Star 
2006) 
• When I vote for him, he says "Okay, I was staying with you but now I'm adopting 
the stage of the other people." Then, they come to tell us to vote [again] after 
they've ignored us. They come back and say, "I'm a candidate and I'll do this and 
this and this," and they just promise everything. (Sihle 2006) 
• The Chairman (of the Ward Committee) told us we were getting houses. Each and 
every month we were paying money for the ANC membership and SANCO 
membership cards but even now we didn't get the houses. I have met many 
people who have spent many years there, more than 15 years, and are still looking 
for development. Right now, we still haven't gotten it... .We are sick and tired of 
the promises." (Vuyi 2006) 
Local government used its control over services to intimidate and silence those voicing 
opposition. Youth activists within Abahlali's fight for land and housing were denied political 
access because of their activism. Sihle described what happened in Joe Slovo after residents 
joined Abahlali, 
They said you must move. This place is for the municipality or this place is for 
somebody else. So now, it's hard to communicate. .. .Now the councillors they 
won't help us with anything that we want. Some of our mothers they want the 
stamps for the grants. When they go to the councillor the councillor says, 'I 
don't know you. (2006) 
In Pinetown, when the municipality illegally evicted residents of the Motala Heights informal 
settlement, remaining residents gathered in protest and some began to rebuild homes. Officials 
attempted to coerce those who remained behind into compliance. Some were told that if they 
didn't leave, the city would turn off their water. Others heard that they could purchase 
government homes only with thousands of Rands. Security forces threatened violent retribution 
to still others (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 11/2006). 
The municipality, indeed, employed force to quell protest. System, a 27 year-old 
activist in Abahlali baseMjondolo lost her tooth at once such instance. She discussed what 
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happened when the Kennedy Road community attempted to employ self-directed action rather 
than official channels. At first, local government officials failed to respond: 
We started a project called a Cleaning Campaign with the PDI. The PDI gave us 
green bags to sort the rubbish. When we were cleaning, the rubbish was down 
by the hall and the municipality wouldn't come to pick up the rubbish because 
they said the plastics were the green ones, and they didn't take the green ones-
they take only the yellow. So after that we started to march because the rubbish 
was full down by the hall. We tried to contact our councillor, and our councillor 
didn't even attend our meetings... (2006) 
Next, community members initiated action against the unresponsive municipality, who 
responded violently: 
[The councillor] didn't come so that was the day we decided to march. We 
picked up the rubbish and put it in Kennedy Road so that the councillor would 
come and talk to us. He didn't come because he didn't recognize us. We went 
down to Ml 9. We burned tires there. Then, the police asked why are we angry. 
We told the police the whole story. Then they tried to phone our councillor. The 
councillor said I don't know those people. They're just criminals so just arrest 
them. So the police started shooting rubber bullets. They beat 14 comrades 
including two young teenagers who were supposed to write their exams. They 
took them to the police station. We tried to march to the police station but the 
police blocked us there. So they took them to Westville Prison and we were 
thinking those Bahlali were Nelson Mandela because they were arrested for the 
people. (System 2006) 
The pattern of failed service delivery, community action and critique, government 
dismissiveness, and violent police repression was not unique to Kennedy Road. Three Umlazi 
activists, including one twenty-five year old woman, were reportedly murdered for opposing a 
local councillor in the 2006 municipal elections by his bodyguards (Concerned Residents and 
Organizations 2006). In October 2006, as they prepared to appear on a local radio station in 
order to criticize local housing policies, two leaders of Abahlali were arrested on invented 
charges by the local police. Arresting officers uttered racial slurs and beat one leader 
unconscious (Tolsi 2006). 
Among community activists, municipal security forces were notorious. In Motala 
Heights, Pinetown, in October and November 2006, Abahlali members faced almost daily 
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harassment. On October 28, metro security forces arrived unannounced with labourers who 
proceeded to illegally evict shack dwellers and demolish their homes, leaving at least 19 people 
including several children and young people homeless. When the municipality's forces returned 
days later to tear down shacks that had been rebuilt, shots were fired when community members 
gathered in protest. When a local Abahlali member produced a letter from a lawyer urging that 
the forces desist demolition, that member was pepper-sprayed. The local police turned him 
away when he went to lodge a complaint. The next day, security forces threatened him with 
further violence. As children played in the site of their former homes, security forces swung 
their automatic weapons and hurled insults. Multiple attempts were made to contact the 
municipality, and when an official was eventually reached, she stated that the city did not know 
of the evictions occurring in Motala Heights, further demonstrating the deliberately 
unresponsive and undemocratic nature of certain local government practice (Abahlali 
baseMjondolo Observations 2006). 
In November 2006, several Bahlali met with local community members in Motala 
Heights. Mnikelo, a young activist and then Community PRO of Abahlali spoke with the 
residents. Passionately, he declared, "We Abahlali are for all umhlali. We are going. We have 
force... "The Constitution is not Govendor's33 or the government's. It's ours. We have the 
right to basic services." In a moment of transformation, Mnikelo flipped the undemocratic 
action of the state on the state and reclaimed democracy on behalf of the people, "The 
Constitution; It's ours." He further defined Abahlali's participation in democratic South 
Africa: "We are going. We have force." When a court edict was finally won in December 2006, 
local police came to protect community members of Motala Heights from what would have 
otherwise been further demolitions, the community celebrated its victory (Abahlali 
Mr. Govendor is a local landowner owning land adjacent to and portions of the Motala Heights Settlement. He pressured 
residents and city officials alike to clear the entire Motala Heights Settlement for his development plans. 
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baseMjondolo Observations 2006). Motala Heights residents and Abahlali activists had 
claimed the law as their own and protected their community. 
Analysts linked the emergence of social movements in South Africa to a heightened 
dissatisfaction regarding service delivery and the politics of participation (see Chapter 2). 
Though only a minority of young people included in this study reported taking part in social 
movements (26% of those surveyed and 31% of those interviewed) or indicated interactions 
with municipal forces as violent as those experienced by bahlali, the majority's interactions 
with broader society, too, reflected the decreasingly participatory practice of the ruling elite. As 
the ANC adopted a western liberal model of governance, its commitment to social development 
and participatory democracy waned on local levels in particular. In light of the narrowed 
confines for development and participation, young people have responded to the political 
context by accepting the elements of choice and autonomy inherent in western liberal 
democracy on the one hand, but demanding community-based and participatory understanding 
and practice on the other. 
1.2: Defining Relationships to Materialism and Democratic Participation 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, South African youth have been accused of rejecting political 
participation for a culture of material accumulation. Young people's relationship with 
materialism, however, was complex and mimicked the national political context. As democratic 
South Africa adopted a liberal definition of democracy inclusive of free-market and growth 
strategies, many young people embraced the accompanying ethic of consumption that inundated 
mass media. This ethic, however, did not wholly reject civic participation and, in fact, was 
viewed by some young people as the means for participation. Choice and freedom of choice 
mattered to today's young people; however, young people expressed concern about material 
indulgence at the cost of community development. 
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To a certain extent, young people embraced materialism, but not universally. 65% of 
those surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that youth were materialistic. As one university leader 
found, "When I look here at the environment [at the University of KwaZulu-Natal], when we 
were organizing elections, basically we were told 'we don't have issues. We want 
entertainment'" (Mapule 2006). "Generations have changed," Thabo agreed, "People want to 
accumulate wealth. [They care about] what kind of vehicle they want to drive at the end of the 
day. They care about their family, but they forget that they've grown up in the community." 
The degree to which young people valued material goods should not be over-generalized, 
however. 









































Though 65% of youth leaders from Our Lady of Fatima Interact students and 57% of students 
from Meadowlands strongly agreed, only one quarter of Northwood Boys Interact students and 
just over one-third (34%) of Dumahlezi high school students strongly agreed that they wanted 
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to buy jewellery and clothes in the next three years. One quarter of Youth for Christ interns 
strongly disagreed. Young people had not entirely made up their minds about the worth of 
material goods. As Mpho from INK described, "Young people have a lot of brains. Without 
them there would be nothing in the world. Some of us want to focus on worldly things. Some 
of us want to focus on education." Glen agreed that "[t]o a degree, I guess everyone is 
materialistic," but disagreed that young people cared only about material gain. "I believe in 
looking out for other people more than looking out for myself. We're sometimes driven by 
outside motives, but I'm not driven by that. Here [at Glenwood Boys High School] everyone 
looks out for each other. I've learned to do everything for my team." 
Nor had young people accepted materialism unconditionally. More young people agreed 
or strongly agreed that young people were leaders of the nation (76%) than those who thought 
young people were materialistic (65%). Young people were also more interested in pursuing 
their education than acquiring material goods. 
General Youth Future Orientation 
_9Q_ 
1 UipjF--t 
I want to buy I want to I want to I want to I want to find 
nice clothes further my help out a work toward a job 
and jewelry education political party solving 
or candidate social 
problems 
In the next three years... 
In regards to future orientation, more youth (72%) agreed or strongly agreed that in the next 
three years they wanted to buy jewellery or clothes than work to solve a social problem (59%), 
but many more (90%) agreed or strongly agreed that they wanted to further their education and 
the same number (72%) wanted to find a job. 
Social pressure in the new democracy, however, connected status and success with 
material acquisition. Young people from a variety of backgrounds reported experiencing such 
pressure. "We feel that by having material stuff we can be happy.. .it's peer pressure to get the 
material stuff." (Mapule 2006) Zodwa, an umhlali, agreed, "We want to have money, to have 
capitalistic things. Because we feel that in order to be recognized, you must have something 
material." In the new society, peer pressure enforced notions that equated happiness and social 
status. As discussed in section 1 of this chapter, young people expressed deep concern for the 
effect of peer pressure on their generation. As Aadila described it, "In order to be cool you 
have to wear the right clothes and go to the right places... Kids today worry about 'Am I going 
to get the right outfit from YED?' .. .1 think it's the same across the board. All races and classes 
except a very few." Glen identified a culture where "richest is the coolest." Kuku from INK 
explained, "They are obsessed with material things because if you don't have such things you 
don't seem to be cool." M'du agreed, "The time we're living in is different from olden times. 
You need things in order impress" as did Thando, "Some seek things that make you able to get 
a cell phone just because a friend has a cell phone." Media influence added to pressures 
experienced by many young South Africans. "TV and magazines play such a huge influence.... 
A lot has to do with society. Fashion TV, for example, never says look at what's happening in 
Sudan. It places a huge amount of pressure on young people." (Aadila 2007) 
Young people interpreted materialism not only in light of social pressures but also as 
part of the new South African society itself. If South African democracy was defined according 
to a liberal rights-based definition, the freedom and ability to choose as a consumer would be 
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included in one's democratic rights. Aadila found that "in some respects teenagers are selfish" 
but within democratic society "they have every right to be selfish." She cautioned, however, 
that " there's a point where you have to stop being self indulgent and pay attention to people 
around you." For some poor young people, especially, economic security and consumer choice 
was equated with freedom, itself. Star described such a phenomenon. 
Now, it's a new generation. Young people need to be happy with their 
lives... .By getting all the phones, it's a new freedom for them. They have to 
express themselves. That's why others are saying 'they're selfish or what what.' 
They have to do what they want. They need to express themselves. (2006) 
For the new generation, material acquisition was also the means to join the 
technologically advanced global order. Philani explained, "Modern people are not obsessed 
about the rural things. They do things the modern way," which includes accessing modern 
technology. Mapule characterized her generation as "more technologically-based." Cell phones 
and material items had real functional value in providing access to the broader society for young 
people who would not otherwise be able. Ayanda denied partaking in material acquisition for 
frivolous pursuits but stated, "I carry the cell phone for personal things. I don't carry this cell 
phone for fun." Cell phones are the means towards communicating with one another and 
participating in the broader society. According to System, cell phones and other material items 
enabled poor South African youth access otherwise unavailable: 
"The reason that some of the youth focus on the cell phones and all that stuff is 
because it is the only thing that they can do to keep themselves busy. There are 
no free computer centres or studies. Nothing. The youth love technology and the 
computer is a part of it. You can find data, there's the Internet, all that stuff. If 
there were computer studies for free, the youth would focus on the computer. 
To a certain extent, therefore, material acquisition could be interpreted as action taken to 
fill gaps of access and opportunity for young South Africans. 
A youth culture of individual choice and material acquisition had emerged. Lindiwe 
linked the increase in independent decision-making to a lack of support, "The reason young 
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Many youth, however, had begun to feel uneasy about the influence of materialism and 
free choice on South African young people and society. Poor youth, in particular, were 
concerned about the impact of unfettered choice and materialism. 
Most Pressing Youth Problem 
Drugs or Alcohol Abuse 
HIV/AIDS or Disease 
Teen Pregnancy and Premature Relationships 
Loss of Respect or Control 
Peer Pressure 
Crime and Violence 
Materialism 
Education 





































Township and informal settlement youth reflected relatively greater concern about the perceived 
culture of materialism than suburban and urban counterparts. Among those surveyed, the sixth 
and seventh highest number of township and informal settlement young people listed 
materialism as the most pressing issue facing South African young people, whereas materialism 
ranked eleventh among suburban youth. Youth critical of materialism viewed the freedoms 
inherent in democracy and emphasized in western liberal democracy as having opened the way 
for a sense of reckless individual entitlement. According to Sihle, youth "want things easy. 
[For example,] when I want Raymond's cell phone, I take the knife and I point it at him because 
I want his cell phone." 
Young people likewise warned that individualistic materialism posed a potential threat 
to traditional values for collectivism. Religious youth in particular bemoaned the moral decline 
of the capitalist society. Munhara blamed the "fast pace of life" on the fact that "people have 
become so wrapped up in this life and themselves that they don't care about other people or 
how their actions affect other people." Khurshid summarized the critical youth perspective, 
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"With democracy has come an openness...[and] its brought us social and moral vices." Sihle 
described how the new culture detracted from the ethos of community, "Life has become selfish 
because we think for us. We don't think for our parents or our nation." In battling financial 
exclusions at the University of KwaZulu-Natal on Westville campus, Thabo described how the 
new culture impacted student mobilisation efforts, 
It was the township youth who used to be in the forefront [of activist struggles]. 
But today it is quite surprising because they are not interested anymore. It has 
become a stigma. They don't want to say 'I don't have money to register.' 
People they don't talk anymore. It's like 'I have to deal with my problem.' Or 
'you have to deal with your problem.' Everyone's on their own. (2006) 
Young people rejected total emphasis on individual freedoms, which some felt distorted 
democracy, itself. 
1 ' Democracy [has been] used unnecessarily because some people don't understand 
the way democracy works.. .In a democracy everybody has a right to do 
whatever, so some people don't care. 'As long as I know I have rights, my life 
doesn't affect your life.' They're over doing it. If I slap you, I say 'It's my right 
that if you make me angry that I slap you.' But actually it's your right not to be 
slapped. (System 2006) 
Youth interpretations of democracy required both personal freedom and collective well-
being. The attention span of young people affirmed their emphasis on community. Though 
more youth paid attention to popular culture (54%) than to local or national politics, even 
greater numbers of youth (69%) paid attention to what was going on in their community. Vuyi 
defined Abahlali baseMjondolo as democratic because of its commitment to both individual 
autonomy and respect for the broader community: "We [in Abahlali] respect one another. It's a 
democracy because there's no one who tells us what to do." As they have negotiated the ethos 
of materialism that permeated South African youth culture and embraced both individualism 
and collectivism, young people defined democratic participation in community development 
contexts and engaged in complementary ways. 
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1.3: Defining Democratic Engagement 
Young people were fairly united in how they defined democratic involvement. 
Surveyed youth were asked an open-ended question about what it meant to be an active citizen 
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The three highest responses included developing, growing or building the country or community 
for the better (17%), caring or helping others (17%), and taking part in the community or 
community events (13%). Young people from a ride range of backgrounds incorporated helping 
others and developing the broader community into their definitions.35 
Those who defined democratic involvement as developing, growing, or building the 
country or community, generally described the process as an active and joint effort. "Kusho 
ukubamisana nabanye abantu owakehlene nabo" or "It means to come together with other 
34 Responses were grouped into 15 categories determined from youth responses that were not unique. 
35 Three of the ten interviewees who defined active citizenship listed helping others in their definitions. Both 13-17 year-olds 
and 18-23 year-olds and township and suburban youth listed developing the community in their top-three responses. All 
subgroups except UKZN student leaders ranked "helping others" in their top three responses. 
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people and to build with them" (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006). Participation was part of a process 
of improvement for the greater whole, "to work to better and improve our country" (Fairvale 
Interact Surveys 2006). Helping others, too, meant actively contributing to the broader society. 
Active citizenship meant not only that " [y]ou care about your community and its people" 
(Durban Youth Council Surveys 2006) but also required physical involvement in addressing the 
needs of others: 
Kuletha izidingo abantu abazifunayo (To bring the needs to the people who are 
wanting) (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006) 
Kusho ukuzikhandla nokukhatazeka ngabanye abantu (It means to exert oneself 
and to worry about other people) (Dumahlezi Surveys 2006) 
You must try to help people around you. (Meadowlands Surveys 2007) 
Taking an interest in your community and the people around you. Physically 
getting involved. (Aadila 2007) 
Finally, active citizenship required long-term commitment. To Munhara, participation meant 
"not only showing concern about the plight of others, but you're doing something about it on a 
continuous basis. You make it part of your lifestyle." One survey respondent described the 
future-orientation necessary, "It means helping to achieve a better South Africa for our future 
leaders" (Meadowlands Surveys 2007). 
The next highest number of youth also defined active citizenship in community contexts, 
but not necessarily orientated towards the betterment of community. Active citizenship meant 
"to take part and be involved in your country" (Our Lady of Fatima Interact Surveys 2006) or 
"getting involved with the community" (VS Naik Leaders Surveys 2007). Some youth defined 
participation merely as taking part in the country, community and community activities. 
Citizenship simply meant "tak[ing] part in any activities occurring around your area" 
(Northwood Boys Surveys 2006). Others, however, placed involvement in community 
development contexts. For these young people, citizenship activity would include "forming 
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part of youth organizations and community development projects," UZKN leaders Surveys 
2007). 
Many defined active citizenship as multi-layered and inclusive of multiple categories of 
participation. Forty percent of survey respondents who attempted to define active citizenship 
included more than one category of participation. For example, respondents defined active 
citizenship as both taking part and helping others, "being involved in the community and 
helping your fellow South African citizens" (Durban Girls Interact Surveys 2006). A handful of 
young people defined citizenship in light of positive self-development and personal 
responsibility, but this too was portrayed as contributing to the broader development of the 
nation. This form of active citizenship meant that "you are doing things to make South Africa a 
better country. These can be big things including donations or simply small things like studying 
well so you can get a job, and well, this does make the country a better place, I think." (Durban 
Girls Interact Surveys 2006). "In the process of earning well" and seeking personal 
development, Munhara concluded, "you're empowering others." 
Others extended the meaning of active citizenship beyond general contribution to the 
community and included educating and organizing others. Interviewed leaders in particular 
suggested that community-based action should include community education and 
empowerment. For Star, "To be active, is where you can actually help the people who really 
need your help. To help the people to understand what they want, issues, proper channels to 
follow rather than just to sit down and not do anything" (Star 2006). Three percent of survey 
respondents included mentoring in their definitions of active citizenship. 
Several respondents from varied socio-economic backgrounds indicated cynicism 
concerning citizenship. Eleven surveyed respondents from Dumahlezi High School, 
Meadowlands High School, Northwood Boys High School, Durban Girls Interact, Phakama 
Peer Leaders, and VS Naik leaders responded that active citizenship meant not much or nothing 
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at all. Such responses vented frustration with service delivery and opportunities for 
participation (see section 1.1 in this chapter): 
Akusho lutho lokhu-ubandlululo alwaka pheli SA kukho izindawo esingakwazi 
ukuzingena ezikhetha izinhlanga. (It doesn't mean anything - they still haven't 
built houses in SA and there are places in which we can't enter to vote.) 
(Dumahlezi Surveys 2006) 
They felt stymied from participating meaningfully. Citizenship "does not mean a lot...because 
our opinions are not heard but rather rejected." To a student from Meadowlands, being a citizen 
in democratic South Africa, "does not mean a lot. The government does not care." 
(Meadowlands Surveys 2006) 
A significant portion of young people did not attempt to define active citizenship. Over 
one-third (37%) failed to complete the open-ended survey question. The high omission rate 
might appear to reflect survey fatigue. More likely, however, omission indicated a lack of 
familiarity or a discomfort among young people in addressing the topic. Many more people 
completed the responses to the open-ended question asking youth to identify pressing youth 
issues (only 16% omitted) that also fell at the end of the survey. Significant numbers of youth 
might have felt unprepared to interpret democratic engagement. 
Young leaders, however, felt more equipped than general youth. 
Definition 
develop the community 
care or help others 
participate in the community 
voice critical opinions 
vote or participate politically 
work to solve social problems 
it means nothing or something negative 
protect rights 
love or take pride in the country 
live in a democracy/freedom 
knowledgeable about issues facing community 
positive self-development 
1 don't know 































































































Whereas one in two non-leaders (48%) did not attempt to define active citizenship, four in five 
young leaders (81%) responded. 
Whether a young person actively engaged influenced the ways in which he or she 
defined citizenship. Leaders were not just more comfortable defining citizenship but also more 
likely to define citizenship as the exercise of critical voice.36 For one Durban Youth Council 
member, "An active citizen is someone who would express their opinion freely and without 
offence but with courage and not be afraid of being laughed at or ostracized" (Durban Youth 
Council Surveys 2006). Leaders from political or activist backgrounds seemed particularly 
inclined to define active citizenship through the expression of critical and independently formed 
opinions. Mapule explained that as an active citizen, 
You have to fight for what you want. You have to be outspoken. Speak for the 
people. Criticize people. Provide a way forward. You need to stand for what you 
believe in... Basically, you need to make a lot of noise. (2006) 
To Mapule, participation was partially representative- active citizens "speak for the people," 
especially "those people scared to speak for themselves- for other young people," but for others 
they did not envision the vanguard as their spokesmen. Rather, they insisted that autonomy of 
voice be included in democratic understanding. Vuyi, an umhlali, insisted on independence of 
voice and action, "To be an active South African citizen, means that we're doing everything that 
needs to be done. There's no one who can tell us what to do. We're independent." 
Other differences were also observed. Suburban youth were more inclined than 
township youth to voice criticism (12% versus <1%). Township youth were much more 
inclined to include national pride in their definitions than suburban youth. Pride ranked sixth 
among township youth and ranked first among informal settlement youth, but only tenth among 
suburban youth. Leadership imbalance between surveyed suburban and township populations 
36 Critical voice ranked fourth among leaders defining active citizenship, but eleventh among non-leaders. 
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might account from some differences in democratic understandings. The highest numbers of 
both non-leaders of Dumahlezi and Phakama Peer Leaders (from INK), however, defined active 
citizenship as possessing pride for the nation suggesting that leadership differences did not fully 
account for subgroup variation. Instead, differences between suburban and township youth 
might have reflected historical and political contexts unique to poor black areas. 
Young black people likely have felt a genuine sense of obligation to support the new 
nation that had replaced the apartheid state and ended white rule. The black political and 
economic elite used racial identity to encourage affiliation that would maintain its rule (Erasmus 
2005). Fear, too, might also account for some of the differences between suburban and 
township youth. National ANC executive practice touted party allegiance as its model for 
citizenship, acting to silence internal dissent. Likewise, the patronage and retribution practices 
of local politics in poor areas in particular (see section 1.1 of this chapter) demonstrated 
intolerance for dissidence. Finally, the fear-driven legacy of the violence that divided 
eThekwini's townships into no-go zones until the late 1990's (see Chapter 2) might also have 
made more township youth uncomfortable from speaking out critically. 
Unwillingness to speak out critically did not reflect approbation. Young people 
unanimously rejected politics as practiced in favour of community-based definitions of 
participation. Only two surveyed non-leaders defined citizenship through voting or 
participating in direct politics. This is fewer than the number (three) of young people who 
defined active citizenship as playing sports. According to one university leader, "People don't 
want to hear about Marx, but are worried about human rights." "More value is placed on values 
as opposed to politics." "People don't want to hear 'comrades.'" (Khurshid) Young people 
defined democratic participation at local and community levels based upon principled action. 
Leaders were more heavily represented among suburban youth than among township youth (71% versus 27%). Differences 
between cohorts might have been exaggerated by differences in leadership status.37 
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As young people took part in their communities, they rejected official forms of participation for 
multi-tiered and varied forms grounded in community. 
1.4: Youth Disengagement 
At a gospel concert at the Durban University of Technology attended by over seventy 
young people, the minister bellowed, "The government doesn't provide scholarships," and 
leaving room for suspenseful anticipation, explained that it was a higher power from which the 
audience should seek solutions. Students responded with "Alleluias" and "Amen's" (Other 
Observations and Key Informants 2006). Young people had withdrawn from political and 
electoral structures, but disengagement trends and attitudes revealed a sophisticated reasoning 
critical of government and political practice. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier this chapter, young people perceived government 
to have failed in the realm of youth and community development. Likewise, they felt repelled 
by political practice at the local level. Levels of trust for civic actors were low in general, but 
particularly low in relationship to government officials and political parties. Few young people 
believed political parties (29%) and government officials (36%) were working to solve 
problems in their communities. Even fewer (16%) reported trust for political party leaders 
despite a majority who trusted school (59%) and religious (53%) leaders. As a result of 
plummeting feelings of trust and inadequate spaces for engagement, young people withdrew 
from state-sanctioned forms of participation in favour of other forms of engagement. 
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Civic Indication 
Political Voice Electoral 
and Awareness 
Trust Community Community Justice 
Engagement Problem-Solving Orientation 
Civic Indicator Sets 
Though young people sought other forms of participation, they were little inclined to engage 
politically and electorally. One quarter of young people indicated political voice and 
awareness, demonstrating a small likelihood that they would contact public officials, follow 
politics, or employ official channels for participation. Similarly, less than one-third (31%) of 
young people indicated electoral indication. 
Young people tended to avoid participation in directly political organizations. The 













political party trade union burial 
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Though low levels of participation in trade unions and burial associations might be explained by 
class and age specificity, political parties broadly catered to the youth generation. Major 
political parties in eThekwini incorporated youth bodies into broader structures.38 Still, only 
8% of young people reported current active membership in a political party. 
The withdrawal of young people from political activity was demonstrated across 
demographic groups. 
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Extremely low numbers of youth reported current political participation across a wide variety of 
survey groups. Likewise, past behaviour also revealed evidence for political disengagement. 
38 The ANCYL and IFP Youth Brigade each reported significant presence in KwaZulu-Natal, but the Democratic Alliance 
Youth's strongest bodies appeared more active in the Western Cape (Democratic Alliance 2007). 
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Past Participation (in the Last Year) 
I have taken party in a I have contacted or visited I have volunteered or I have worked with another I have belonged to a group 
protest, march, or a government official about interned with a religious, person or people to fry to 
demonstration a concern youth/children's, health or address a social problem 
social service organization. 
Type of Participation 
On the whole, only 9% of respondents indicated that they had contacted a public official in the 
last year. Low levels of past political participation were reported across all survey groupings 
except those identified for their political affiliation. 
In the last year... 
Dumahlezi High School 
Northwood Boys Hiqh School 
Meadowlands High School 
Phakama Peer Leaders 
Northwood Boys Interact 
Durban Girls Interact 
Durban Youth Council 
Fairvale Interact 
Our Lady of Fatima Interact 
VS Naik leaders 
Youth for Christ Interns 









































































As compared with other recent past behaviour (marching, addressing social problems, 
participating with community development groups, and belonging to a group), the fewest 
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numbers reported contacting a public official in each surveyed group, except for UKZN 
political leaders. 
Electoral behaviour was difficult to assess given that large numbers of young people 
surveyed and interviewed fell under the voting age. Descriptions of intended electoral 
behaviour, however, were revealing. Some youth did not think voting mattered. Glen, for 
example, did not intend to vote because he expressed, "I don't think it makes a difference." The 
majority of young people, however, valued their right to vote. 73% of young people surveyed 
agreed that voting mattered. "Voting is a very prestigious event. I will vote because even one 
vote of millions is still something. It's your vote" (Munhara 2007). A young person from INK 
passionately responded to the question about whether she would vote, "If I don't vote, I won't 
make my opinion heard to important people so they can do things about drugs and violence. If I 
don't vote, how will the world be a better place?" (Mpho 2006) Others echoed the same 
sentiment and viewed voting as a privilege inherited from those who struggled to topple the 
apartheid state. According to Ayanda, "I'll vote because they say if you are a South African 
citizen you have to vote." As Thabo described it, "I do vote because our past leaders, our 
forefathers, they fought just to vote and they fought against the exclusion of the black majority 
of people from not participating in the national elections so I think its very important to take 
part in the elections." 
For many young people, voting exercised ownership of the democratic state. In 
sophisticated practice of engagement, young people viewed voting and not voting as the means 
towards exercising individual autonomy over the state. As Zodwa described it, "I vote because 
it's my democracy. I vote to make democracy work." However, precisely because of her deep 
sense of ownership for the democracy, refusing to vote was also the means to take back 
ownership from the state. Zodwa further described her decision not to vote in local elections, 
however. "I didn't vote because I feel that by voting for a person who I don't believe in, I'm 
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just giving that person power, power to oppress us." In the last election, Thabo also asked, 
"how do you express your dissatisfaction with those parties?" and concluded that the best way 
was through spoiling the ballot paper. 
I went there and in the booth, I spoiled the ballot paper. I wrote what we wanted. 
Free education. Free housing. Free water. Access to basic needs. Let's say 2000 
people were to do that, I think it could have an impact on the government. Then, 
they'd have to ask themselves why people are writing all these things. And 
maybe one day they'd realize people are angry. (2006) 
Members of Abahlali baseMjondolo agreed in the 2006 municipal election to withhold their 
votes in the "No House No Land No Vote" campaign. Vuyi described the decision, 
I did not make my vote because we are sick and tired of voting and never getting 
the promises. We told the government we would hold our votes because he 
didn't give us our basic needs (especially housing). No one in Jadhu Place voted 
because all the people staying here are Abahlali." (2006) 
A frustration over a lack of service delivery and empty promises of political leaders motivated 
decisions to withhold votes. The No House No Land Campaign deliberately confronted the 
patronage politics of the ANC as practiced in eThekwini. 
Voting was viewed by youth both as the means for the state and politicians to 
wield power over individuals and for individuals to wield power over the state. Some 
youth voted because they knew that the state kept track of voting rolls and believed that 
councillors used such rolls to deny requests for services based on your voting record. 
I will vote in order to get basic needs for the community because if I don't vote 
even if 1 report my needs to the community leaders, they will not provide for 
them if I haven't voted." (Lindiwe 2006) 
I voted in hope because they promised and promised. I know since 1994, when 
our parents voted, they didn't fulfil their promises, but ... you know when you 
vote they put a mark on your id. Some say, "eh if you don't vote, there will 
come a time when you have no say because you didn't vote." That is a reason 
that makes me really go to vote. Because they say if you don't vote, there will 
come a time when they will check whether you did vote or not." But really, 
really, I can't see anything that we are voting for." (System 2006) 
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Just as politicians had attempted to manipulate voters through promises of service delivery and 
by withholding access when citizens had broken from party ranks, however, young citizens used 
their vote as a negotiation tool. Sihle described how he changed from interpreting his vote as an 
exercise in freedom to viewing it as a tool in negotiating with the state. 
I was voting because ... [the] old people said "Eh, you know what, apartheid was 
doing this and this and this. Now it's better to vote and vote for your colour in 
order to break from the chains that they wore before." That's why I would 
vote.... [But] at the moment, it's hard to say I'm not voting or I'm voting. [The 
politicians are] starting to come to us and tell us everything. I want to see the 
progress of what they're doing. After I see that they're doing what they say, that 
I can vote for. (2006) 
Many young people indicated that they would vote only if political leaders will provided 
the services they had promised to the citizenry. "If the councillor can make change, then 
I will vote." (Zodwa 2006) According to Star, describing the Abahlali campaigns, he 
was willing to vote if conditions of living change, "It was 'No Land No House No Vote' 
and then 'House First, Man Behind'. If you give me a house now, then let me be sure I 
will have to vote for you." Until promises of service delivery were fulfilled, however, 
Star and other young people planned to continue refuse their vote in order to assert 
autonomy. 
If it continues like this, I won't vote because I have to vote for something that 
has changed my life. At the moment, there is nothing that has changed my life so 
why would I vote? To vote would mean that I would be wasting my vote. I 
would be putting a person on top of me, on top of my head. I would be his tool, 
just working for him while he doesn't give me anything. (2006) 
Resisting political processes, therefore, for many young people, embodied an active and 
engaged stance against state policies and leaders. Young people valued democratic processes 
but sought to practice participatory democracy that contributed toward community development. 
Contemporary social perceptions (discussed in Chapter 2) erroneously cast youth disengagement 
from political processes as part of a broader problem of the youth. Instead, in withdrawing 
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politically, individuals reflected informed decision-making. Young people rejected state-
sanctioned forms of participation in order to participate on their own terms of engagement. 
1.5: Correlations between Youth Perspectives and Practice 
Statistical calculations from survey data strengthened evidence linking the rejection of 
political and electoral participation to youth attitudes and trust for political processes. Youth 
attitudes towards political parties, leaders, and electoral processes significantly correlated with 
behaviours and perspectives on political processes. Perceived effectiveness was connected to 
trust. 
Sig. Noted 
at or below 
Voting matters .01 level 
correlated with 
I talk about social and political issues with my friends or family (inverted scale from I do 
not talk about...) 
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community. 










Whether a young person felt voting mattered significantly correlated with whether he or she 
indicated trust for civic actors in general. In particular, the weight placed on voting correlated 
with whether he or she believed that political parties worked to solve problems in the 
community. Young people's perceptions of the intentions of political parties and leaders 
likewise affected their willingness to participate politically. 
Using SPSS software, 2-tailed significance of correlations was determined. Significance was noted at or below the .01 level. 
Though correlations do not account for other variables and, therefore, do not confirm causality or the nature of the relationship, 
they do suggest some level of interdependency. Throughout this study, including but not limited to this section and part, 
references to correlation suggest significant relationship determined by this process. A complete table of correlations (including 
significant and non-significant calculations) is included in the Appendix. 
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"1 trust political party leaders" 
correlated with 
1 pay attention to what's going on in local politics. 
1 pay attention to what's going on in national politics. 
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved. 
The government is working to solve problems in our communities. 
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Political parties care about youth issues. 
In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate. 
In the next three years, I want to find a job. 
I trust school officials and teachers. 
I trust community leaders. 
South Africans think young people are important. 
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard. 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health 
or social service organization 
In the last year have you belonged to any group 
currently an active member-political 
currently an active member-trade union 
Trust Indication 
Sig. noted 




















Whether a young person trusted political party leaders significantly correlated with whether she 
considered contacting public officials effective in making her voice heard and whether she paid 
attention to local and national politics. Further correlation between trust for political party 
leaders and government officials suggested that young people perceived the line between 
politics and government officials as blurred. Given that only 16% of young people trusted 
political party leaders, the patronage politics of local governance during election cycles did little 
to encourage a reversal in the youth trend for political disengagement. 
As part of their withdrawal, young people believed that youth issues received little 
currency in political arenas. 
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"Political parties care about youth issues" 
correlated with 
1 pay attention to what's going on in national politics. 
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans have improved. 
The government is working to solve problems in our communities. 
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities. 
In the next three years, I want to help out a political party or candidate. 
I trust political party leaders. 
I trust school officials and teachers. 
I trust community leaders. 
South Africans think young people are important. 
Contacting a party official is an effective way to make your voice heard. 
Trust Indication 
Sig. noted 















Whether a young person believed political parties cared about youth issues correlated with a 
wide range of civic attitudes and behaviours related generally to trust and specifically to 
electoral and political participation. Young people who did not believe politics prioritized 
youth issues (Only 35% believed political parties cared about youth issues) were seemingly 
inclined to mistrust politicians or political structures (only 16% trusted political party leaders). 
However, as corresponding cycles of political disengagement emerged, withdrawal did not 
mean total disengagement. 
1.6: Youth Engagement 
Despite having rejected political forms of participation, young people possessed positive 
outlooks on youth abilities and roles in the civic sphere and demonstrated high levels of 
engagement. 
Young people almost unanimously reported wanting to further their education. Ninety 
percent of surveyed youth agreed that they wanted to further their education in the next three 
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years. Likewise, among interviewees, out-of-school youth, too, hoped to further education and 
skill sets. System, who did not have her matric, expressed a desire to attain it but an inability to 
afford to pay. "If I was in charge that the youth have free education and [the chance] to pick up 
their skills in every area that they need." (2006) 
Young people valued community and believed that they had a significant role to play in 
developing the community. 
Youth Perspective on Roles and Abilities 
Young people are Getting involved in I have the ability to People working 
leaders of the my community is make a difference together can make 
nation important in the community a difference in the 
community 
An overwhelming majority felt able to effect positive change in their community especially if 
collective action was taken. Seventy-five percent of young people felt they had an ability to 
make a difference and eighty-one percent felt that people working together could make a 
difference in their community. Young people did not only consider themselves potential 
contributors but present day leaders. Over three-fourths felt that young people were the leaders 
of the nation. These statistics portrayed a positive youth outlook. Supporting correlations also 
concurred. Personal efficacy, in particular, may positively impact a wide range of civic 
behaviours and indicators.40 The high prevalence of personal efficacy among young people 
40 Personal efficacy (whether individuals felt that they had the ability to impact the community) correlated significantly with 
indication including but not limited to community engagement (and a belief in the importance of getting involved), political 
voice and awareness, electoral inclination (and whether young people thought politics mattered to their community), community 
problem-solving, justice-orientation (and whether young people believed protesting effectively made their voices heard); and 
trust. 
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(75%), therefore, suggested a huge potential for the broad civic engagement of eThekwini 
youth. 
Indeed, young people were significantly engaged in their communities. They possessed 
nuanced interpretations of the wide array of social issues facing their generation. 
















I pay I pay I pay I pay I talk about 
attention to attention to attention to attention to social and 
what's going what's going what's going popular political 
on in local on in national on in my culture issues with 
politics politics community my friends or 
family 
Over half (57%) reported talking about social and political issues with friends and family. High 
numbers of eThekwini youth paid attention to community affairs (69%). Only half followed 
politics (41%), however, further indicating their withdrawal from political processes in favour 
of community-based participation. 










Political Voice and Electoral Trust 
Awareness 
Community Community Justice Orientation Efficacy 
Engagement Problem-Solving 
Civic Indication 
Young people were strongly inclined to working to solve problems within their communities. 
59% of youth surveyed demonstrated community problem-solving indication. Young people 
were also oriented towards justice-building activity. Under half (47%), however, felt connected 
and involved in the community. Lower community engagement levels might suggest 
ambivalent understanding or feelings among youth regarding their relationships to support 
networks and communities, especially those related to government and political processes. 
Aforementioned low levels of general trust likely meant lower feelings of connectivity. 
Despite potential feelings of disconnect, young people participated willingly in their 
communities. Equipped with a positive sense of personal and collective ability and inclination 
towards community problem-solving in particular, high numbers engaged civically. More 
specifically, 
• 88% of surveyed youth indicated current active membership in at least one 
group or organization. 
• 50% indicated current active membership in 3 or more. 
• 34% indicated current active membership in 5 or more. 
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Type of Participation 
student 
organization 
They also reported recent past participation in a wide range of civic activity. 
Recent Past Participation (in the Last Year) 
I have taken party in a I have contacted or visited a I have volunteered or I have worked with another I have belonged to a group 
protest, march, or government official about a interned with a religious, person or people to try to 
demonstration concern youth/children's, health or address a social problem 
social service organization. 
Type of Participation 
Nearly three-quarters (72%) reported group membership in the last year. A significant portion 
of young people sought to contribute specifically toward the development of their communities. 
Over half (53%) reported having volunteered with a religious, children's, health, or social 
services organization and nearly half (44%) reported having worked on a social problem in the 
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past year. Surprisingly, despite justice-orientation, youth involvement in social movements was 
relatively low. Only 14% reported having taken part in a march, demonstration, or protest in 
the past year.41 One possible explanation could have been a lack of knowledge or exposure 
necessary to organize or join social protests. 
42 1.7: Demographic Differences 
Though young people on the whole rejected political participation for community-based 
forms, demographic differences affected civic engagement patterns among subgroups. 
Differences between age groups might have reflected an increasing trend of political 
disengagement among youth generations.43 
Differences in Age 








Indication for Trust in political 
political voice and parties 
awareness 
In comparing 13-17 year olds and 18-23 year olds from Phakama Peer Leaders and Dumahlezi 
High School, young people from the older cohort were more inclined to trust and participate in 
directly political processes. 
41 Higher numbers (26% of respondents) reported current active membership in social movements suggesting either a flaw in 
question wording or more fluid youth interpretations of the term social movements that extended beyond protest activity. 
42 Only statistically significant differences will be discussed in this study (with the exception of differences concerning open-
ended responses and other models of research). Significance was determined using SPSS software to calculate independent t-
tests of means. 
43 Respondents were grouped into three age cohorts: 13-17 year olds, 18-23 year olds, and 24-29 year olds. Because of the 
extremely small sample of 24-29 year olds (n. 4), comparisons did not address this portion of the population. Dumahlezi youth 
and Phakama Peer leaders accounted for 64% of all 18-23 year olds, therefore additional measures were taken to control for 
sample biases (An independent t-test of means was conducted to test for age differences between 13-17 year olds (n. 72) and 18-
23 year olds (n. 75) from Dumahlezi and Phakama Peer Leaders only.) 
44 Socio-economic environment also affected youth participation. Young people from 
different socio-economic backgrounds did not different significantly in indication for trust, 
community engagement, community problem solving, electoral, justice orientation, and political 
voice and awareness. Township and suburban youth, however, did differ in levels of efficacy 
and types of civic participation. 
Though equal numbers of township and suburban youth leaders engaged civically, they 
demonstrated different forms of engagement. 
Significant Differences in Civic Activities 
Suburban and Township Youth (Leaders Only) 
I Township 
I Suburban 
Religious, chllttens, Beltnged to a group (in Trade unions (current] StoVvi 
health a ctmmurity the last yea) 
organization (in me last 
Bun at soaetiei 
(current) 
Civic Activity 
Township youth leaders were more involved than their suburban counterparts in traditional 
membership organizations including trade unions, burial societies and stokvel associations. 
Suburban youth leaders, on the other hand, reported significantly greater participation in 
structured youth forms or community services. Higher numbers of suburban youth had 
44 Because of the relative scarcity of respondents indicating rural residence (n. 14), this study did not seek to make any major 
comparisons between rural youth and other counterparts. T-tests of independent means were calculated between all other 
categories. No significant differences were found among responses of young people from urban and suburban environments. 
Likewise, the only significant difference between young people from informal settlements and townships occurred between trust 
for religious leaders. Significant differences were noted between township and suburban responses. However, suburban youth 
more heavily represented leaders than township youth (71% versus 27%); therefore, to account for this bias, additional 
independent t-tests of means, comparing township leaders (n. 49) and suburban youth leaders (n. 140) only, were calculated. 
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belonged to a group and volunteered or interned with a religious, children's, health or 
community organization. 
Differences in modes of engagement were likely due to issues of access. Organized to 
contribute to the economic support network of working class and poor South Africans, stokvels, 
trade unions, and burial associations were much more prevalent in township communities than 
suburban ones. Structured service groups and groups in general, in contrast, might have been 
more prevalent in suburban communities. Organizations more prevalent in townships did not 
seem to have accounted for all disparity as related to group membership and structured social 
services. Though only four percent of suburban youth did so, thirty-seven percent of township 
youth did not report group membership. Differences in resources likely impacted the available 
opportunity for structured membership. 
Perhaps because of disproportionate engagement opportunity, suburban youth leaders 
demonstrated a greater sense of efficacy than township leaders. 
Differences Between Township and Suburban Young People 
(Leaders Only) 
1 think people working together can make 












Given the high correlation of efficacy with other civic factors (see footnote 41), this disparity is 
of particular concern and a potential threat to other aspects of engagement.45 Efforts to support 
increased opportunities for engagement for youth living in townships and informal settlements 
should be made by those interested in enhancing the civic engagement and addressing persistent 
issues of equity among eThekwini youth. 
Correlations between efficacy of youth leaders and other civic indexes resembled those calculated for youth in general. 
1.8: Conclusions and Ambiguities Concerning General Youth Engagement 
Young people in eThekwini described patterns of engagement that reflected a distrustful 
and distant relationship with political and governmental persons and processes, but their 
position was not irreversible. Youth expressed significant ambiguity. 
% Who Neither Agreed nor Disagreed 
Politics matters to my community 
Political parties care about youth issues 
34 
31 
Significant numbers of youth were uncertain about the relevance of politics to their lives. For 
example, one-third neither agreed nor disagreed that politics mattered to their communities. 
Neither had they entirely made up their minds about whether to engage in political processes. 
% Who Showed Neither Positive nor Negative Indication46 
Trust Indication 
Political Voice and Awareness Indication 
89 
72 
72% provided neither negative nor positive indication for political voice and awareness. 
Though young people almost unanimously agreed that the government was not doing enough 
for young people, there was a sense that though "they're not doing enough.. .they are doing 
some" (Mapule 2006). "They're subtly trying" (Munhara 2007). The government "is 
trying...He is trying but he is still one step behind" (Star 2006). 
Young people indicated that should the government better address youth issues and 
fulfil the promise of local politics for meaningful engagement and service delivery, more young 
people would engage politically. In the interim, young people planned to engage on their own 
terms, employing official channels for participation when complementary to their version of 
democratic engagement. At a general body meeting to plan a protest of a housing conference 
(that would be attended mostly by local and national government officials and NGOs and held 
46 Indication, as already mentioned, was reflected in average mean scores of 4 or greater for each indicator set. Likewise, strong 
lack of indication was marked at 2 or below. Those who showed neither positive nor negative indication possessed average 
mean scores per indicator of greater than 2 and less than 4. 
without significant popular inclusion), members of Abahlali and other local movements debated 
the merits of sending participants to the conference. They concluded that the value of the 
information available to insiders at the conference warranted limited participation. On the day 
of the conference, a handful of Bahlali attended, and hundreds of Bahlali stood outside the 
conference centre picketing in protest. Despite the visual presence, no official came out to 
address the crowd in person (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 9/2006). As long as public 
officials resisted consequential forms of interaction between the state and its citizenry, young 
people intended to limit their engagement with official structures. 
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Part 2: How Civic Experiences Shaped Youth Leaders 
System spoke passionately about her involvement in the Abahlali baseMjondolo social 
movement for land and housing, emphasizing the autonomous decision-making, voice, and 
action influencing her participation, "I'm not fighting for anyone. I'm fighting for myself. 
Whenever I do anything to pick up the struggle, I'm not telling myself I'm doing it for our 
President S'bu, or for other comrades or just to show off. I'm fighting for my children. I'm 
fighting for my life." (System 2006) 
Young people who engaged civically exercised independent voice and decision-making. 
Young leaders were self-directed in how they choose to participate civically, and their civic 
activity likewise affected how they further considered and acted civically. Active youth were 
more engaged, connected, and autonomous and gained enhanced skills, exposure, and feelings 
of trust and personal efficacy. 7 This chapter will explore the impact of civic experience on 
active engaged youth and how young leaders themselves shaped their experience. 
2.1 Increased Efficacy 
Young leaders had a deepened sense of personal efficacy. System, an Umhlali, 
described how her involvement in Abahlali baseMjondolo increased her sense of personal 
power. 
I feel like a hero because everywhere people are talking about the red t-shirts. 
Even if I'm not wearing a red t-shirt, I can hear some people in the community 
"Hey these people Abahlali, eh they're very strong."...I'm proud of it. And the 
other day I heard the people saying "Eh, those are the ones who marched and one 
lady was beaten by the police and they broke her tooth. Hey I wish to see that 
lady." I didn't say, "Here I am." I just listened to them talk and talk and talk. 
And other people said "It's a shame because these people were not fighting, they 
just needed service delivery." "They're not against ANC." So I can hear some 
47 As point of reminder, only statistically significant differences among survey respondents will be discussed. For a complete 
list of significant differences between non-leaders and leaders calculated using independent t-tests of means, see the Appendix. 
people debating about us. Eh, 1 feel like a hero. I say, Abahlali are too powerful 
and I feel like a powerful lady. I am powerful." (2006) 
Leaders demonstrated significantly higher indication of efficacy than non-leaders. 












Efficacy Indication I feel that I have the 
ability to make a 




Leaders indicated efficacy whereas non-leaders did not. More specifically, young leaders 
were more inclined than non-leaders to feel that they could make a difference in their 
community. 
Personal Efficacy % Who Agreed 
Civic Groups 
Northwood Boys Interact 
Durban Youth Council 





Dumahlezi High School 
Northwood Boys High School 




Comparisons between civically active and non-leader groups of young people likewise 
demonstrated differences in feelings of individual ability. Munhara's civic experience 
highlighted the positive impact of active engagement on efficacy. Acting civically "makes you 
feel like you have greater purpose." 
As acknowledged earlier this chapter, indication is measured by scores greater than or equal to 4. 
Not only did civic activity improve feelings of efficacy, but also positive feelings of 
efficacy enhanced other civic behaviours and future inclination. "If a young person can achieve 
this much, then when you're older, you think you can achieve even more" (Munhara 2007). 
Efficacy Indication (Among Leaders) Correlated with 
Electoral Indication 
Community Engagement Indication 
Political Voice and Awareness Indication 
Trust Indication 
Justice Orientation Indication 
Community Problem-Solving Indication 
In the next three years, 1 want to further my education. 
In the next three years, 1 want to work towards solving social 
problems. 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, 
youth/children's, health or social service organization 
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to 
try to address a social problem 













An individual's sense of collective and personal ability affected all aspects of civic life. A 
leader's indication of efficacy significantly correlated with all civic indicators, past behaviour 
and intentions for future participation in community problem-solving in particular. 
Opportunities for meaningful engagement, in improving efficacy, helped strengthen youth 
commitments toward acting civically to benefit their communities. 
2.2 Increased Skills 
A young person's sense of efficacy might have been partly enhanced because of the 
knowledge and skills gained through participation. According to Mbali, by serving as peer 
leader, "I have learned the information about how to behave, HIV and teen pregnancy. I can be 
a leader." Star described how participation in Abahlali baseMjondolo enhanced his 
understanding. 
At the beginning we didn't understand the struggle. And that's where Abahlali 
came... [and] taught us that being in the struggle is like this and you have to 
know your rights and you have to follow the proper channels. Now, we really 
understand. At the beginning, when Abahlali were not here, we used to be 
treated so badly by the politicians and the police. They used to come where we 
live in the settlement, Foreman Road. They used to beat us. They'd not even ask 
but just come to us and then they'd beat us. But now if the police came, we'll ask 
the police "Under which act?" .. .Hawu! It's something that we know now that 
the police won't take advantage of us. Abahlali has helped us a lot because we 
know the things we didn't know at the beginning. It's so good to be in Abahlali. 
(2006) 
Knowledge gained from civic experience provided both theoretical and practical 
benefits. Zodwa described one aspect of this process, "Abahlali taught us about the law. We 
didn't know how to exercise our rights but since I've been Abahlali I know how to exercise my 
rights." Young people eagerly sought knowledge about the democratic channels open to them 
and rights protecting them. At an Abahlali meeting to plan a two-day housing conference co-
hosted by COHRE, excited discussion occurred when questions intended for guest speakers and 
lawyers about rights were posed. The mood was hopeful as those in attendance looked forward 
to the knowledge and access to experts they would gain in hosting the conference (Abahlali 
baseMjondolo Observations 11/2006). Following the conference, S'bu Zikode spoke about "the 
wealth of knowledge that has come from this room" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 
12/2006). With increased knowledge and exposure, youth leaders in general were better 
prepared to interpret and define their roles in the broader society. Surveyed leaders, for 
example, were more comfortable than non-leaders in defining active citizenship.49 Thabo's 
experience as a student activist helped him "to differentiate and to understand what's happening 
around the country and [and that it] is not a given thing. It's not written on stone. It can be 
changed, you see." Indeed, new knowledge and skill sets seemed to have equipped young 
people to better negotiate their role in democratic South Africa. 
See Part 1. Though only 52% of non-leaders defined active citizenship, an overwhelming majority (81%) of leaders so did. 
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2.3 Increased Exposure 
Participation also enabled access to resources, individuals, and experiences not 
otherwise available. According to Glen, his leadership experience gave him "a much wider 
perspective on life." Zodwa described her experience in a women's conference she attended in 
Cape Town, "I feel empowered and proud to be a woman. It inspired me to see those women. It 
made me want to be like them. If they can be like that in that position why not me? What can 
stop me to be like them?" Exposure to other people and experiences also led to a greater sense 
of connection with those people and experiences. For Vuyi, her involvement in Abahlali meant 
"getting more experience" and 
Communicating with more people from different provinces and different 
countries.. .when I went to Cape Town, I experienced different things. To be a 
member of Abahlali, you experience different provinces. I feel connected to 
young people and women and to struggles of other people as well. (2006) 
Civic experience, therefore, filled some of the vacancies created by persistent inequality and 
societal division. 
2.4 Increased Connectedness 
Young leaders felt connected and supported within their communities. For some youth, 
connection to community values drove their decision to engage civically. "I feel a part of the 
community because I show respect. With other boys from around the community, we like to 
clean the yards of the grannies because we don't want any property that is unclean around the 
community" (S'bu 2006). For others, civic activity inspired feelings of increased 
connectedness. M'du from INK indicated that he felt connected because of his civic activity. 
I feel connected to my community because I'm involved with a team of youth 
who go to the houses where there are people who are sick and who are HIV 
positive. We clean the houses and pick up in the yard and the women do the 
wash. I'm also involved in the cleaning of the schools around the community. 
(2006) 
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Young leaders felt more connected to their community than non-leaders. 
1 feel connected to others 
Leaders 
Non-leaders 
Average Mean Agreement 
3.95 
3.62 
Significant difference was noted between young leaders and non-leaders in the degree to which 
they reported feeling connected. 
For many young people, civic activity filled a void, providing needed community 
networks. Aadila, who is of mixed parentage, did not feel part of any particular racial or ethnic 
grouping, but instead defined her community by her experience. "In some sense, I think of 
Rotary as a community." For 15 year-old Ayanda, participation in Abahlali formed his social 
groups, 
You don't see Abahlali fighting. There in Abahlali, I make friends. Here in Joe Slovo, 
even in school, I don't have any friends. I just sit alone. But when I met Abahlali, I met 
people like M'du and Philani, so I have friends. I even met you. That's how I connect 
with Abahlali. When I go to Abahlali, I feel happy, you see, because when I'm here in 
Joe Slovo, I just sit sad. I can only come to Sihle but when Sihle's not here I just sit 
alone...Whenever I'm with Abahlali, I think it's home. (2006) 
Glen also indicated the social importance of his activity, "It also has a social level. Meeting lots 
of new people not just at school but around Durban." System likewise agreed that her civic 
activity provided important social connections, "It's great because Abahlali has an active youth. 
Whenever there's something to be done, the youth are there. So it's fun. It's like we are a 
family, one big family." 
2.5 Increased Trust for Community 
As a result of positive interactions and meaningful engagement in the community, 
leaders were significantly more inclined to trust civic actors than non-leaders. 
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In particular, leaders more strongly indicated trust for community leaders. 
Differences in Trust Between Leaders and Non-Leaders 
Trust Indication Community services are Religious groups are working I trust community leaders, 
working to solve problems in to solve problems in our 
our communities. community. 
Response or Indicator 
Leaders were in more agreement than non-leaders that community service groups were 
working to solve problems in the community (3.77 average mean versus 3.17). 
Likewise, leaders demonstrated greater trust for community leaders (3.27 average mean 
versus 2.89 average mean) and greater trust in general. Trust indication for young 
people in general significantly correlated with all other civic indexes and impacted 
current civic attitudes and practice in particular. 
Sig. noted 
at or below 
Trust Indication (General Youth) .01 level 
correlated with 
Voting matters (inverted scale from Voting doesn't matter original 
statement) 
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community 
I pay attention to what's going on in my community. 
I feel connected to others. 
Young people are leaders of the nation. 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, 
youth/children's, health or social service organization 
currently an active member-religious 
currently an active member-community services centre 
currently an active member-political 
Electoral Indication 
Community Engagement Indication 
Political Voice and Awareness Indication 
Efficacy Indication 
Justice Orientation Indication 


















Correlations suggested a profound connection between trust and patterns of civic behaviour, 
perceptions, attention, and indication among young people. Because of the enhanced levels of 
trust afforded by their experience, their engagement levels and inclination towards engagement 
might have been further increased. 
2.6 Increased Engagement 
Young leaders were much more involved and inclined to be involved in their 
communities than non-leaders. 
Higher numbers reported discussing social and political issues. Engaged in the issues, active 
youth valued community involvement and demonstrated greater orientation towards community 
involvement and problem solving. Leaders showed significantly stronger agreement than non-
leaders, for example, that they intended to solve problems in their community (3.81 average 
mean versus 3.47 average mean). 
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The civic practice of young leaders reflected their orientation towards community involvement 
and problem solving. 
Significant Differences Current and Past Participation 
Non-Leaders and Leaders 
! 00% • • 
currently an active currently an active currently an active currently an active currently an active In the last year have you In the last year have you In the last year have you 
member-religious member-community member-student member-stokvel member-social movement volunteered or interned worked with another belonged to any group 
services center organization association with a religious, person or people to try to 
youth/children's, health or address a social probtem 
social service organization 
Type of participation 
Significantly higher numbers of youth leaders participated in religious groups, student 
organizations, stokvel associations, social movements and community service centres. Over 
three times the number of youth leaders reported membership in community service centres than 
non-leaders. Leaders, therefore, demonstrated greater involvement in general and increased 
community development activity in particular. 
Community-orientated engagement influenced many other aspects of engagement. 
Social problem solving enhanced feelings of connectedness and levels of attention towards 
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community affairs. Enhanced levels of community engagement contributed to the strong 
feelings of efficacy among youth leaders (see 2.1). Whether a leader indicated community 
engagement, significantly correlated with whether he or she felt personal efficacy. Belonging 
enhanced feelings of ability. Individuals confirmed the connection. According to one umhiali, 
through her experience she learned that, 
[U]nity is powerful. You can't fight alone. For example, if you collect some 
wood, one piece, you can just break it, but if you make a pile, you can't break 
that pile because there are too many pieces now. So I think we are strong. To be 
united, is powerful. No one will defeat us. (System 2006) 
Further, community engagement correlated with higher rates of involvement in community-
based forms of engagement (religious groups, community-service groups, and social 
movements) but not officially structured modes for participation (trade union, stokvel, political, 
burial, school, and sports groups). This interesting distinction points to the cyclical impact of 
civic practice on civic understanding and vice versa. Just as indication for community 
engagement may have influenced the types of engagement sought by young people, the forms 
themselves influenced how young people defined the terrain for community engagement. 
2.7 The Connection between Defining and Doing 
For actively engaged young people, the relationship between civic activity and civic 
understanding was, indeed, multi-directional. Not only did civic indication affect civic 
behaviour and practice, but also the nature of civic involvement shaped youth leaders' 
understanding of engagement. 
The experience and civic understanding of Phakama Peer Leaders illustrated this effect. 
Young peer leaders facilitated support processes within peer groups and served as role models 
in their schools and communities. In 2006, peer leaders at Dumahlezi High School organized a 
50 Community Problem Solving indication significantly correlated with a wide range of behaviours for all young people 
including but not limited to whether young people felt connected to others, had worked to solve a social problem, had paid 
attention to community affairs (See Appendix for all correlations). 
school-wide event. Concerned about the high rates of teen pregnancy and HIV/AIDS among 
their peers, peer leaders gained permission from their principle to host a full assembly about the 
issues and to invite other youth leaders to attend. Over three hundred young people from three 
schools in INK sat in unusual captive attention as young leaders gave motivational speeches, 
recited poetry, and performed skits. In near tears, a young leader admitted to her classmates 
about the fact that she was a teen mother, spoke eloquently about the difficulty parenthood 
posed in young life, and urged her classmates to practice safe sex. When asked about whether 
the event was a success, young learners from Dumahlezi overwhelmingly agreed because they 
said peer leaders had changed the minds of other learners and now those learners too could 
teach others. Peer leaders, therefore, defined involvement according to their experience as role 
models and educators. Among surveyed youth groups, Phakama Peer Leaders were unique in 
the emphasis they placed on acting as role model in defining active citizenship.51 As one peer 
leader wrote, active citizenship meant "that I try to encourage others by speaking to them" 
("Kusho ukuthi ngiyazama ukgqugquzela abanye nabo babe nje ngathi") (Phakama Peer 
Leaders Surveys 2006). Not only peer leaders based civic perceptions on participatory 
experience. 
Definitions for active citizenship among interviewees also mirrored experience. The ten 
interviewees asked to define active citizenship included social movement activists, service club 
leaders, religious leaders, and one campus politician. Young people who had participated in 
service activity defined active citizenship as getting involved to help others. Service club leader 
Aadila, defined active citizenship as "taking an interest in your community and the people 
around you...[and] physically getting involved." Interact Club leader, Glen, too, explained, 
"Do your bit.. .to do something other than for yourself or your immediate family." Glen further 
articulated how his service activity had influenced him, teaching him that "To help others you 
51 For Phakama Peer Leaders, serving as a role model was tied for highest ranking with pride in one's country. 
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too one day maybe are helped." Religious youth leaders who were engaged in service activity 
as also defined participation as getting involved to help others. Munhara equated active 
citizenship with "doing something on a continuous basis" to help address "the plight of others." 
Khurshid's definition too included helping the broader society, but in an explicitly religious 
undertone. Active citizenship meant, "Muslim activism" and "religious work towards a moral 
rejuvenation of South African society." 
As discussed in Chapter 2, social movements in eThekwini structured their engagement 
as independent from political processes, in opposition to particular political politics and 
persons, and towards the realization of societal change. Appropriately, of those interviewees 
who participated in social movements, three of the five youth leaders defined active citizenship 
as fighting to making change using weighted phrases like 'confront management' and 
'challenge these people' (Thabo 2006; Star 2006). Two defined active citizenship as exercising 
autonomous voice in the fight to make change. According to Vuyi, "To be an active citizen 
means that we're doing everything that needs to be done. There's no one who can tell us what 
to do. We're independent." For System, it meant, "I am a strong lady. I can stand on my feet 
and fight for myself.. .1 can fight for myself not waiting for anyone to talk for me. I talk for 
myself because I'm the one who's suffering." The emphasis on independent voice reflected the 
direct experience of Abahlali baseMjondolo which has struggled for forms of meaningful and 
independent participation in addition to its goals of land and housing (see Chapter 2). 
The directly participatory interpretation of democratic engagement expressed by social 
movement participants differed from the view expressed by the campus student representative. 
Though the student politician also defined active citizenship as exercising autonomous voice 
and fighting for change, "You have to fight for what you want. You have to be outspoken," she 
based her definition on a representational model, "You need to be a people's person, and speak 
for those people scared to speak for themselves." As direct political processes have 
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increasingly relied upon representative governance of the ruling elite, forms of political 
vanguardism and patronage politics have been enforced (see Chapter 2 and Part 1 of this 
chapter). Their implementation seems to have impacted how those participating in direct 
political processes, in particular, conceived of democratic participation. For young people, 
however, the influence did not fully supplant fuller notions of participation. The youth 
politician, though accepting a representational model for participation, did not endorse national 
party politics but thought youth politicians should stand independently on the issues. Young 
leaders exercised independent action and thought in how they conceived of democratic 
engagement. 
2.8 Increased Voice and Autonomy 
Young leaders valued autonomous action when engaging civically. Actively engaged 
youth were significantly less inclined to rely on others to represent their views. For example, 
leaders were less inclined than non-leaders to believe that speaking to public officials was 
effective.52 Very few young leaders (15%), reported approaching state officials to voice their 
concerns, but instead chose other forms of expression. Speaking out or critically expressing 
one's opinions was the fourth most listed definition of active citizenship among leaders but 
ranked only 12l among non-leaders. Young leaders sought to express themselves directly. 
Vuyi described what it meant to be a part of Abahlali baseMjondolo: 
There is no one standing in front of us. We are talking for ourselves. No one can 
tell us what can be done because we are sick and tired of staying in the shacks. 
We are going straight to the municipality to make meetings with them, to march. 
We mobilize people to go straight to the community and say "Tell us what you 
want from the municipality." They express their feelings and their suffering...I 
needed to speak to the official government myself, and talk to him face to face. 
Some people are telling us they talk to him for us. I'm sick and tired of talking to 
someone because there are only promises. That' why I joined Abahlali because 
we're speaking ourselves. (2006) 
Non-leaders scored an average mean of 3.32 and leaders 3.05. 
Though frustration with political practice was nearly unanimous among all young 
people, contestation in the democratic terrain had less impact on leaders than non-leaders. 
Those actively involved seemed more secure in their civic actions and interpretations than non-
leaders. Negative attitudes, political withdrawal, and low levels of trust for political processes 
among leaders did not stymie other forms of participation. A lack of trust for political leaders 
and their intentions correlated less with other civic factors for young leaders than for non-
leaders. 
2-tailed significance (at or below .01) of correlation 
I trust political party leaders 
Electoral Indication 
Community Engagement Indication 
Political Voice and Awareness Indication 
I feel connected to others. 
Political Parties care about youth issues 
Electoral Indication 
Community Engagement Indication 
Political Voice and Awareness Indication 



























Trust for political parties, for example, did not correlate with electoral inclination among 
leaders though significant correlation was noted for non-leaders. Actively engaged youth, 
therefore, seemed more likely to have exercised their own civic politics in their decisions 
concerning electoral behaviour (see 1.1 of this chapter). Likewise, the negative consequences 
of poor trust on civic engagement were muted for leaders. Whether a young non-leader thought 
political parties cared about youth issues significantly correlated with community engagement 
indication but did not do so for leaders. Indeed, the withdrawal of young people from political 
and electoral processes seemed to impact non-leaders and leaders differently. Leaders did not 
demonstrate a significant relationship between electoral indication and their indication for 
community-engagement and justice-orientation, unlike non-leaders, for whom electoral 
indication correlated with all civic indexes. Because of their civic activity, therefore, the 
community and justice-oriented practice and perspectives were more secure for leaders than for 
non-leaders. For those youth participating outside of the political and electoral arenas that most 
young people had rejected, civic understanding and practice was deeply rooted and reinforced 
by their experience. Justice-oriented youth, in particular, formed a politics of opposition that 
was grounded in a fiercely participatory understanding of democracy. 
2.9 Out-of-Order Politics 
The experience of youth within the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement illustrated the 
politics of opposition that had emerged in South Africa's contested democratic terrain. Within 
Abahlali baseMjondolo, as reviewed in Chapter 2, a profoundly democratic and participatory 
practise challenged status quo politics: 
The politics of the strong poor is an anti-party politics. Our politics is not to put 
someone in an office. Our politics is to put people above that office.. .Our politics 
is also not a politics of a few people... [it] is a traditional home politics which is 
understood very well by all the old mamas and gogos because it affects their lives. 
(Zikode "Greatest Threat" 2006) 
This 'home politics' had a profound impact on young people participating in Abahlali. 
Youth participants were provided significant roles and responsibilities within Abahlali, 
and they accepted the responsibility placed upon them: 
They always put the responsibility on me and they say, "You still have the 
potential to go there, but us we are old now, there's not too much energy. You 
are still young . You are still active. You have to go. You have to challenge these 
people in order for our things to be done properly. (Star 2006) 
They make sure that the youth are doing the most so that they can learn how to 
do things. (System 2006) 
Young people were always present at Abahlali baseMjondolo meetings and visits. During six 
general meetings from 23 September 2006 to 25 November 2006, between 33 and 40 percent of 
Bahlali in attendance were young people. Youth members were selected to become trained and 
conduct research in conjunction with the Human Science Research Council. Young people also 
served in leadership capacities. In 2006, youth members held two of the four top executive 
positions. As System described it, "Abahlali has an active youth. Whenever there's something 
to be done, the youth are there." In one instance, following the dismissal of charges fabricated 
by the police against two Abahlali leaders, an impromptu celebration at Blue Lagoon was hosted. 
When rain poured down on the gathering, after being reminded of their role, young bahlali not 
only ushered older bahlali to shelter but also organized a plan for attaining transport home 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 17/10/2006). 
Young bahlali owned the democratic politics of the movement. They seemed to uphold 
principles of participatory democracy in community decision-making. As System explained, 
Abahlali is democratic. Whenever we're having meetings, or maybe we have an 
invitation, we don't just say "Go, S'bu because you are the leader." No, they 
open it to everybody to choose. If I say "Ally" and someone says "No, System," 
we must use democracy and vote to se how many are saying Ally and how many 
saying System. Our leaders don't make the decisions. We are the ones who 
make the decisions. We act to [encourage the expression of] the different views 
of Bahlali so that we can come to one decision. (2006) 
At all meetings attended, agendas were put to a vote, and in every decision taken, gender 
balance and geographic representivity was sought and usually attained. In the formation of an 
eight-person committee to work with church leaders, for example, care was taken to ensure that 
representatives from each major informal settlement and four women and four men were 
selected. The process for selection, itself, was democratic. Members nominated individuals, 
discussed their merits, and then voted. One youth member in attendance, Mnikelo, praised what 
he called the "democratic way" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 23/9/2006). During that 
same meeting in September, attendees debated an invitation to attend a large YCL event. The 
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invitation had been extended to a limit of two Bahlali. Because members insisted, "Abahlali is 
a mass movement" and "people must see that Abahlali isn't just about Kennedy Road, but is a 
broader and even national movement," the general body told its leadership to seek additional 
seats. In November, Abahlali held its annual general election of leadership. Not only did 
young leaders help organize and marshal the election, but also Mnikelo, who had stood for re-
election for Community PRO and lost, wrote an article praising the election as 'real 
democracy.' He compared the election to the municipal elections of 2006. Unlike in the 
municipal elections, delegates sent by each informal settlement, 
They were voting for real leaders, leaders who work for the people, leaders who 
work to make the strong poor even stronger. They were not voting for breyani 
councillors who work for the rich and throw some crumbs to the poor. No signal 
individual or area asked for by-elections. This was real democracy. Now we say 
"Vote for Land and Housing." (Ndabankulu 2006) 
Individuals, too, were assured of their democratic right to participate within Abahlali. One 
youth member described what it meant to be Abahlali by providing an example: one person 
might want to march, another one might want to pray and neither idea should be discouraged 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 10/3/2007). Open space was provided at the end of each 
general meeting for individuals to voice concerns or raise issues. 
In 2007, Abahlali baseMjondolo democratically approved two coordinators to form a 
youth committee.53 Youth committee members modelled proceedings after those of the broader 
movement. Within the youth committee, again, representivity was sought. The committee 
likewise made decisions collectively. Many of the people who had volunteered and been 
approved as representatives to the committee had not been active members of Abahlali. In the 
initial stages of the youth committee launch, new youth leaders were hesitant to voice opinions 
or challenge suggestions made by coordinators or more seasoned youth leaders. Youth 
members became more willing to speak out as their civic experience shaped them. The 
53 Sihle and I volunteered and were approved to act as youth committee coordinators. 
commitment to democratic action seemed firm. When the need emerged to appoint a 
replacement coordinator emerged, Sihle rejected the suggestion that a particular individual be 
approached without group decision-making and instead the opening was brought back to the 
general body for appointment and approval. 
The movement demanded that its leadership and members be responsive to the broader 
movement, and young bahlali accordingly adhered to principles of discipline and accountability. 
When a meeting began late because of the two youth members of the executive, the general 
body criticized the individuals. With some friction and chagrin, the youth leaders apologized 
sufficiently to proceed with the meeting (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 23/9/2006). In 
another instance, young leaders (as well as non-youth leaders) faced the ire of the general 
populace regarding a big decision that had been made without general body consensus. 
Members were justifiably angry about a perceived lack of accountability and meaningful 
process. In that moment of heated and tense frustration, criticism was not only received but also 
encouraged by the leadership (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 4/11/2006). In a separate 
occurrence, members expressed concern and annoyance over the disruptive behaviour of youth 
members at an overnight meeting. The only young person in attendance, Ayanda, accepted 
responsibility and promised to hold himself and other young people accountable at the next 
overnight camp (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 27/1/2007). 
As young Bahlali learned to adhere to Abahlali's politics internally, they simultaneously 
sought to assert its rigor externally on other bodies and politics. In order to enforce its 'home 
politics' in other arenas, bahlali asserted an 'out-of-order' politics that demanded democratic 
procedure, consultation, and representation. Abahlali's 'out-of-order' politics was most 
evident in its 2006 'No House No Land No Vote' campaign, but it had been practiced 
elsewhere, too. The decision taken by Abahlali to picket a housing conference in Durban (see 
54 The vacancy opened because of my impending departure. 
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Part 1), occurred in response to a perceived lack of consultation and inclusion of the 
communities impacted most by the housing issue (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 
11/9/2006). For both Abahlali and external players, the red t-shirts Bahlali wore became 
associated with the movement that refused to back down from its demands for land and housing 
and participatory democracy. Many of the shirts displayed the slogan "Talk to us. Not about 
us." According to youth member, Mnikelo, decisions for 'out of order' politics arose only if 
procedures were "like red and not red" (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 23/9/2006). If 
proceedings claimed democracy but did not practice it, Abahlali members were committed to 
asserting out-of-order politics. As discussed in Chapter 2, Abahlali's decision to boycott the 
Social Movement Indaba (SMI) arose because Bahlali viewed the process and procedures 
within the SMI as undemocratic. The spark that prompted Abahlali to reject the SMI occurred 
at an SMI planning meeting in late 2006 when Abahlali requested a vote to put a sensitive issue 
on the agenda and the vote was denied. When that happened, Mnikelo reported, "We decided to 
be out-of order" (Observations Abahlali baseMjondolo 23/9/2006). 
Young people within Abahlali accepted and celebrated 'out-of-order' politics as 
autonomous and effective action. Explaining how change should be achieved, Vuyi chronicled, 
"We pressure them. We go to them and tell them what we want. They see the crowd." Though 
the 'red shirts' have been targeted by police forces for their activism, System asserted, "I'm 
wearing it [the red t-shirt] whenever I feel like it. I'm proud of being uMhlali." When Zodwa 
described the concluding events at the SMI conference that both Bahlali and Western Cape Anti-
Eviction members interrupted in protest (see Chapter 2), she smiled broadly at what she and the 
other Bahlali perceived as a victory and demonstration of democracy in action. Abahlali had 
voted to attend and disrupt the event, and the action had stopped the procedures of the 
conference and brought attention to Abahlali's grievances. When bahlali perceived politics or 
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proceedings to have failed democracy, they attempted to put the democracy back into the 
proceedings through 'out-of-order' action. 
The experience of youth within Abahlali baseMjondolo was certainly unique, though not 
irrelevant to the broader youth one. More so than their average counterparts, youth within 
Abahlali were committed to participatory democratic practice, oriented towards 'out-of-order' 
politics, and empowered within the broader movement. Abahlali exposed its youth members to 
participatory democracy principles and practice that were integrated into the larger movement's 
strategies and actions. The experience made a lasting impression on youthful members that 
encouraged not only increased understanding and civic engagement, but also a deepened 
commitment to democratic principles themselves. Participatory forms of engagement, 
therefore, significantly enhanced youth commitment to democratic practice. Should more 
lasting commitments and impressions be desired of the broader youth generation, it seems, 
participatory democratic engagement ensuring meaningful youth roles, direct democratic 
decision-making, and accountability should be encouraged. 
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Part 3: Recommendations by Youth Leaders About Youth and Governmental Roles 
As we walk out of the interview, staring off into the distance, Khurshid utters some last 
words, almost as an after thought: "It's like everyone's searching for something." 
Young people, indeed, were searching for solutions, support, and meaningful 
involvement in the democratic fabric. Young leaders had a lot to say about why and how the 
state and society in general should be improved. This part captures suggestions by young 
leaders about youth roles, models for change, and recommended forms of government 
intervention. Young leaders believed that they had a significant role to play in positively 
shaping South African society. They placed responsibility for development on state 
institutions, communities, and individuals, alike, and hoped to employ both social and political 
avenues for community and youth development. This study and young leaders, themselves, 
suggest that towards the benefit of young people and society alike, youth should be 
meaningfully employed in working to solve problems for their communities. 
3.1 Summary of Youth Recommendations 
As will be explored in detail in the remaining sections of this chapter, young leaders 
suggested several key principles to consider in the development of South African young people: 
1. Youth leaders expressed a healthy and robust perception about the potential youth role in 
positively affecting change in South Africa. They considered themselves responsible for 
individual and collective action towards positive personal and community development, but 
young leaders felt untapped and under-utilized. 
2. Negative perceptions of the youth role detracted from the civic inclination of young people 
and, therefore, should be modified. 
3. To promote positive youth development and engagement in both informal and formal 
structures of the democratic state, the government and political parties must work to repair 
the perceptions of careerism and insincerity, reprioritize by demonstrating commitment to 
youth issues and community development, and foster participatory forms of democratic 
involvement. 
4. The government should help close the gap between rich and poor and support positive youth 
development by providing basic services (including free education, housing, water, and 
electricity), opportunities for positive youth development, job and skills development 
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opportunities, and meaningful spaces for youth interaction with decision-makers and 
decision-making. 
5. The state, communities, and individuals should all work to improve society through a mixed 
model of political and social change. 
6. Youth should be consulted and consultation should directly inform policy-making and 
community development schemes. 
7. Communities, civic bodies, government officials, and state institutions should engage young 
people in solving social problems. 
3.2 Youth Roles: "A Bull Comes From the Calf" 
The perceived value society placed on youth influenced their sense of trust, connection, 
and leadership potential. 
"South Africans think young people are important." 
(2-Tailed 
Sig. at or 
correlated with (among others) below .01) 
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities. 
The government is working to solve problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Political parties care about youth issues. 
I trust community leaders. 
I trust political party leaders. 
I trust school officials and teachers. 
Trust Indication 
I feel connected to others. 
I pay attention to what's going on in my community. 
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems. 














Whether young people believed South Africans placed importance on the youth role correlated 
significantly with a series of trust statements, whether young people believed they would work 
to solve social problems in the future, and how they viewed their generation. Societal prejudice 
as explored in Chapter 2, therefore, has potentially dangerous ramifications. The ripple effect 
of low trust indication was explored in Part 1 of this chapter. The value South Africans placed 
on young people, because of its connection to whether young people considered themselves 
leaders of the nation, further influenced factors important to community engagement, efficacy, 
and community problem-solving. 
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Young people are leaders of the nation 
correlated with (among others) 
Community Engagement Indication 
Community Problem-Solving Indication 
Efficacy Indication 
Total current participation 
1 feel connected to others. 
1 feel that 1 have the ability to make a difference in the community 
1 pay attention to what's going on in my community. 
1 think people working together can make a difference in the community. 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health 
or social service organization 
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social 
problem 
In the next three years, 1 want to work towards solving social problems. 
Justice Orientation Indication 





















Whether a young person possessed a strong sense of the youth rule significantly correlated with 
all current, past and future participation and all civic indexes. The direct and indirect 
connections between youth perceptions of societal views and civic indication, therefore, suggest 
that public officials, educators, and the media should confront bias and adopt positive youth 
development approaches. 
Young leaders, whose involvement likely enforced positive messaging, expressed a 
healthy and robust perception about the potential of youth to effect positive change in South 
Africa. Young leaders believed that they were custodians of the future. As Mbali stated, " I 
have the information to guide youth to the future." Moreover, young leaders believed that they 
were contemporary societal players, "We hear that youth are the future leaders of tomorrow but 
that's not true. We're the future leaders of today" (Munhara 2007). Three quarters (76%) of all 
youth surveyed believed that young people were the leaders of the nation. Civically active 
youth believed that as young people, they possessed energy, creativity and innovation that many 
adults lacked. "Youth must come together and do political things because they are the hope of 
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adults now" (Kuku 2006). Their energy and insight would help propel the country forward. 
"Young people are leaders because without young people, the country will stop. Without young 
people, there's nothing that will be going on. Young people come fresh-minded. As young 
people, we are still growing this country" (Star 2006). Young leaders also attributed a critical 
mind to youthful talents and leadership. "We know where things went wrong, what we need to 
do, what channels we need to set in order for things to be right." (Star 2006) 
Active youth hoped that their generation would come together to fight for a changed 
society. "Young people, their role is to fight for every body... get involved...be active...and 
make people aware that you're.. .a person part of a bigger world" (Mapule 2006). Youth 
leaders criticized disorganization and internal divisions among their peers and urged collective 
mobilization around youth issues. 
Their role is to organize themselves. The problem with the youth is that they are 
not organized.. .they don't view themselves as a whole.. .some will meet their 
degrees and will join the bourgeoisie and some will join the working class. We 
are not sure of our destination. But that's the problem. We have to organize 
ourselves. We have to make our voices heard by the government. We have to be 
involved in policy making." (Thabo 2006) 
Despite positive views on the youth potential, active youth asserted that on the whole, 
they were untapped and under-utilized by the broader society. Official forms for participation 
did not effectively include youth leaders. Munhara complained that most of the ANC Youth 
League leaders were in their thirties and that the body did not adequately connect to the 
majority of young people. "The ANC Youth Leagues is quite influential and vocal but I 
emailed them and never got a response." Young leaders believed that the failure to include 
young people in decision-making and to support their leadership potential detracted from 
national well-being. "I can tell you there is a future for the youth if the government can focus 
on the youth. The youth have a lot of energy. A lot of spirit. They can make anything possible." 
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(System 2006) System explained that if she were in charge she would implement policy 
according to the saying, "Inkunzi isemitholeni": 
In English, it says "a bull comes from a calf which means to be an adult you 
started from a child. The child is very important. To be an adult, you come from 
the child and the child has a fresh mind. [If I were in charge I would] focus on 
the youth because the youth has important inputs. They have skills. They have 
energy. They are so clever. So I would make sure if I was in charge that the 
youth have free education and [the chance] to pick up their skills in every area 
that they need. (2006) 
Young leaders asserted that they were capable and willing participants in developing the nation 
and communities, if provided with proper opportunities and supports. Proving their untapped 
potential, young leaders offered sophisticated suggestions for how to develop South African 
communities for the better. Responses are discussed in the following section. 
3.3: Change Requires Multiple Strategies 
Youth leaders adopted a multiple-approach method to change that employed political 
and social strategies and allocated responsibility to state, community, and individual entities. 
Influenced in part by their experience, young leaders varied in the degree of responsibility they 
assigned to the various bodies. 
On the whole, young leaders urged personal responsibility in addressing societal ills. 
Young people in general, they suggested, should seek to further their education and promote 
positive self-development, "The role of young people in South Africa is to be educated. If we're 
not educated, we'll end up on a lower level. When we're educated you're on the right track: you 
can start a business." (Vuyi 2006) Young leaders urged their peers to resist negative influences 
including over-indulgence in the culture of accumulation. "It's our duty as South African youth 
as people who have developed so much from this motherland not to let greed and moral 
degradation take over. Not to let the fruits of our democracy block our eyes out" (Khurshid 
2006). They also warned against risk-taking behaviour. The youth role in changing the nation 
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"is to stop early pregnancy and using drugs" (Mbali 2006). Lindiwe agreed, "one thing young 
people can do is stop early relationships and going to parties." Many young leaders, indeed, 
called for a moral rejuvenation among their generation. Glen echoed his youth contemporaries 
when he proclaimed, "Teenagers, we need to get our morals straight. That's where it starts. If 
the young people are the ones smoking, having underage sex, drugs, then where's the country 
going to go? We need to pull finger and start being more responsible." Young leaders believed 
that change at the individual level would extend to the broader society, but broad change 
required societal and political involvement too. 
Youth directly involved in politics expressed the greatest support for political methods. 
According to Mapule, "Politics is the most effective way." Other youth reluctantly placed the 
onus on official structures despite frustration with politics on the ground. "Even if there are a 
lot of political parties, ANC IFP, etc, and they do have some conflicts," "it can be one thing that 
solves everything" (Thando 2006). There was an overwhelming sense that the government's 
function was to serve the people. Mpho passionately declared, "The government should be the 
first to make change to make the world a better place." However, young leaders acknowledged 
that there were other avenues for change. Mapule suggested alternatives, "Even if you're not in 
politics, there're a lot of avenues to get involved. Another effective way is to get involved in 
charity organizations or NGOs or community structures." 
Youth involved injustice-oriented activity placed the heaviest emphasis on popular 
social movements as the means for positive change. "We need the mass of people." "It's a 
struggle and the struggle continues...[P]eople should continue with the struggle, with the 
marches and all the activism...especially for the basic needs of the people" (Thabo 2006). Vuyi 
described how change would occur through mass mobilization. "[W]e pressure [the 
government officials]. We go to them and tell them what we want. They see the crowd." At 
one Abahlali meeting, Ayanda urged mass action within Abahlali and asked, "When did we last 
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have a march?" (Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 10/3/2007) Even youth activists, 
included political avenues in their solution, however. Social movements aimed to force the 
state to engage positively. Star elaborated on the need for a mixed model approach that took the 
politics of the masses to the politics of government. To make change, South Africa needed: 
Social organizations organizing. Maybe we have to make marches against them 
so that they can listen to us because if we're just sitting there like that nothing 
will happen. You can raise your voice but no one will hear you, but once you 
start putting people in the street, it's when the government will really understand, 
"Hey these people, they really need this thing." And [secondly], politics. Politics 
is where government is. Actually, if we don't talk politics, there's nothing that 
will happen. Government will just ignore you. It means, "Oh, everything in the 
country is going well. People are not complaining. (2006) 
For activist youth, therefore, change required both large-scale popular mobilization and the 
navigation of official structures. In November 2006, Bahlali debated whether to march in 
response to the cancellation of a scheduled meeting with the mayor's office. On the one hand, 
people urged mass action, but on the other, people suggested "Now, we're exercising our 
democratic right when we go to the court." "Before we go to the street, we must ask our 
lawyers' advice." As S'bu Zikode mediated, he described Abahlali's mixed model approach. 
"This is a political war. We use the law. We use mass action. We use whatever it takes" 
(Abahlali baseMjondolo Observations 25/11/2006). 
Youth active in service and religious bodies envisioned change through a combination 
of individual service, value shifts, and political activity. To make change, "You either aim to 
get into a very important political position so you can help eradicate social problems or you can 
become a community worker...it's getting the balance of the two" (Munhara 2007). Likewise, 
however, "people's attitudes need to change" (Aadila 2007). Glen advocated using mass media 
to encourage service, "My answer would be to get celebrities and role models to start leading 
the way." Values-based service activity should not only occur in religious or community 
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contexts, but should be brought to political and justice-oriented spheres as well. Khurshid 
argued, 
We need activism but maybe activism needs to be.. .focused on our common 
ground. Religious youth and politicized youth should come together to work 
toward a moral rejuvenation of South African society... We've relinquished our 
responsibility of safe guarding South African society to the ANC. (2006) 
Direction and control, therefore, needed to include communities and young people themselves. 
For change to occur, youth warned, the government needed to encourage meaningful forms of 
participation. 
3.4: Change Requires Government Intervention 
Young leaders called local government to live up to its mandate and promise for 
participatory practice in wide-scale service delivery. They overwhelmingly agreed that the 
divide between rich and poor South Africans should be narrowed through the provision of 
adequate services and by investing in skills development of poor and young people. Young 
leaders advocated for a policy shift that would address disparities. "The government must 
change its policy. These policies are the ones that are causing the country to be like this 
because these policies are making the rich richer and the poor poorer. If the government can 
change its policies, maybe it would be a better place" (Zodwa 2006). 
If in charge, many young leaders said they would focus on developing poor areas. 
Munhara would "try to develop the townships. Grow good homes for them. Why build a house 
that will fall apart in two years? Build quality homes. Start building schools. Develop industry. 
Improve education." Ayanda declared, "I'd say, "Build a house for everyone. Give him water. 
Give him electricity." Thando agreed that to make South Africa a better place, the government 
should provide "housing because many people are homeless and those homeless people break 
into the homes." 
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Development efforts also required access to free education and opportunities for positive 
youth development. Vuyi suggested that "The government can give the youth bursaries and 
events for the youth from grade 8 and lower.. .we need free education because we are poor 
people." Aadila complained about the priorities of the national government that lacked 
emphasis on education. "The Government forgets that the youth of today are going to run our 
country tomorrow. And instead [of educational investment] they're investing in 2010 and 
foreign investment." Youth leaders desired a reversal of national policy trends that would 
favour community development rather than private growth and international globalization (see 
Chapter 2). Vuyi suggested that "for the youth, we'll make a grounds, a hall, a library and 
work as well." Poor people lacked access to safe and positive spaces for development like 
recreational grounds and libraries. System described the impact of resource inequity, "[I]f the 
youth are doing nothing, no sports, nothing, that's what makes the youth go stealing because 
they are lonely. There's nothing they can do. They go to do other things because there's 
nothing to keep them busy." Ayanda agreed, "Every youth must have something to do-some 
fun, because we don't have a place to play." Philani thought every school should have a peer 
education program to help support young people in meeting socio-economic challenges (Philani 
2006). 
Young leaders insisted that in addition to recreational and social development outlets, 
older and out-of-school youth required skill development and employment opportunities. Job 
development would help bridge the divide between rich and poor. Mapule urged, "Bridge the 
gap between the poor and the rich. Take businesses and invest in small business in the 
townships and create jobs for the poor and give them skills, job training. Invest in poor people 
and the youth." Mandla agreed, "The government must give more job opportunities." 
Some young leaders provided direct advice about job and skills development schemes 
for young people. S'bu's plan would employ and train young people in police services, thereby 
155 
tackling youth crime and unemployment simultaneously (S'bu 2006). Zodwa thought the 
government should provide job training. "Youth need to acquire some skills so they will be 
able to find a job. ...Whenever you look for a job they only ask 'Do you have any experience?' 
Where can you get experience because you are young and you are coming from school?" In her 
plan, the government would increase its youth hiring in order to give young people necessary 
experience for subsequent hire in the private sector. M'du described a scheme that would allow 
youth to acquire the needed experience while also helping poor communities. M'du's plan 
"involved young people in the community. The scheme should be compulsory and at the end of 
the year, they should be credited for their work. Two or three years down the line, they should 
be able to produce a certificate of their experience when they look for a job." 
Young leaders offered suggestions about how to close the divide between young people 
and formal political processes. Youth plans required space for direct interaction with decision-
makers and opportunities for decision-making. Star urged, 
Politicians [should realize that] it feels bad to be ignored, as we are the poor 
from the poorest. I don't know where it will end because they are the ones 
.. .came to us saying vote for me and I will do this: I will build houses for you; I 
will make it so you don't have to pay at school; I will give you jobs." Then what 
happened to their promises? We've been neglected now. (2006) 
Youth leaders demanded an end to sloganeering and patronage politics to be replaced by 
participatory development practice. "You can't expect a child to be active in the community if 
you aren't." To get a young person involved, you "need to show them how it actually affects 
them. You need to show them that those worlds are interrelated" (Munhara 2006). Rather than 
top-down politics as usual (see Chapter 2), local officials should "communicate; spend more 
time with [the youth]; don't just tell them what to do" (Philani 2006). Community actors too 
should employ participatory practice in development efforts. Young people responded 
positively to interactions that provided opportunities for actual decision-making in Phakama life 
skills classes. One day in October 2006 at Dumahlezi High School, the majority of classes had 
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self-dismissed because of a major school event taking place for only the upper grades. Rather 
than ignoring the disruption outside or submitting to it, Phakama facilitators asked each class 
whether they agreed to participate before proceeding with the lesson. Because young people 
themselves agreed to continue, they remained focused despite loud and constant disruption from 
the school event (Phakama Observations 5/10/2006). 
Young people should also be consulted about relevant and important issues. Whether a 
young person talked about social and political issues correlated with whether that young person 
thought getting involved was important, felt personal efficacy, and paid attention to politics. 
Young people were eager to discuss important hot-topic issues. As Thando described, "When 
they can talk about certain topics, like teen pregnancy, they get interested." Star suggested a 
scheme that would enable youth participation and allow youth discussions to directly inform 
policy-makers. 
I would try to put an organization [together], which would be driven by youth. 
This organization will be based on youth culture and will involve youth and ask 
them what they want, how they feel, what needs to be done, what the 
government should do for you So that they can participate and the government 
can really understand that they are the future of the country. " 
The youth model for meaningful engagement, therefore, called for cultural and 
generational relevance, the direct involvement of young people in development efforts, 
adequate supports and resources, and the reliance on young leaders to inform policy-making 
and implementation. 
3.5: Youth Engagement Benefits Communities: What the Individuals and Statistics Suggest 
As discussed in Chapter 2, youth development theory assumes that civic engagement 
benefits both individual young people and communities. Both youth profiles and group 
statistics supported such claims. 
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Individuals interviewed and observed within participation-observation demonstrated 
incredible commitment to developing the broader society, even in their demands for improved 
youth and community support. The twenty-two youth leaders interviewed were involved in a 
wide range of civic forms including religious, sports, school, political, and community activity. 
All participated formally and informally to benefit their communities. None were paid for their 
involvement, but whether through political means, social protest, moral rejuvenation, 
mentoring, education, or service, each believed that his or her involvement would make a 
difference to others. In the wide variety of workshops held after survey completion with 
leaders, groups deliberated about youth problems and their solutions and expressed intent on 
working towards such solutions within their own lives and communities. Peers at Dumahlezi 
respected young people involved in Phakama Peer Education, whom they believed supported 
others. Likewise, Abahlali youth not only worked toward the completion of organization goals, 
but also were active members in their informal settlements providing services to elderly 
members, caring for HIV/AIDs patients, and mentoring younger residents. 
The complimentary relationship between the engagement of young people and 
community development was further illustrated through correlations found within survey data. 
"1 am involved in my community" 
Correlated with (among others) 
Efficacy Indication 
1 feel that 1 have the ability to make a difference in the community 
1 pay attention to what's going on in my community. 
currently an active member-community services centre 
currently an active member-social movement 
Total current participation 
In the last year have you belonged to any group 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social 
service organization 
In the last year have you worked with another person or people to try to address a social problem 
Political parties are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Religious groups are working to solve problems in our community. 
Community services are working to solve problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve problems in our communities. 
1 trust community leaders. 
(2-Tailed 

















Not only did community involvement correlate with efficacy and trust for community actors 
(see Part 2 for efficacy and trust correlations), but it also correlated with civic forms meant to 
better communities. Whether a young person reported being involved in the community 
correlated with whether he had worked with social service organizations or to solve social 
problems. By inspiring participation in community problem-solving, civic involvement further 
enhanced other community-based forms of engagement and future inclination towards 
development efforts. Whether a young person had worked to solve a social problem in the last 
year correlated significantly with a wide range of civic indicators. 
Working with another person or people to try to address a social problem 
(in the last year) 
(2-Tailed 
Sig. at or 
correlated with (among others) below .01) 
Efficacy Indication 
I feel that I have the ability to make a difference in the community 
I think people working together can make a difference in the community. 
Community Engaqement Indication 
Community Problem-Solving Indication 
Getting involved in my community is important 
I am involved in my community. 
currently an active member-community services centre 
currently an active member-political 
currently an active member-religious 
currently an active member-social movement 
currently an active member-sports team or athletics club 
currently an active member-student organization 
Total current participation 
In the last year have you belonged to any group 
In the last year have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern 
In the last year have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration 
In the last year have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or 
social service organization 
In the next three years, I want to work towards solving social problems. 
Voting matters (inverted scale from Voting doesn't matter original statement) 






















Recent past participation in community problem-solving enhanced participation in almost all 
civic forms (religious, political, student, sports, justice, and community service), strengthened 
the value for community involvement, and secured indication and future inclination towards 
community problem-solving. 
As statistically and individually reflected, young South Africans engaged in community 
problem-solving in eThekwini demonstrated thoughtfulness, creativity, commitment, and 
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diligence in addressing community issues. Their contribution to the broader society will only 
continue and increase as they too continue to grow. 
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Conclusion and Afterward 
At an impassioned Abahlali meeting, bahlali gathered in support of the two leaders who 
had been illegally arrested and beaten up by the Sydenham police. The mood was angry, defiant, 
and determined as over forty people crammed into one room for the general meeting. Mnikelo, a 
young person at the time Community PRO, described what had happened to him as the other two 
were thrown into the police van. At the arrest, "that red shirt, they tore it off me as I stood there, 
but Abahlali is strong." Participants took turns speaking, "I'll fight until our goals are achieved." 
Another said members of the ANC were degrading the party. Applause erupted when the 
president, and one of the arrested spoke, "Abahlali is strong." Shouts of "Qina. Qina," "Viva 
Abahlali Viva," and "Siphambili" reverberated. As the chanting quieted, the two small children 
playing outside adjacent to the Kennedy Road Hall shouted in eager child voices, "Viva!" 
"Viva!" (16/9/2007) 
The scene described above- children, in the midst of play, shouting "Viva," and 
surrounded by alienated but engaged community members- reveals a lot about the state of youth 
civic engagement in eThekwini. Young people have been accused of forsaking the revolution, 
however, young people rather have been forsaken. 
Young people learned about engagement from their surrounding political environment. 
National and local political and governmental spheres addressed youth unilaterally and 
insufficiently. The implementation of development and participation policies had thus far failed 
to fulfil constitutional mandates for service delivery and public participation. On local levels, an 
emergent system of patronage had threatened some and protected others while enforcing notions 
of careerism and insincerity increasingly associated with government and party officials. A shift 
away from participatory practice on the local level accompanied by policy shifts and party 
politics on the national level. The ruling elite muted fully participatory notions of democracy 
and development and, instead, adopted a western liberal standpoint that that emphasized top-
down and representational governance on the one hand, and capitalist economics on the other. 
As a culture of accumulation flooded the marketplace, young people sought to exercise 
individual freedom and advancement in the new society but not at the cost of their community 
orientation. 
Young people angrily rejected the politics of the democratic state in favour of their own 
versions of democratic participation. The youthful politics of engagement sought to correct 
where state politics had gone wrong. Young people engaged civically and considered 
democratic participation in community contexts centred in social and personal development 
schemes. Though united by democratic understanding, democratic practice varied among 
subgroups of young people who were still facing significant challenges of racial and economic 
inequality. Young leaders across demographic groups, however, were determined to make 
meaningful contributions on their own terms. If provided opportunities for meaningful 
engagement that empowered youth with decision-making, leadership building, skill 
enhancement, and network building opportunity, young leaders became even more involved and 
inclined towards community development. Accepting personal responsibility, young leaders 
insisted that the advancement of South African communities required the full participation of 
individuals, communities, and political and state entities. 
Through the graffiti art in Wentworth, Durban, this study introduced the question of 
youth apathy in the democratic South Africa (see Introduction). If characterizing the civic 
engagement of eThekwini youth, however, the painted words, "Vote for Yourself," should be 
interpreted by youth terms of engagement. Young people trusted versions of democracy that 
encouraged participation and sought community development. They intended to 'vote' for 
themselves and their notions of democratic engagement because they perceived official 
structures to fall outside of their demands for participatory and development practice. When Star 
had described why he would vote in Abahlali's general elections in spite of withholding his vote 
in municipal elections, he had passionately declared, "Because it's Abahlali. It's Abahlali: it's 
not something that's promised. Abahlali is a social organization that is trying to help poor people 
with what the political parties have promised us. It's something that's totally different. I have to 
vote for Abahlali." 
Young South Africans felt compelled to act in ways that promoted participatory 
democracy, enabled effective and responsive leaders, and supported individual and community 
development. Should political parties and state institutions act to promote positive youth 
development and participatory democracy, young people likewise would expand notions of 
participation to include political processes. Until South African governance, however, more 
adequately wrestles with questions of community development, dissent, and popular 
participation, young South Africans will likely continue to resist formal participation and "vote" 
for their own community-based notions of engagement. As long as popular participation remains 
the exception rather than the rule for official democratic practice, young South Africans living in 
eThewkini will continue to engage in the political periphery. Whether shouting "Viva Abahlali" 
in the shacks of Durban, spoiling ballot papers, assisting elderly neighbours, withdrawing from 
politics in favour of community work and service, or spray painting "Vote for Yourself on city 
walls, young people of eThekwini were steeped in a politics of engagement that rejected official 
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i. Survey Tool 
Thank you for filling out this survey. Please relax as you fill in your responses as completely as possible. 
Please CIRCLE only one for each of the following questions. 
1. Are you between the ages of 13 and 29? YES (Y) /(NO) N 
If so, how old are you? a. 13-17 b.18-23 c. 24-29 
2. Which response best describes where you are currently living? 
a. Urban b. Rural c. Township d. Suburb e. Informal Settlement 
3. Which response best describes the highest level of education you have completed! 
a. Grade 8 or below b. Grade 9 c. Grade 10 d. Grade 11 e. Grade 12 (Matric) 
f. some tertiary g. tertiary degree h. honor's degree i. master's degree or beyond 
4. Which best describes your employment status? a. Fully-employed 
b. Partially-employed or internship c. Self-employed d. Unemployed and looking for a job e. Unemployed and not looking for a 
job f. Full-time student 
For each of the following statements please indicate 
CIRCLE the appropriate number 
indicating your level of agreement. 
Voting doesn't matter. 
Getting involved in the community is 
important. 
I feel that I have the ability to make a 
difference in the community. 
I do not talk about social and political 
issues with my friends or family. 
1 pay attention to what's going on in 
local politics. 
I pay attention to what's going on in 
national politics. 
I pay attention to what's going on in my 
community. 
I pay attention to popular culture, 
(lockh' tion culture) 
Politics matters to my community. 
Since 1994, the lives of South Africans 
have improved. 
I feel connected to others. 
The government is working to solve 
problems in our communities. 
Political parties are working to solve 
problems in our communities. 
Trade unions are working to solve 
problems in our communities. 
Community services are working to 
solve problems in our communities. 
Religious groups are working to solve 
problems in our community. 
I am involved in my community. 
1 think people working together can 
make a difference in the community. 
Political parties care about youth issues. 
In the next three years, I want to buy 
nice clothes and jewelry. 
In the next three years, I want to further 
my education. 
In the next three years, I want to help 




































































































In the next three years, I want to work 
towards solving social problems. 
In the next three years, I want to find a 
job. 
I trust political party leaders. 
I trust school officials and teachers. 
I trust community leaders. 
I trust religious leaders. 
South Africans think young people are 
important. 
Contacting a party official is an 
effective way to make your voice heard. 
Marching or protesting is an effective 
way to make your voice heard. 
Young people are materialistic. 
























































Please answer the following YES (Y) or NO (N) questions... 
In the last year, 
1. have you taken part in a protest, march or demonstration? Y / N 
2. have you contacted or visited a government official about a concern? Y / N 
3. have you volunteered or interned with a religious, youth/children's, health or social service organization? Y / N 
4. have you worked with another person or people to try to address asocial problem? Y / N 
5. have you belonged to any group such as a youth group, community services organization, trade union, a political group, a 
burial society, a sports team, a religious group or any other kind? Y / N 
Indicate which organizations in which you are currently an active member (attend some meetings and events)... 
Religious Y / N 
Community services center Y / N 
Political Y / N 
Trade union Y / N 
Sports team or athletics club Y / N 
Student organization Y / N 
Burial association Y / N 
Stokvel association Y / N 
Social movement Y / N 
Another group not mentioned here (please list the group(s)): 
Please complete the following short answer questions. 
1. What is the most pressing issue facing young people today? 
2. .In your opinion, what does it mean to be an active citizen in today's South Africa? 
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Dear Student, 
Thank you for filling out this survey. As you know, participation in this survey is voluntary. 
All responses will be kept completely anonymous. Surveys will not be graded or connected to 
student performance in any way. Research gathered from this survey will be used towards 
completion of a master's of arts degree in political science. You should also know that this 
research is not linked to any governmental body, political party, or other third party. The 
research findings could potentially inform decision-makers, youth workers, or other public 
officials about youth concerns, opinions, and perspectives. 
Should you have any concerns or wish to find out more about research findings, you may contact 
me at 073-670-7141. 
Thanks very much again. 
Sincerely, 
Ally Brundige 
Please initial the following to signify that you agree to the terms of research listed above 
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ii. Interview Questions 
People say "young people today just don't care" or "young people are selfish"—do you 
agree or disagree. Why? 
Other people say the kwaito generation is only about diamonds and gold. Do you think 
today's youth generation is more materialistic than previous ones? Why or why not? 
What do young people care about today?/What issues are most relevant to youth in South 
Africa today? 
What gets young people interested in an issue or topic? What doesn't? 
Do you feel connected to your community? Why or why not? 
Do you feel connected to other young people from different townships, municipalities, or 
nations? Why or why not? 
Is the government doing enough for young people? If not, what should they be doing? 
Do you plan on voting/do you vote? Why or why not? 
In your opinion, what does it mean to be an active citizen in today's South Africa? 
Do you think politics is an effective avenue for solving social problems? 
What other ways are out there? 
What types of groups, organizations, or movements do you currently participate in? 
How have these shaped your life or your views? Please expand. 
In your opinion, what needs to happen to make South Africa (and Durban) a better place 
for the future? 
What will be the role of young people in shaping the future? 
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Civic Activity for which Identified 
Muslim Student Association (UKZN) 
Chair 
Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni 
High School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni 
High School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni 
High School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Zimphambeleni 
High School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High 
School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High 
School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High 
School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Dumahlezi High 
School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Comprehensive 
High School 
Phakama Peer Leader-Comprehensive 
High School 
ANC Youth League and SRC 
Leadership 
Socialist Student Movement (UKZN) 
Glenwood Boys School Interact Club 
President 
Roteract President 
coordinator World Assembly of Muslim 
Youth 
Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement 
Abahlali baseMjondolo social movement 
































































































































yed and unenrolled 
completed/unemplo 
yed and unenrolled 
Enrolled-high school 
incomplete/unemplo 
yed and unenrolled 
incomplete/unemplo 
yed and unenrolled 
completed/unemplo 




































Phakama Peer Educators-Dumahlezi 
High School 
Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills 
Classroom) 
Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills 
Classroom) 
Peer Educators Awareness Program 
Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills 
Classroom) 
Dumahlezi High School Beauty Pageant 
Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills 
Classroom) 
Leadership Workshop (Phakama Peer 
Educators - All) 
Dumahlezi High School-Yizini (Life Skills 
Classroom) 












































































4 {2 youth) 
24+(10 youth) 
100+ 
20 (7+ youth) 
25 (8 youth) 
N/A 





11 (3 youth) 
26 (10 youth) 
12 youth 
9 youth 
Meeting to plan picket 
Picket @ ICC for its conference on 
housing. 
Meeting 






Site Visit Motalla Heights 
meeting 
Site Visit Motalla Heights 
meeting 
meeting to plan Annual General Election 
Housing, education, and street trading 
rights workshop (COHRE) 
meeting 
meeting 
Youth Committee meeting 













































































































vi. Other Key Informants and Observations 
75 university 
students 









DUT-Steve Biko Campus Gospel 
concert 
Rotary Youth Leadership Workshop 
University of KwaZulu-Natal Ladies 
Soccer Team 
Northwood Boys Interact-Leadership 
Workshop 
Fairvale Interact Club-Leadership 
Workshop 
Our Lady of Fatima-Leadership 
Presentation 
Durban Girls Interact Club-Leadership 
Presentation 
Glenwood Boys Interact Leadership 
Presentation 





















































vii. Significant Differences* Between Leaders and Non-Leaders 
( page 1 / 2 ) 
Response or Indicator 
currently an active member-
religious 
currently an active member-
community services center 
currently an active member-
student organization 
currently an active member-
stokvel association 
currently an active member-
social movement 
In the last year have you 
volunteered or interned with a 
religious, youth/children's, 
health or social service 
organization 
In the last year have you 
worked with another person or 
people to try to address a social 
problem 
In the last year have you 





Comunity Problem Solving 
Indicator 
I feel that I have the ability to 
make a difference in the 
community 
In the next three years, I want to 
further my education. 
In the next three years, I want to 



































































































































































































Significant Differences* Between Leaders and Non-Leaders 
(page 2 / 2 ) 
Response or Indicator 
In the next three years, 1 want to 
find a job. 
1 trust community leaders. 
1 am involved in my community. 
Contacting a party official is an 
effective way to make your 
voice heard. 
1 feel connected to others. 
1 talk about social and political 
issues with my friends or family 
(inverted scale from 1 do not talk 
about...) 
Getting involved in my 
community is important 
Community services are 
working to solve problems in 
our communities. 
Religious groups are working to 

























































































































* Independent Samples Tests calculated significant difference between leaders 
and nonleaders. Specifically, a t-test for Equality of Means determined 
significant difference between average mean scores. 















































































































































Al l Youn i 
552.0 Votinq matters (inverted scale from 
Gettina involved in mv communitv is 
1 feel that 1 have the ability to make a 
1 talk about social and political issue 
1 pav attention to what's going on in 
1 pav attention to what's qoing on in 
1 pav attention to what's goinp on in 
1 pay attention to popular culture ( lo 
Politics matters to my community. 
Since 1994. the lives of South Afric 
1 feel connected to others. 
The government is working to solve 
Political parties are working to solve 
Trade unions are working to solve p 
Communitv services are working to 
Reliqious aroups are working to solv 
1 am involved in mv communitv 
1 think people working together can 
Political oarties care about youth iss 
In the next three years. 1 want to buy 
In the next three years. 1 want to furt 
In the next three years, 1 want to hel 
In the next three years, 1 want to wo 



















































































































































































































































































































0 0 1 5 
In t he las t 
year have 
you taken 
m a r c h or 
demons t ra 
















































in the last 
year have 
contacted 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Pol i t i ca l 
A w a r e n e s 





















































































































































Jus t i ce 
Or ien ta t io 





































































































All Youth Correlations (page 3/4) 
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